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Abstract 
The solution of mathematical problems by numerical analysis is 
a large, intricate subject in its own right, and the substance-of many 
Ph. D. theses in mathematics. The advancement of numerical analysis and 
computer technology are clearly not mutually exclusive. Moreover this 
combination through the growth in computer software facilities is' easily 
within reach of a researcher with no expertise in either numerical 
analysis or computer programming. In particular the Numerical Algorithms 
Group (NAG) based in Oxford provides a library of subroutines for 
incorporation into source programmes across a broad spectrum of 
mathematics. The relevance of this development for the economist lies 
with the considerable scope for providing quantitative evaluations of 
microeconomic models outside of traditional statistical methods. To 
justify such a claim the thesis develops a number of applications from 
microeconomic theory: imperfect information in a non-sequential search 
framework; optimum tax with endogenous wages; a two sector general 
equilibrium model of union and non-union wage rate determination; 
Chamberlin's welfare ideal; and a quantity setting duopoly analysis of 
the structure conduct performance paradigm. 
It is hoped that the insights gained from such diverse topics will 
convince the reader as to the appropriateness of applying numerical 
computing to microeconomic questions in general, and the usefulness of 
the NAG software in particular. 
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Preface 
ý'9 
The contents of this thesis reflect to some extent my initial 
research experience at the Fraser of Allander-Institute, University 
of Strathclyde, which consisted mainly of computer-based projects, for 
example, Bell and Carruth (1976). While a graduate student at the 
University of Warwick, I provided programming assistance for 
Nicholas Stern's work on 'Optimum Taxation with Errors in Administration'. 
This was linked to the Social Science Research Council financed project 
on Taxation, Incentives and the Distribution of Income. By then I 
felt that the continued development of-'easy to use' algorithms 
through the Numerical Algorithms Group (NAG, 1981) library offered 
considerable scope to enhance theoretical work, and provide useful 
insights. The thesis develops a number of applications which, I hope, 
may support such a claim. 
I have discovered that the ability to write computer programmes 
leads naturally to cooperation in research, which I personally enjoy, 
but creates the difficulty of using this work, fairly, in a thesis. 
Two chapters reflect this situation. Chapter 4 is based on a paper by 
Carruth and Oswald (1982). I have restricted the presentation to a 
small subset of the work which highlights the numerical computations, 
and can stand on its own with respect to the analytical content. 
Chapter 6 does not afford this luxury, so it would be right and proper 
to roughly indicate the areas of responsibility. It is based on a 
paper by Cable, Carruth and Dixit (1982). Computations and graphics 
were my responsibility; the style of presentation reflects Cable and 
to a lesser extent myself and Dixit. The original framework was due 
to Dixit (1979). I an indebted to my co-authors for allowing me to 
make use of this work. I accept sole responsibility for the way in 
Cvi? 
Which it has been presented in the thesis. 
The diversity of subject matter has given each chapter a 
measure of autonomy. Therefore I have provided an introduction and 
conclusion in each case. Similarly the footnote numbering-is exclusive 
to each chapter and operates in ascending order. I have also taken 
the liberty of treating the words 'numerical' and 'computational' as 
synonyms and similarly 'analysis', 'techniques' and 'methods', when 
used in the context of the expression 'numerical analysis'. 
Finally, to illustrate the usefulness, of the Numerical 
Algorithm Group's library of subroutines, I have used in Chapter 1 
photocopies of the contents page, and the decision tree to chapter E04 
from the Fortran manual at Mark 9. I should declare that my use of 
this material is for the personal research purposes of this thesis, 
and for no other reason. 
ALAN CARRUTH 
SEPTEMBER 1982 
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Chapter 1 Computational Techniques in Economic Theory 
1.1 Introduction 
The numerate economist appears to see his role as the testing 
of and forecasting from economic models by well tried statistical 
techniques, often labelled econometrics. Most measurements generated 
can be related to standard tests of significance be they of at-, 
F- or Chi-square basis. Even though strong assumptions may underlie 
the statistical approach, it is still, by and large, the main tool of 
the applied economist. It is equally evident that the application of 
. econometrics has been considerably conditioned. 
by the development of 
computer technology. 
1 
On the software side there has been a 
proliferation of easy to use packages designed for researchers with 
little programming experience. 
2 
This is exactly as it should be in a 
world where the division of labour has played a crucial role 
throughout history. However the essence of the statistical approach 
is always the availability of a suitable data set. 
A less obvious approach to quantify qualitative predictions from 
economic models, which are not amenable to conventional econometric or 
other statistical methods, is the use of numerical analysis to find 
optimisation or equilibrium solutions to theoretical problems. Two 
reasons can be advanced for this state of affairs. 
1. Improvements in the speed of hardware have facilitated the iterative 
solution, for example, the estimation of complex labour supply 
problems with piecewise linear budget constraints, or the estimation 
of disequilibrium models with minimum conditions (see Atkinson, Stern 
and Gomulka, 1980 and Rosen and Quandt, 1978). 
2. Two well known packages are Time Series Processor (TSP) and 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). 
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First a greater familiarity with computer operation is required 
of the researcher. For example, knowledge of a high level language 
like Fortran may be necessary. This will always necessitate a working 
knowledge of the operating system at the-researcher's local computer 
site. Those with resources can of course hire someone to carry out the 
computing stage of a project, and for large projects the division of labour 
argument would deem this a sensible course of action: but, small problems 
will not warrant a full-time computer specialist. Only the computations 
to Chapter 3 were extensive enough to gainfully employ an individual 
at the programming end for a considerable period of time. 
Second is the difficulty that any quantification is deterministic 
in the sense that well behaved random errors are not part of the 
problem. As such the researcher will often choose key parameters upon 
which any quantitative assessment may be made. The applied economist- 
is then in a very dictatorial position, and may be influenced by 
personal value judgments. It may then be possible to present results 
to fit a particular political persuasion. This can be harmful, but is 
not unique to the numerical analysis approach. There are many ways 
for economists to back their political instincts. 
3 At least the use of 
sensitivity tests, which may not be vitally interesting, can be an 
important check on the robustness of the results the researcher favours. 
Moreover, in many computational problems one can directly appeal to 
the econometric work of other researchers, where there appears to be 
some consensus. Sometimes indirect appeals are possible, for example, 
with IU-shaped scale curves (quadratic function say) we can easily 
3. Compare the different economic forecasts computed by the Liverpool, 
London Business School and Cambridge models of the macro economy. 
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examine the effect of a unit cost penalty operating when the output 
rate is only 50% of minimum efficient scale. 
4 
Pratten (1971) has 
1 
examined this question in a comprehensive empirical study of industry 
scale curves. 
The essence of numerical analysis is an iterative, and, therefore, 
approximate solution to mathematical problems where suitable parameter 
values are available. Non-linear econometrics is based on iterative 
solutions; but, the two approaches part company over the availability 
or relevance of suitable data. This will become clear as the thesis 
develops the many different applications. 
Finally, microeconomic problems which invite computational 
solutions can sometimes be usefully illustrated using computer graphics 
to draw contours, functions or straight lines: and even in three 
dimensions if necessary. This can lighten the burden of numerous tables 
of results, as a picture is often a preferred means of communication. 
So, though of pedagogic value, it does complement the computational 
approach. Chapters 5 and 6 attempt a demonstration of this technique. 
The next section provides a brief account of how, in the last ten 
years, researchers have been receiving greater assistance in implementing 
numerical analysis methods and computer graphics. Section 1.3 briefly 
discusses a number of previous studies which have employed computational 
techniques. Finally section 1.4 sets down the scope of the thesis with 
respect to the microeconomic applications undertaken by the author. 
ý+. This is examined in detail in the appendix to Chapter 2. 
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1.2 The Numerical Algorithms Group (NAG, 1981) and Computer Graphic 
Libraries 
A considerable body of microeconomic theory rests on the concepts 
of optimisation and equilibrium., There is also a, wealth of mathematical 
knowledge on these subjects, which has been brought to bear at a 
practical level on finding solutions for the problems and experiments 
set up by mathematicians and natural scientists., These are the numerical 
analysis techniques which are a vast subject in themselves. This 
thesis is not concerned with the mathematical background to numerical 
analysis, but may be more correctly labelled as numerical computing. 
All we desire is to be able to use numerical methods in our research. 
This makes good sense because, even though access to computer 
facilities is now the norm for academics, our computer user faces 
two main problems in any scientific computation. First, considerable 
experience is necessary before a computer user could transform a given 
algorithm into an efficient programme in terms of programme run-time 
and storage space on the computer. Secondly, even for an experienced 
computer user, considerable knowledge of numerical analysis principles 
and methods is required, before one can guarantee to have an efficient 
algorithm. 
Such difficulties led to the formation of the Numerical Algorithms 
Group (NAG from now on) project 
5 
which according to Ford and others 
C19-791 has four main aims: 
"1, To create a balanced, general purpose numerical algorithms 
library to meet the mathematical and statistical requirements 
of computer users, in Fortran and Algol 60. 
5. The project was initiated in 1970, but has really gained pace 
since around 1975. 
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2. To support the library with documentation giving advice 
on problem identification and algorithm selection, and on 
the use of each routine. 
3. To provide a test programme library for certification of 
the library. 
4. To implement the library as widely as user demand. required" 
(1979, pp. 65). 
The authors stress the need for collaboration between different technical 
communities in order to achieve and maintain these four aims. 
To illustrate the comprehensive nature of the library Table 1.1 
presents the contents page from the NAG Fortran Library manual at 
Mark 9.6 The Chapters represent general mathematical areas, and within 
each area are many programme subroutines based on different algorithms 
or on variants of, a type of mathematical problem. Notice that the 
present extent of the Fortran library runs to six (large! )"volum, es. 
At the beginning of each chapter of the NAG library there is 
considerable guidance on how to choose the appropriate subroutine for 
a particular research problem. Tables 1.2a and 1.2b illustrate one 
aspect of this choice problem using decision trees. The chapter. is 
ýEOO which is useful for economic optimisation models. Chapter 3 
of the thesis on optimum taxation makes use of E04-routines. The Tables 
also demonstrate the considerable number of subroutines available to the 
researcher depending on the type of problem he is faced with. 
Having selected an appropriate routine our researcher can then 
consult the appropriate section of the manual which gives full details 
plus an example programme on the routine's use. This will normally be 
.................... 
The members of NAG (it is a non-profit organisation) attempt to 
update the library approximately once a year; hence Mark 10 will 
be the next update and so on. 
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TABLE 1 .1 
NAG FORTRAN Library Manual 
CONTENTS - FLM9 
CONTENTS OF THE NAG FORTRAN LIBRARY MANUAL - MARK 9 
FOREWORD 
CONTENTS 
FORTRAN MARK 9 NEWS 
KEYWORD INDEX 
INTRODUCTION 
1. ESSENTIAL INTRODUCTION TO THE NAG LIBRARY 
2. NOTES ON ROUTINE DOCUMENTS 
3. THE NAG LIBRARY SERVICE 
CHAPTERS OF TE LIBRARY 
A02 - COMPLEX ARITHMETIC 
C02 - ZEROS OF POLYNOMIALS 
COS - ROOTS OF ONE OR MORE TRANSCENDENTAL EQUATIONS 
C06 - SUMMATION OF SERIES 
DO1 - QUADRATURE 
D02 - ORDINARY DIFFERENTIAL EQUATIONS 
D03 - PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL EQUATIONS 
D04 - NUMERICAL DIFFERENTIATION 
D05 - INTEGRAL EQUATIONS 
E01 - INTERPOLATION 
E02 - CURVE AND SURFACE FITTING 
E04 - MINIMIZING OR MAXIMIZING A FUNCTION 
FO1 - MATRIX OPERATIONS, INCLUDING INVERSION 
F02 - EIGENVALUES AND EIGENVECTORS 
P03 - DETERMINANTS 
F04 - SIMULTANEOUS LINEAR EQUATIONS 
F05 - ORTHOGONALISATION 
G01 - SIMPLE CALCULATIONS ON STATISTICAL DATA 
G02 - CORRELATION AND REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
G04 - ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
G05 - RANDOM NUMBER GENERATORS 
G08 - NONPARAMETRIC STATISTICS 
G13 - TIME SERIES ANALYSIS 
H- OPERATIONS RESEARCH 
MO1 - SORTING 
P01 - ERROR TRAPPING 
S- APPROXIMATIONS OF SPECIAL FUNCTIONS 
X01 - MATHEMATICAL CONSTANTS 
X02 - MACHINE CONSTANTS 
X03 - INNERPRODUCTS 
X04 - INPUT/OUTPUT UTILITIES 
DOCUMENT LIST 
VOLUME 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1/2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
NB: Some chapter contents docwnents are headed "CHAPTER CONTENTS - MARK 5". 
Such docznents refer to chapters where Zists of routine documents have not 
changed since Mark 5 and are equaZZy applicable to Marks 6,7,8 and 9. 
L1198011873: 
19: 0ct81 Page 1 (Zart) 
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TABLE 1.2a 
E04 - Minimizing or Maximizing a Function 
INTRODUCTION - E04 
3.3. Decision Trees 
3.3.1. Selection Chart for Constrained Problems 
Are the A. first 
STAR constraints derivatives 
simple bounds no available 
Yes yes 
Are second 
derivatives 
{ available 
no 
Is 
computational 
.. at critical 
no 
Are you an 
experienced 
Are llrrt 
d tiv s i 
user no 
va e er 
available 
yes yea 
Are NCOnd 
derivatives 
available 
In 
computational 
critical 
Are first 
derivatives 
avallabIa 
yes 
Are second 
derivatives 
available 
no 
to 
204U" 
E04HM 
204W AP 
E04IU 
E04VA? 
E04HAA 
ED4VBt 
EO4RM 
E04JAF 
1 E04LAP I 
s04KAF 
E04KCT 
Y04JBü/r 
SWLBA/F 
aamputationat z04KIaA/r 
coat critical 
Ye. 
no 
Page 26 
.. + E06KD71/F 
NAGLIB: 1 49912 42 7: MU: Dee 78 
-a TABLE 1.2b 
E04 - Minimizing or Maximizing a Function 
INTRODUCTION - E04 
3,3.2. Selection Chart for Unconstrained Problems 
Only one 
Are first 
ST 
variable 
I-Y. 
-. -ý 
mvaivativos available 
Ar. you an 
experienced 
user yes 
no 
Are first 
E04FDF derivatives 
no available 
yes 
Are second 
E04RPT derivatives 
yes available 
no 
Are there more 
E04GEP than ten 
no variables 
E040Cr 
E04FCF Ars first 
E04FAA derivatives no available 
yes 
Are second 
804HEF derivatives 
yes available 
no 
E04mF WF Are there more 
E04 than ten no variables 
yes 
E040 BF 
MGM 
Is store size 
a problem 
no 
Is the function 
a at of squares 
yes 
Are you an 
experienced 
user 
Yes 
mai- E04'Mº/! 
Yes 
EOd71871/F 
E04DM/! 
Ara first 
g04cc 
derivatives E06CEA Do available Ao 
s 
k second 
derivatives EO4ESr 
available- 
ýs 
r'o 
Is 
computational E04DET 
Dost critical yes 
E04Dn 
Does the function 
have many E04CC7ý/l 
discontinuities Y"! 
Are first 
derivatives E04JWF 
available no 
yes 
Are second 
derivatives EO4LaA/T 
available yes 
Is 
computational E04RBA/l 
cost critical Yes 
EoumW? 
I NAGLIB: 1499/1417: Mk6: Dec78 Page 27 
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incorporated into the user's source programme with relative ease. 
Ideally, very sophisticated techniques can be implemented easily and 
efficiently by a researcher with only a limited knowledge of programming 
and numerical analysis.? Therefore through a number of'microeconomic. 
applications which implement NAG it is hoped to demonstrate that it 
can be put to good use by economists. 
Similarly computer graphics has been developed by scientists. 
(GHOST library (1978)) and design centres (GINO-F library (1976)). 
Again there is scope for economists to make use of such facilities even 
though it may have only teaching value. The present writer has had 
some experience of GINO-F (Graphical Input-Output-Fortran) originally 
developed at the computer aided design centre in Cambridge. The 
appendix to Chapter 6 lists a programme written to utilise GINO-F. 
This graphics library is implemented at the University of Kent. Whilst 
at the University of Warwick, the author worked with GHOST"(Graphical 
Output System) developed at the U. K. Atomic Energy Authority Culham 
Laboratory in Oxford. GHOST has the advantage of being able to produce 
graphical output on any output device. 
8 
Moreover the link between the 
mathematical space of a problem and the physical space of the diagram 
is much simpler for GHOST. Nevertheless both systems provide a variety 
of facilities which the economist can put to good use. 
7. Compare the applied researcher's use of packages like TSP and SPSS. 
8. The television medium is a good illustration of the usefulness of 
computer graphics, especially in the presentation of statistical information, eg. "The Money Programme". 
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1.3 Historical Perspective of Computational Applications 
The present set of applications attempts to advertise the use 
of numerical techniques and in particular how the recent growth of the 
NAG library, and its general availability, can make this approach a 
good deal more amenable to the researcher who, more often than not, is 
no expert in numerical methods nor computer programming. However the 
application of, computational techniques does not need to be based 
solely on NAG routines. Chapter 6 develops a duopoly problem which does 
not require a sophisticated solution: explicit formulae can be derived 
and evaluated through a Fortran source programme. Moreover early 
practitioners did not have the benefit of a NAG library at their local 
computer site. 
Growth theory and dynamic problems generally were an early 
devotee of computational practices. For example, Mirrlees, (1967), 
Atkinson (1969), Mirrlees and Stern (1972) and Dixit, Mirrlees and. 
Stern (1975) attempt to complement their work with numerical analysis 
solutions. In particular Atkinson (1969) is concerned with the 
timescale of growth models, for 
"In many cases we know how the major variables of the model change 
over time, in very few cases do we know how quickly they will change. 
Yet the speed of change is a prediction of the model, and by examining 
this we have a further test of the model's properties" (1969, pp. 137). 
In one example Atkinson analyses the one sector growth model 
for the case where technical progress is both capital and labour 
augmenting. The basic prediction of this model is that one of the factor 
shares falls to zero over time. It has been argued that such an outcome 
is at variance with the reality of constant factor shares, or 
Bowley's Law. However as Atkinson points out we do not know how 
- 11 - 
quickly the depleting factor share will be eradicated, that is how 
long it will take to attain the long run growth path. Therefore the 
model may have unattractive features and not yet necessarily be 
inconsistent with constant factor shares'-if the time path , 
is. very slow.. 
In other words a slow decline of one factor share may not be an 
unreasonable approximation to reality. 
Atkinson then examines the case where the capital share declines 
(elasticity of substitution less than unity). The differential 
equations derived are not tractable, therefore a computational appraisal 
can be most helpful, and so Atkinson seeks a solution using a numerical 
integration procedure. He shows that, for a specific set of parameters, 
the capital share takes at least 110 years to fall to half its initial 
value. He follows the basic result with a number of sensitivity tests 
on the selected parameters. This limited check does not lead him to 
reject the main finding that the approach to a long-run equilibrium may 
take rather a long time. Hence, given the length of'time series data 
presently at our disposal, the model may not be at odds with Bowley's 
Law even though it can be criticised on other grounds. 
Another theoretical field which becomes analytically messy is the 
optimum tax literature. From the seminal work of Mirrlees, (19T1) we 
can observe an attempt to incorporate the numerical analysis technique in 
calculating optimum tax rates for specific functional forms and selected 
parameters. Subsequent work has maintained the tradition, Atkinson (1973) 
and Stern (1976,1982). 
Among other things Stern (1976) demonstrates that the numerical 
estimation of tax rates could be greatly improved in the tax literature by 
an appeal to econometric analysis of labour supply. This stems from the 
rather surprising optimum tax rates derived by Mirrlees which were rather 
- 12 - 
low and tended to fall at the higher end of the income distribution. 
Atkinson (1973) takes up the issue on the basis of the cardinality of the 
utility function demonstrating the limiting Rawlsian Maximin case where 
the utility of the worst-off individual is maximised. This increases the 
optimum tax rates found, but not dramatically. The Maximin criterion 
in the Mirrlees model yields tax rates around 50% for the median 
individual, see Atkinson (1973). 
Stern (1976) points out that the probable influence of backward 
bending labour supply effects have an important bearing on the value of 
the elasticity of substitution between leisure and commodities, e. The 
earlier work had not carried out any sensitivity tests on the value of e 
and so c=1 was an arbitrary selection. Following Ashenfelter and 
Heckman (14731, Stern calculates e to be approximately 0.4+, certainly less 
than unity. Leaving aside cardinality he calculated optimum tax rates 
for c in the range, (0,1). It becomes apparent that the marginal rate 
of tax approaches 100% as e tends to zero. In fact a theorem is proved 
that optimum taxation involves a marginal rate of tax of 100% for e=0. 
A most significant point for the appropriate use of numerical methods 
is that Stern is able to arrive at tax rates more in accord with those 
observed in practice by complementing the numerical approach with 
econometric work on labour supply, that is, by a better selection of 
parameter values based on known empirical results. Chapter 3 looks at 
some recent issues on the structure of optimum income taxation. 
Numerical analysis has not been exclusively restricted to the 
fields of optimum growth and taxation. Dixit (1973) has employed the 
approach in a study of the optimum size and arrangements of a monocentric 
city. Nelson and Winter (1973,1976) have used more grandiose simulation 
techniques to study technological change in the theory of the firm. Their 
work was inspired by the view that conventional models of the firm do not 
correspond adequately to economic reality. In a world of friction, 
- 13 - 
uncertainty and feedback. it is suggested that only crude economic: 
mechanisms function reliably. Their simulation model attempts to capture 
these mechanisms. 
Finally Fisher-(1971) also explores through. simulation the question 
of why the aggregate production function model seems to fit so well 
when its assumptions are considered so dubious. He demonstrates that 
it is the constancy of labour's share which allows the aggregate 
Cobb-Douglas production function to work reasonably well, particularly 
in explaining wages, rather than that the underlying technology is in 
fact Cobb-Douglas. Therefore causation is in the opposite direction, 
that is, not from an underlying Cobb-Douglas technology to a constancy 
in labour share. Hence the constancy of labour's share becomes an 
unexplained open question. 
The above remarks have not in any way attempted to be exhaustive 
but demonstrate that numerical techniques have been put to-some use in 
the past. However the recent development of the NAG library has made 
their application relatively more accessible to economic and other 
researchers. The next section will sketch 'a number of other applications 
to be developed in the thesis, which will hopefully bring out the 
versatility of this approach. 
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1.4 The Applications in Outline 
It has been suggested that the terms of reference of the thesis are 
to demonstrate, through applications undertaken by the author across a 
broad range of microeconomic problems, the scope for computational 
techniques in the light of the NAG library development. This enables us 
to provide a quantitative appraisal of microeconomic models where 
analytic solutions may be limited or difficult to derive explicitly. 
There is a tendency in the economics profession to marvel at 
theoretical models which have tight unambiguous results. Yet models of 
greater complexity and perhaps realism which do not yield elegant 
comparative statics are often dismissed as lacking in some way. If we 
can demonstrate that numerical solutions can help reduce ambiguity 
and provide quantitative assessments of problems which are not amenable 
to conventional econometric or statistical techniques, then the chapters 
to follow will have achieved their purpose. 
Chapter 2 takes up the issue of economic models of markets with 
imperfect information which have increasingly involved high degrees of 
theoretical sophistication, yet, so far there has been no movement 
beyond qualitative prediction. An appeal to fairly simple numerical 
optimisation techniques enables us to question under what circumstances 
single price equilibria will exist under different assumptions about the 
distribution of search costs. 
Chapter 3 examines some recent work by Stern (1982) and Allen (1982) 
and assesses the sensitivity of optimum tax rates to the production 
and consumption-assumptions embodied in their models. 
- Chapter 
k considers the question if, in a partially unionised 
economy, union workers force up their absolute wage rate, how does 
this affect the wage paid in the non-union sector. Here the framework 
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is a two sector general equilibrium model of a closed economy, and the 
computations attempt to lessen an analytic ambiguity. 
Chapter 5 develops a model which captures the trade-off between 
scale economies and product variety in a world of monopolistic 
competition. It extends the work of Spence (1976a) to include a second 
best solution which requires a NAG routine, plus a U-shaped scale 
curve. It also shows how the entire analysis can be illustrated on 
diagrams using computer graphics. 
Chapter 6 introduces oligopolistic interaction into the monopoly 
welfare loss debate which was pioneered by Harberger (1954). By 
postulating a specific social welfare function we can solve directly 
for the level of welfare (net surplus), concentration, prices and output 
rates. The numerical computations are almost'trivial and require no 
appeal to the NAG library. Again the analysis can be usefully illustrated 
by computer graphics. 
Conclusions will be drawn at the end of each chapter, especially in 
view of the diversity of the applications. However a short concluding 
chapter will bring out the more general points of the thesis. 
- 16 - 
Chapter 2A Computational Assessment of the Quantitative 
Significance of Imperfect Information in a Non-Seouentii 
Search Model 
2.1 Introduction* 
-V 
Retail markets are characterised, more often than not, by price 
dispersion, yet conventional microeconomic wisdom espouses the cause 
of single price equilibria. Some economists have attempted to explain 
how price dispersion can persist in markets where some consumers follow 
rational behaviour patterns. One focus has been the information 
structure of markets. However the seminal paper by Stigler (1961) 
assumed price dispersion, a priori, without questioning whether it 
would exist in a full equilibrium.. This difficulty was remedied by 
Salop and Stiglitz (1977) and Braverman (1980). Other researchers, 
for example, Stiglitz (1974) concentrated on the efficiency properties 
for competitive equilibrium in the presence of imperfect` information. 
He claimed that the results require us to modify the competitive market 
paradigm. 
A common characteristic of all this work is its qualitative nature. 
We have no idea of the quantitative significance of imperfect 
information, such as the possibility of price dispersion. This chapter 
attempts to make such quantitative assessments by way of the numerical 
analysis approach discussed in the previous chapter. It turns out that 
the most we require is a numerical solution to a fairly straight- 
forward optimisation problem. The relevant sections have the details. 
*A shortened version of this chapter is forthcoming in'Carruth (1983). 
The content has benefited from discussions with Avinash Dixit. 
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2.2 Analytical Framework 
ý, 
The basis of the chapter is the non-sequential search framework, 
the variants of which have been brought together under a fairly general 
specification due to Braverman (1980) and Braverman and Dixit (1981). 
1 
This approach embodies limited information about a homogeneous product 
where identical consumers know the distribution of prices charged in 
the market, but not the locations. Individuals enter the market only 
once, and can identify the lowest price store by expending a fixed 
sum, c, which differs across the population: or, they may select a 
store at random. 
The consumer's decision is to 
max u= x0 + U(xi) 
S. t. xo + pixi = M. 
where i= store selected; Mi = income when buying from i; xo = numeraire 
commodity bundle; p= price; x= quantity; and, po = 1. The linearity 
in the numeraire good removes income effects from the analysis in the 
sense that consumer demand is not influenced by the possibility of the 
search cost being met out of disposable-income. 
The maximand and budget, constraint can be rearranged to give 
v= Mi + V(Pi) 
where V(p) = max (U(x) - px) 
x 
= 'consumer surplus' 
1. Von Zur Muellen (1980) has carried out a similar exercise for a 
sequential search framework. 
18 
and 
V'(p) x 
V" (p) dx/dp >0 
so V is convex and decreasing, in the price of bought commodities. If 
the consumer decided to search, then M1 =M-c and pi = pmin, and to 
select, at random M. = M. Therefore an individual's appraisal, of' thee, 
two strategies would be based on whether'. 
v(' ) 
where V(pi) is the expected utility from random selection, given that 
consumers knowthe price distribution. This condition can be 
rearranged to give 
c: V(Pmin) - VCPi) 
which says that search is only worthwhile if the additional utility 
from guaranteeing purchase at the lowest price store is greater than 
the cost, c, of providing this guarantee. Rational behaviour means 
that the point of indifference can be depicted by 
= V(pmin) - V(pi) 
so c is the critical search cost which separates buyers into informed and 
uninformed groups. 
Firms on the other hand maximise profit in a Bertrand-Nash 
fashion and can take account of customers information gathering responses; 
therefore the firm-consumer equilibrium is Stackelberg in nature. 
Finally unit cost curves are taken to be U-shaped. The framework has 
some weak features. The information structure presumes that consumers 
know the price distribution yet are unaware of the specific price each 
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firm charges. Likewise any changes in the price distribution, arising 
from firm behaviour are known without knowledge of the actual firm(s) 
inducing the change(s). Firms are highly sophisticated in their analysis 
of consumer reactions yet naive with respect-to fellow competitor's 
pricing decisions. However the main appeal of this approach lies with 
its attention to industry equilibrium. 
Three types of Nash equilibrium configurations can arise. First 
is a single price equilibrium (SPE) at the competitive price (SPCE) 
or at the monopolistically competitive price (SPME). Second is 
. 
a. two 
price equilibrium (TPE), where the low price is the competitive price, 
the high price is monopolistically competitive. Finally there is the 
possibility of non-existence of any Nash equilibrium. 
Given specific families of demand, cost and information conditions 
the possibilities of the above equilibria can be examined and their 
relative likelihoods assessed. It is clearly of interest to enquire as 
to what percentage of informed individuals are required for the 
competitive outcome to arise through arbitrage. 
It turns out that the analysis can be framed in terms of the 
distribution of search costs around zero. This is tied to the 
analytical approach which postulates a zero profit equilibrium, then 
attempts to reconcile whether profit maximisation- operating through 
a firm's perceived demand curve for a contemplated price change is 
consistent with the initial postulated equilibrium. As such four cases 
can be identified following Braverman (1980) and Braverman and 
Dixit (1981): 
(i) a group with zero search costs (positive atom at zero) 
(ii) no individual has zero search costs (zero density at zero) 
(iii) many consumers with arbitrarily small search costs (infinite 
density at zero) 
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, 
(iv) a positive density at zero. 
For the final case the quantitative possibilities of single price 
equilibria do not arise, as only two price equilibria are possible 
(Braverman (1980), pp. 491). Therefore the next three sections will 
consider the implications of (i), (ii) and (iii) above using numerical 
methods under particular, but sufficiently rich functional forms. 
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2.3 A group with zero search costs 
Suppose consumers are of two types a fraction 6 having zero 
search costs and the rest (1 - 6), positive ones. 
2 
Indeed the rest, 
are assumed here to have infinite search costs, that is, not to search 
at all. The effect of this will be pointed out at a later stage. 
If in an initial equilibrium all n stores charge the same price 
they will have a 1/n share of the market denoted by DD. A slight 
increase in price by a firm will cause it to lose all its share of 
the informed group, while a small cut will cause it to gain them all. 
Thus the perceived demand curve facing each firm, denoted by dd, will 
be discontinuous. If the unit cost curve is a conventional U-shape,, 
there can be an equilibrium where each firm charges the competitive 
minimum average cost price if the demand curve for each firm is as 
shown in Figure 2. '1. (a). However, for a case like Figure 2.1. (b), each 
firm will wish to raise its price suitably and a competitive 
equilibrium will not prevail. 
Our aim is to find conditions on the fraction d, in terms of 
demand and cost parameters, for a competitive equilibrium to exist 
and to find out what happens otherwise. It will be shown that, for 
a linear demand and quadratic cost formulation, two outcomes are 
exhaustive. There will either be a single price competitive 
equilibrium (SPCE) or a two price equilibrium (TPE). Non-existence 
will not arise. Price dispersion is restricted to a TPE because this 
limited information framework can only partition consumers into at 
most two groups, as was shown in the previous section. A full 
explanation can be found in Salop and Stiglitz (1977). 
! 2. Where we normalise the number in the population to unity. 
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Figure 2.1 Potential outcomes for a group with zero search costs. 
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Let output per firm be represented by 
x= (a - p) /2nb (2.1) 
and total cost by 
TC(x) =f+ kx + gx2 (2.2) 
where n is the number of firms, p is price, x is output rate per firm 
and a, b, f, k, g are parameters. Figure 2.1. (a) indicates that 
the SPCE must coincide with minimum average cost, so we require that 
x* = (f/g) 
A 
and p*-= k+ 2(fg)3 (2.3) 
be the competitive output and price respectively. For the remainder 
of this chapter an asterisk will denote competitive magnitudes. 
Equation (2.1) can then be used to obtain n*. 
The analytical procedure discussed earlier is to determine 
under what conditions (p*, x*, n*) can be a competitive equilibrium. 
Figure 2.1. makes it clear that price reductions by any firm will 
generate losses and such behaviour should not take place under profit 
maximisation; but Figure 2.1. (b) suggests the possibility of non- 
existence, where a deviant price-raising firm can make a profit. Here 
the infinite search cost assumption placed on the uninformed 
price will favour non-existence, because finite ice dispersion, 
where there is a well defined search cost distribution, may induce 
more than the informed group to search. Therefore any additional 
reduction in the deviant's sales makes positive profit less likely 
which would help to maintain the SPCE. The later section on the 
infinite density at zero which is similar to the present case relaxes 
this infinite search cost assumption on the uninformed. To keep the 
present arguments tractable it is simpler to presume that the 
uninformed will not search. 
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It can be shown that there will be a critical percentage of .. 
consumers with zero search costs, labelled d, which partitions the 
equilibrium price distributions into either a SPCE or a TPE. Non- 
existence will not arise. The details are left to an appendix. This 
critical percentage is given by 
ä=1- 4(fg) /(a -k+ 2(fg) -). (2.4) 
Any value of d greater than d is sufficient to ensure that price is 
less than unit costs for all output rates below the competitive rate, 
x*. As such deviant price-raising behaviour will not appear 
worthwhile, so the SPCE will hold. On the other hand when the actual 
value of ö is less than or equal to da TPE will be supported by the 
market. 
Equation (2.4) demonstrates that this critical percentage of 
informed consumers is determined entirely by the demand and cost 
parameters; therefore, given explicit values of the parameters, it 
is easy to evaluate d. Here then is one basis for a quantitative 
test of the proportion of informed consumers required to maintain a 
competitive equilibrium. 
3 Any numerical appraisal is faced with 
the problem of realistic parameter values. Two cases are identified 
dependent upon the cost penalty envisaged for firms operating at 
less than the competitive output rate. Details of this exercise are 
also left till the appendix. Suffice it to say that our treatment is 
in terms of a 10% or 20% cost penalty for firms which produce only one 
half the competitive output. This is consistent with the empirical work 
of Pratten (1971). Table 2.1 presents the results including the 
effect of varying fixed costs, f. 
3. Notice that this problem is so straightforward that powerful 
numerical algorithms are not required. We have an explicit solution 
in terms of W for alternative parameter values. The remaining 
sections require more powerful computational techniques. 
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Table 2.1. 
r. 
Group with zero search costs resultsa 
Parameter Set 
abkk 
20 1614 0.56 
3 0.34 
5 0.22 
7 o. 1k 
20 1114 0.65 
3 o. 46 
5 0.36 
7 0.28 
a. Remember 6>6 implies a single price competitive 
equilibrium, and 6< *b means a two price equilibrium 
with (0, < 6$ 1). 
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It is obvious from the table that the range of values for 6 
is considerable. This is not surprising in an exercise where 
parameter sensitivity tests can simulate extreme effects. For example, 
with f=1 in equilibrium, fixed costs comprise 20% of total costs r 
for the first parameter set. A 10% relationship would increase d to 
approximately 78%; whereas the change to f=7 makes fixed costs 
32% of total costs. The inverse relationship between f and 6 
demonstrated by Table 2; 1'is in accord with earlier arguments. With 
rising fixed costs the average cost curve becomes steeper, therefore 
a potential price deviant operating with excess capacity will be 
more easily thwarted as smaller discontinuities in demand will 
generate the losses required to maintain the competitive outcome. 
Graphically Figure 2.1. (a) illustrates the case of a higher fixed cost 
to that displayed by Figure 2.1. (b). The final and perhaps unexpected 
conclusion from this set of results is that for a competitive 
equilibrium to exist through arbitrage the proportion of individuals 
with zero search costs may require to be fairly substantial. 
However, with increasing cost penalties when working at less than 
optimum scale (higher fixed costs), the single price outcome is more 
likely for a given proportion of informed individuals. 
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2.4 No individuals with zero search costs 
This section considers the case where the density function of 
search costs, labelled p'(! ), is such that u'(0) = 0. With the absence 
of demand discontinuities (due to u'(0) = 0) the analysis centers on 
monopolistic market structures. Braverman (1980) shows that, the only 
possible candidate for a single price equilibrium requires a three way 
tangency among the market share demand (DD), perceived demand (dd) and 
average cost, curves. Figure 2.2 illustrates a potential single price 
monopolistic equilibrium (SPME), which is somewhat different from the 
traditional Chamberlin result, and involves the following intuition. 
The tangency between DD and dd is an important distinction from 
the well known Chamberlin result where DD cuts dd from above in 
equilibrium. This arises because a price changing firm in the usual 
Chamberlin scheme will gain or lose customers depending on the 
direction of price movement. On the other hand for small price 
changes with imperfect information captured by the present form of 
search cost distribution consumers will respond by gathering informa- 
tion. Therefore infinitesimal price changes will not gain or lose 
a deviant any customers, so his perceptions must reflect market share 
which requires the equality of DD and dd slopes at the equilibrium 
price-output configuration. When price is greater (less) than the 
monopolistic equilibrium price, dd will lie to the left (right) and 
below (above) DD, because a collective price increase (fall) is liable 
to have a smaller individual effect than a deviant price changer on 
his own. It is then interesting to question whether finite price 
reductions will break the SPME. This can occur if the inducement 
to search is enough to take a deviant's perceived sales inside the 
4. A rigorous demonstration of this result is given by Braverman (1980). 
It is probably easier to accept the result given the aims of this 
analysis rather than padding out the thesis with other researchers 
mathematical proofs. I have been unable to find mistakes in the 
analysis. 
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Figure 2.2. A single price monopolistic equilibrium. 
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average cost curve, and so violate zero profits. The rest of this 
section examines the quantitative possibilities of finite price 
dispersion to test under what search conditions perceived demand 
will remain below average cost. Notice that price-cuts below the 
r 
competitive price are not conceivable. 
Figure 2.2. illustrates that for a SPME to exist over the price 
range (p*, pmc)5 the horizontal distance between average cost and 
perceived demand will be minimised at zero. A numerical procedure 
can check this explicitly for any particular case. We maintain the 
assumption of linear demand, quadratic cost and postulate an inverted 
V search cost density function. This yields the following cumulative 
search cost distribution 
u(c) = 2c2/c2 for c< lc (2.5) 
_ -1 + 1+c/c - 2c2/c2 for c >, Ic (2.6) 
=1 for c, c (2.? ) 
where c is an arbitrary value of c, the search cost fee, which 
determines the shape of the search cost distribution. As c increases 
for a given price dispersion, the numbers induced to search falls. 
At the SPME we know that price equals average cost 
(f/x +k+ gx). Solving this condition for x by selecting the 
smaller root due to average cost decreasing for x< x*, we obtain 
x= z(p) = ((p-k) -/ (p-k)2 -4f &) / 2g (2.8) 
5. pmc is the monopolistically competitive price. 
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for all p in the range (p*, pmc). Provided price is greater than 
or equal to minimum average cost, the expression under the square 
root will be greater than or equal to zero. The next step is to 
consider what happens when (nnc - 1) firfns charge pmc and one charges 
p< pmc' It can be shown that with such a price dispersion consumers 
will search if 
A 
c `ý me - 1) 
(V(p) - V(Pmc))/= =c (2.9) 
A 
where c can be treated as a critical search cost in terms of the 
percentage of individuals who will search. V(p) is an individual's 
indirect utility function which is convex and decreasing in the price 
of bought commodities. 'Thus individuals will search if the cost of 
acquiring information is less than the difference in expected 
utility between the search and no-search strategies. For convenience 
consumers who are indifferent in this choice are assumed td search. 
Hence u(c) individuals will search. A price cutting firm's perceived 
demand curve will be of the general form 
d(p) V'(P)u(c) - V'(P)(l - u(c))/nmc (2.10) 
where - V'(p) makes use of Roy's identity. 
6 
Perceived demand comprises 
the informed plus a 1/n Inc share of 
the uninformed. 
? 
Finally for either of the Table 2.1 parameter sets the problem 
is solved in the following way. A choice of p in the range (pa', pmc) 
enables c to be evaluated from equation (2.9), then u(c) is obtained 
from (2.5), (2.6), or (2.7) by comparing c with c. Perceived demand 
and cost in terms of z(p) can be derived from (2.10) and (2.8) 
6. - V'(p) =+ (a - p) /2b 
7. with f=l only. 
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respectively. Our objective is to 
Minimise (z(p) - d(p)) for all pe (p*, pm) (2.11) 
P 
By careful choice of c we can ensure that this minimum will be zero 
at p= pmc. It, of course, can never be negative if the SPME is to 
be maintained. Table 2.2. presents the results. 
Equation (2.11) was solved for the different parameter sets 
of Table 2.2. by NAG routine E04ABF, which searches for a minimum in 
a given finite interval of a single variable, continuous function. 
The methodology is based on quadratic interpolation and the algorithm 
was proposed by Gill and Murray (1973). This routine is very easy to 
use and requires function values only. It was also used to solve 
for a similar problem presented in the next section. 
Table 2.2. clearly demonstrates that if c is large enough our 
function minimisation procedure will select the monopolistic tangency 
as the minimum point, confirming the potential outcome portrayed by 
Figure 2.2. Intuitively the actual value of c is of no interest. What 
is of interest is its implications for the proportion of the 
individuals in the market adopting a search strategy under finite price 
dispersion. The u(c) column of the table suggests that, when a SPME 
exists, price dispersion equivalent to the difference between p* and 
pme, entices no more than 2j% of the consumer population to pay the 
search cost fee and become informed. The final column of the table 
underlines this point demonstrating that a considerable percentage price 
dispersion is required for even 1% of the market to find search 
worthwhile when the SPME is valid. 
It is also apparent that the higher cost penalty case (parameter 
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set 2) needs a lower likelihood of search to maintain the SPME. 
Given a steeper unit cost curve this is exactly what we should expect 
to happen. 
In summing up this section it would seem that the single price 
monopolistic equilibrium is a rather fragile concept in that most 
consumers would require to remain oblivious to substantial price 
dispersion through an inability to acquire information. Yet while 
a steeper unit'cost curve will make the single price monopolistic 
equilibrium less likely here, the opposite occurred in the previous 
section on competitive equilibrium. This is not surprising given 
the nature of these equilibria. 
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Table 2.2. 
No individual with'zero search 
costs resultsa 
Extent of 
Price 
Minimum Estimated ,. Dispersion 
Parameter Set Value of Position hi(c) to entice 
(z(p)-d(p)) of Minimum when 1% of market 
Pe(P*, Pmc) P P=p* to search 
abkfgc % % 
20 161 4+ 30 -1.826 10.00 3.6 5.2 
120 -o. oo44 11.26 2.7 17.7 
131 0.0000 13.57 2.3 19.2 
20 111k 30 -7.05 5.08 100.0 4.6 
280 -0.0+7 5.92 3.1 33.9 
390 0.0000 10.92 1.6 44.9 
a. For the first parameter set, p* = 10.0, ppc = 13.57 
for the second set, p* = 5.0, pmc = 10.92 
NAG routine E04ABF provided the solutions. 
Accuracy was to 14 decimal places. 
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2.5 Many consumers with arbitrarily small search costs 
,: ýý 
This possibility was elaborated in a note by Braverman and 
Dixit (1981). Where the density function of search costs is infinite 
at zero, the firm's perceived demand curve at some initial position 
has an infinite price derivative. If the starting price, p, equals 
the minimum average cost, and if average cost increases rapidly 
enough for output rates below the optimum scale, then a competitive 
equilibrium will result. Figure 2.3. illustrates this case. 
There are of course similarities with the zero search cost 
group, but while 
"no consumer has literally zero search cost, .... 
there are sufficiently many with arbitrarily small 
search costs" 
(Braverman and Dixit (1981) pp. 658) 
to yield the outcome depicted by Figure 2.3. Here we actually want 
to play much the same sort of game as in the previous section, but 
now we are interested in a deviant price-raising firm. We therefore 
want to check that perceived demand will always remain below and to 
the left of average cost for all p> p*. Prices less than p* are 
untenable as before. Numerically an upper bound on p is not a 
problem, although the output origin is clearly a constraint. 
The choice of density function is again somewhat arbitrary. 
Pareto can meet our requirements where 
ul(c) = acaca-1 (2.12) 
and c is the smallest value of c; for u'(c) = a/c, which approaches 
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infinity as c approaches zero. If we set c to the machine accuracy8 
of the computer, then this should be a reasonably fair representation 
of the Braverman and Dixit scheme. The cumulative distribution 
function will be r 
P(c) =- ca/ca + constant (2.13) 
A value of unity for the constant gives u(c) =0 and p(c - c') = 1, 
which is exactly what we want. Consumer willingness to search will 
depend upon 
V(P))In* =c 
and so perceived demand will be 
(2.14) 
d(p) - V''(P)(1 - u(c))/n* (2.15) 
A price raising deviant firm can only expect a 1/n* share of the 
uninformed. The z(p) relationship is exactly as before (equation 
(2.8)). 
A slight problem is that the minimisation of (z(p) - d(p)) 
A 
can only be checked for p> p*, otherwise c =, 0, which is not defined 
A 
for the cumulative distribution function. As c is small, c can get 
fairly close to zero. Given the way in which the results are presented 
this is of little consequence. Here we can ensure that the SPCE will 
be maintained by our choice of a, which again means that the 
minimum of (z(p) - d(p)) can never be negative. Table 2.3. has the 
results. 
All outcomes in the table represent situations where a SPCE 
8. c=0.22.10-15 on the ICL 2960 at Kent. 
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will hold. The column headed u(c) for p 1% above p* is interesting 
for its close relationship to 6 of Table 2.1. As there is no longer 
an infinite search cost assumption, it is not surprising that the 
percentages are slightly less than for Table 2.1. This accords with 
the arguments presented at that stage. If price continues to rise 
up to 50% above p*, the additional search undertaken is small. The 
final column of the table is also rather interesting. The minimisation 
routine was able to find another tangency point at prices above the 
competitive price (z(p) - d(p) =0 for p> p*). From Table 2.2, for 
f=1, we can see that this price was fairly close to the monopolistic 
price, 
9 
therefore, a TPE was a possibility. However, non-existence could 
not be ruled out for this case. Finally the effect of higher fixed 
costs was to increase the likelihood of a single price competitive 
equilibrium. 
C, 
9. Accuracy here is actually restricted to our choice of a. 
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Table 2.3. a 
Many consumers with arbitrarily small search cost' results. 
Parameter Set p 
(c) for 
p 1% 
above p* 
Ü (c) for 
p 50% 
above p*. 
z(p)-d(p)=0 
for. p, >. p*, 
abkfga % % 
20 16140.0225 10.00 52.4 56.1 13.50 
3 0.01135 12.93 31.9 34.4 14.66 
5 0.00693 15.09 21.1 22.5 15.82 
7 0.00425 16.75 13.6 13.8 16.98 
20 11140.029 5.0 60.9 64.9 10.83 
3 0.0175 7.93 44.2 47.7 11.73 
5.0.0125 9.94 34.5 37.4 12.56 
7 0.00915 11.58 26.8 29.1 13.39 
a. Routine E04ABF found the minimum of (z(p)-d(p)) for p> p*, 
in a similar fashion to the problem of Table 2.2. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has studied the quantitative significance of imperfect 
information. Some numerical results have been obtained for models 
brought together in a. general framework by Braverman (1980) and 
Braverman and Dixit (1981), based on non-sequential search behaviour. 
No attempt was made to quantify the sequential search approach of 
Von Zur Muehlen (1980) which also focussed on the existence of 
industry equilibrium price distributions. 
Initially, it was shown, for example, that up to 65% of 
individuals would need to be perfectly informed (zero search costs) 
for a competitive equilibrium to be reached through arbitrage; 
though substantial scale economies may help to maintain the single 
price competitive equilibrium. Where an atom of consumers have zero 
search costs, under linear demand and quadratic cost, non-existence 
will not arise. Similar results were found when many consumers have 
arbitrarily small search costs, but, with a well defined Pareto 
search cost distribution, non-existence could not be ruled out. 
In a situation where no individuals have zero search costs, 
perceptions for very small price changes reflect share of the market 
demand (DD), so the focus is on monopolistic market structures. Here 
the single price monopolistic equilibrium could only exist, provided 
less than 21% of the consumer population were induced to search 
under a price dispersion equivalent to the difference between 
monopolistic and competitive prices. It is then not surprising that 
price dispersion is the norm in markets with imperfect information. 
The next chapter goes on to detail how NAG software can also be 
used to study the structure of optimum taxation in models with 
endogenous wages, and more than one type of worker. 
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Chapter 2: Appendix: Group with zero search costs 
Suppose we start from a SPCE and take the equations of the 
text as given, and assume the uninformed (1-6) will not search. 
Therefore a price raising firm will have sales 
x= (a-p)(1-d)/2bn* (2.16) 
where the equilibrium number of firms is the relevant magnitude. 
Rearranging (2.16) gives 
p=a- 2bn*x/(1-d) (2.17) 
For a SPCE we require p< AC for all x< x*, that is, 
a- 2bn*x/(1-S) < f/x +k+ gx for all x 
which can be expressed as 
a< min { f/x +k+ 4x } (2.18) 
x 
with 0=g+ 2n*b/(1-d) 
(2.18) states that the minimum value of the right hand side (RHS) with 
respect to x be greater than a if a SPCE is to survive. The minimum 
value of x can be obtained by differentiating the RHS of (2.18). 
Substitution of this value and for n* in (18) yields the condition 
6>1- 1(fg) /(a-k+2(fg)') (2.19) 
which is sufficient to ensure p< AC for all x<X. 
If (2.19) fails to hold it turns out that the outcome is a TPE, 
not non-existence. The easiest way to demonstrate this point is to 
formulate a similar condition for a TPE. Suppose there are nl low 
price firms and n2 high price firms, then the output of a low price 
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firm depends upon its share of the informed and uninformed customers 
respectively, which is 
x* =$ (a-p*)/2bn1 + (1-6)(a-p*)/2b(n1+n2) (2.20) 
Competitive magnitudes on x and p arise because a potentially deviant 
low price firm perceives a demand discontinuity, the informed group 
imparting an effect similar to that illustrated by Figure 2.1. Hence 
it must operate at the optimum scale position. Substitution for 
x* and p* from equation (2.3) yields 
Syl + (1-s)12 = 2b(f/g) /(a-k-2(fg) ) (2.21) 
where yl = 1/n1 and y2 = 1/(n1+n2) 
A high price firm depends solely on the uninformed customers 
for its sales, so 
x= (1-6)Y2(a-p)/2b' (2.22) 
As a monopolistic competitor in a market with many firms, the high 
price firm will obey profit maximisation (MR = MC) and normal profit 
(AR = AC). Equation (2.22) in inverse form is 
P. = a- 2bx/(1-d)y2 (2.23) 
which is average revenue. Marginal revenue is twice as steep as 
AR, so we replace 2bx with 4bx in (2.23). Marginal cost and average 
cost are easily obtained from (2.2). The simultaneous solution of the 
two profit conditions gives x= 2f/(a-k), and substitution back 
into one of the profit conditions for x generates the result 
y2 = 8bf/(1-6)((a-k)2 - 4fg) (2.24) 
Now nl, n2 >0 and nl -< nl + n2 are necessary and sufficient 
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for a TPE, which is equivalent to nl, n2 >0 and yl > y2; moreover 
Yl Y2 <==> 6i + (1-6)Y2 '. Y2 (2.25) 
Equations (2.21) and (2.22k) can be substituted into (2.25) to give 
Y1 >, y2<=> 6<1- 4(fg)'/(a-k+2(fg)') (2.26) 
which provides another restriction on d; but for a TPE. Inspection 
of (2.19) and (2.26) demonstrates that the possibilities for this case 
are exhausted: non-existence will not arise. Hence we can use 
d=1- 4(fg) /(a-k+2(fg) (2.27) 
As a partition into the two equilibrium price distributions with 
6<6 implying a TPE, and d> d implying a SPCE. 
The final issue we wish to deal with in this appendix concerns 
the implications for scale or minimum efficient size (mes). This 
helps with our choice of parameter values. Average cost is 
AC=f/x+k+gx 
minimum average cost, min(AC) = It + 2(fg)' at x* = (f/g) 
Suppose a plant operates at 50% of mes at x= jx*. Therefore 
AC = f/jx* +k+ Jgx* 
=k+ 5/2(fg)i 
and (AC - min(AC))/min(AC) _ J(fg)'/k+2(fg)' (2.28) 
= 1/0 + 2k/(fg)') 
If a 10% cost penalty is appropriate when operating at 50% of mes, 
then 
(AC - min (AC))/min(AC) = 1/10 
and so k= 3(fg)a, using (2.28). An analogous argument for a 20% cost 
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penalty yields k= J(fg)ý 
Such restrictions help to reduce the somewhat arbitrary choice 
of numerical values for the parameters. The work of Pratten (1971) 
suggests that a cost penalty in the range 5% - 20% is consistent 
with his empirical cost analysis of a variety of different industries 
when plants are restricted to produce at 50% of mes. For the 10% 
cost penalty case we let f=1, g=4, which means k=6. Similarly 
k+ 2(fg)i = 10 and a> 10 is necessary. To allow some leeway for 
changing f we take a= 20, b=1, k=6, f=1, g=4. For the 20% 
cost penalty we have a= 20, b=1, k=1, f=1, g=4. 
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Chapter 3 Optimum Taxation Models with Endogenous Wages 
3.1 Introduction* 
Mirrlees (1971) in his seminal paper on optimum income taxation 
formulates a model where individuals have identical utility functions 
but differ in their skills and pre-tax wage rates. The government 
chooses the income tax function to maximise the sum of utilities across 
the population. There is a resource constraint and in addition 
individuals make their own utility maximising choice of consumption 
and leisure given their pre-tax wages and the income tax schedule. 
His rigorous handling of the incentive issue did not allow the 
derivation of many unequivocal results. However he was able to show 
that marginal tax rates would be non-negative. 
The Mirrlees framework assumes that the elasticity of substitution 
between workers of different productive abilities is constant and 
infinite. Consequently the ratio of the wages of any two groups of 
workers of different abilities is completely independent of the 
number of man-hours supplied by these groups (and indeed, by any other 
group). Researchers wishing to work with a continuum of abilities 
have in the main kept to this assumption for ease of exposition. 
However this type of approach not only ignores the impact of supply 
factors it also limits the role of the tax system in improving the 
welfare distribution to that of redistributing spending power. 
The introduction of a production function with more than one type 
of labour means that the wages earned by the various groups of workers 
can also depend upon their labour supply. This allows an alternative 
*A subset-of this chapter has appeared in a symposium, Carruth (1982). 
This version has benefited from some recent work undertaken by 
Heady, tJlph and Carruth (1982). For encouragement on this topic I 
am indebted to Nicholas Stern and David Jlph, who are in no way 
responsible for remaining failings. 
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route by which the tax system can bring about some redistribution. '. " 
Feldstein (1973) was the first to address the consequences of 
different, but finite, labour types and endogenous wages. In fact 
his discrete population included only two groups of workers, which, 
Heady, Ulph and Carruth (1982) have recently suggested, may be 
restrictive. Nevertheless Feldstein's numerical computations 
indicated that the effect of endogenous wage rates on optimum tax 
rates was of little consequence. Recent theoretical work by Allen (1982) 
has questioned this finding. He argues that the redistribution route 
through labour supplies and relative wage rates (the production effect) 
was submerged in Feldstein's computations due to the adoption of the 
Cobb-Douglas production function. Otherwise it is theoretically 
possible to posit outcomes which have negative marginal tax rates at 
the optimum. This stands in stark contrast to the Mirrlees finding. 
Section 3.4 will attempt to explore the circumstances of 
'tie Allen 
result through numerical computation. 
Another application of the Feldstein framework in terms of the 
Cobb-Douglas production function was undertaken by Stern (1982). He 
compares the welfare implications of lump-sum taxation where errors in 
classifying individuals are committed, and income taxation, where each 
individual faces the same tax schedule. With no mistakes in 
classification and no disutility from providing information first-best 
welfare theory unambiguously favours lump-sum taxation. However, as 
horizontal inequity can occur through otherwise identical individuals 
receiving an incorrect lump-sum transfer, this first-best implication 
may no longer hold. This begs the question as to the scope for 
governments to commit errors in classification before optimum income 
taxation becomes the preferred tax structure. It would seem from 
Stern's results that, among other factors, much depends upon society's 
* It should be noted that Feldstein worked within the linear income tax 
framework, whereas Mirrlees was firmly committed to non-linear income tax 
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preference for inequality in utility levels. It is of interest to 
check whether his conclusions are also specific to the Cobb-Douglas 
formulation. Therefore sections 3.2 and 3.3 will present a 
computational framework to include a CES production function, which 
will provide an additional degree of freedom in the value of the 
elasticity of substitution, denoted by a. 
The computations for this chapter were dependent to a large 
extent on the NAG software. General details were set out in an 
earlier chapter. Specific information on the actual routines used to 
solve a problem will be given at appropriate points in the text. 
_k7_ 
3.2 The Effect of a CES Production Function on Optimum Taxation 
with Errors 
The basis of this analysis is a comparison of 
"the welfare levels which can be achieved by two 
distinct tax regimes: lump-sum taxation, where one attempts 
to identify individuals and allocate transfers or subsidies 
on the basis of characteristics, and income taxation, where 
characteristics are not observed but incomes are measured and 
taxed. Where there are no errors in classifying individuals, 
lump-sum taxation is superior, but, where mistakes are made 
in the allocation of lump-sum grants or subsidies, income 
taxation may be more attractive. " (Stern (1982), pp. 181) 
1 
Both of these tax regimes have their own information requirements 
and administrative costs. To keep the analysis tractable we take it 
that administrative costs are similar for the two schemes, but that 
the set-up costs of each are prohibitive enough to make having both 
operating together undesirable. We, therefore, concentrate on the 
benefits of either regime. 
The Lump-Sum Tax Model 
In line with most adaptations of the Feldstein model the analysis 
is restricted to the two labour types, one skilled (subscript S), the 
other unskilled (subscript N). Both types are involved in the 
production of a single consumption good, Y. As is usual each individual 
maximises an identical utility function 
1. It is well known that incentives may exist for individuals not to 
reveal information on personal characteristics or income. We do 
not address this issue directly. 
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1 
U(C, L) -2 
%-(1-a)C p+ a(l-L)_u 
7 
subject to the budget constraint 
Ci = (1-t) Wi Li + Gj 
where Wi is the gross hourly wage of labour type i, t is the marginal 
tax rate, Li is the amount of labour supplied, Ci is consumption and 
Gj is the lump-sum grant for individual type j. The indices i and j 
take the values S and N: if an individual is correctly classified 
i=j, if incorrectly i j. The utility function has a standard 
CES interpretation of the parameters, and c= 1/(1+u) is the consumption- 
leisure elasticity of substitution. It would appear from Stern (1976) 
that c=I has some empirical plausibility in terms of recent 
econometric work on labour supply- 
2 
It was suggested above that any attempt at discrimination among 
individuals and the likelihood of making errors in such a practice 
is one of the novel features of this work. As such the probability of 
an individual being misclassified is di. With GS < GN the asymmetry 
of incentive3 to be placed in the wrong group warrants an endogenous 
S. Two alternatives pursued by Stern for exogenous d are, firstly, 
to have the proportion of skilled misclassified greater than unskilled (aS > 1i 
Secondly due to the asymmetrical incentive to be misclassified, the 
unskilled should always be correctly classified; so dN 0 and dS 3 0. In 
reality there may be a significant extra cost in ensuring that the 
unskilled are correctly screened. If society is unable or unwilling 
to bear such costs then it is necessary to accept 6N >0 and 
2. This is consistent with a negative labour supply elasticity, and 
is based on work by Ashenfelter and Heckman (1973) and others. 
3. Skilled individuals would be happy to receive GN, but not the 
unskilled with GS. 
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investigate its consequences. Hence computations will be presented, 
for 6= SS =6N>0,6 S>6N and 6N=0. 
The production function is given by 
_ 
r_ 1 
Y= Y{A(ßLS) p+ (1-9)((2-ß)LN) p} 
'' (3.2) 
where y, 0 and p are the efficiency, distribution and substitution 
parameters respectively. There are ß individuals of type S and (2-ß) 
of type N. The degree of substitutability between the two types of 
labour is given by a= l/(l+p). Individual workers are paid their 
marginal products per hour of work supplied. 
Ws = AYp+1/Yp($LS)p+1 (3.3) 
WN = (1-A)Yp+l/Yp((2-ß)LN)p+l 3.14) 
Like all linearly homogeneous production functions, the CES in its 
present form will display constant returns, so factor shares will 
exhaust output. 
The labour supply functions derived from (3.1) are 
LS (1-aWSeGS)/(1+aaS-e) (3.5) 
LS = (1-aWSEGG)/(1+aWS-E) (3.6) 
_ (1-aaNeGN)/(l+a 
N-e) (3.7) 
Li = (1-aWNGS)/(l+a 
N-e) (3.8) 
where WI = (1-t) Wi for i=S, N is the net wage and a 
Correctly classified persons have superscript o and those incorrectly 
classified a superscript 1. Consumption levels follow from (3.1). 
The average labour supply of type's and N groups is given respectively 
by the linear combinations 
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LS = (1-8s)LS + aSLS (3.9) 
It _ (1-6N)LN + 6Ni'N (3.10) 
The government budget constraint is 
{Bil-ds)+(2-8)dN}GS+{ßds+(2-ß)(1-dN)}GN - tY-R (3.11) 
where R represents a revenue requirement outside of the transfer system. 
Equations (3.2) - (3.11) represent a simultaneous system of 
10 equations in 12 unknowns, the left hand sides of (3.2) to (3.10) 
plus t, GN, GS. By adopting values of t and GN it is possible to 
solve for the other variables in terms of the maximand 
vW _ (1-as)ßv"(cs, LS) + 6SßUv (s, LS) 
+ (1-dN)(2-ß)Uv (CN, r. ) + dN(2-ß)U"(CN, I, 
N). 
(3.12) 
U is just our CES utility function: v is Atkinson's (1970) inequality. 
aversion parameter in terms of utility levels. Ex ante it allows society 
to decide the weight to attach to the lower utility levels, which in 
this case will be the incorrectly classified unskilled individual. With 
v=1 we have the utilitarian objective whereas as v; - we maximise 
the utility of the worst-off individual in society - the maxi. min 
criterion. 
The Non-Linear Income Tax Model 
This model is formulated as 
Max W(U(CS, LS), U(CN, LN)) (3.13) 
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s. t. UCCS, LSZ T 71 Cc1 , WN LN) >. 0 
(3.14a). 
WS 
- C$ - CN - RfX .0 
(3.15) 
with 0=1. We require to maximise social welfare, W("), subject to the 
resource constraint, C3.15), and constraint (3.11a) which just states 
that type S individuals do not want to earn CN post tax. This reflects 
the skilled having a lower social marginal utility of consumption, and 
is related to the issue of wages monotonic increasing in ability for 
the Mirrlees (1971, infinite elasticity of substitution) production 
framework. With finite production elasticities some kinds of workers 
may be very abundant relative to other less able workers and so may 
receive a lower wage. However such an outcome raises the likelihood 
that skilled individuals will switch to the higher paid jobs. Stern 
(1982) and Allen (1982) rule out this possibility by assuming the wage 
is strictly increasing in skill; hence constraint (3.11ta) is appropriate. 
Nevertheless non monotonicity does raise issues of absolute/ 
comparative advantage of workers and the potential endogeneity of job 
choice. This can only be examined satisfactorily for the continuum case. 
Heady, Ulph and Carruth (1982) have attempted to move in this direction 
though the analysis becomes extremely complex. Suffice it to say that 
in the section on Allen's (1982) two theorems we encounter the problems 
of computational solutions with WN > WS and a need to use the constraint 
U(cN, LN) - U(CS) WS L51 .0 
(3.11b) 
N 
7 
so that type N individuals do not want to earn CS post tax. Effectively 
the numerical analysis encounters regions where the monotonicity 
assumption is no longer viable. This is in complete sympathy with the 
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Heady, Ulph, and Carruth (1982) position. 
Stern (1982) demonstrates that the inclusion of a production 
function with more than one type of labour and finite substitution 
elasticity violates the well-known theorems of Mirrlees (1971), positive 
marginal tax rates and Seade (1977), bounded income distributions have 
zero marginal tax rates at both endpoints. We now expect to find a 
marginal subsidy (negative marginal tax rate) at the top and a positive 
marginal-tax rate at the bottom. Heady, Ulph and Carruth (1982) 
demonstrate that this result carries over to the continuum case. It 
reflects the following intuition. 
"By lowering the marginal tax rate at the top the highest skilled 
workers are encouraged to work harder, so driving down their wage 
relative to that of other individuals. This narrowing of the wage 
distribution means that marginal tax rates can be lower elsewhere in the 
distribution (less redistribution required), and so the increased 
distortion at the top of the distribution can be traded off against 
the reduced distortion lower down. " (1982, pp 5). 
Other Outcomes 
Optimum linear income tax with GS = GN =G (and SS = SN = 0, of 
course) in . 
(3.2) to (3.12) is simplified to one dimension, t; for now 
the government budget constraint, (3.11) provides a relation between 
t and G. It is also apparent from lump-sum that when Si =3 the 
classification provides no information -a random allocation. 
4 
Such 
randomness suggests a solution of equal grants for all which corresponds 
to optimum linear income taxation. Therefore between 6i=0 and 
di =b and di = 1-b will provide the same information with the 
labels reversed when b=1. 
i 
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0< Si -4 
I we should expect to move from first-best to approximately, 
optimum linear taxation. 
A final comparison for the welfare levels of lump-sum taxation 
is given by the point on the first-bestfrontier where both skilled 
and unskilled have equal utility levels. This is the maximin solution. 
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3.3 Computations for Optimum Taxation with Errors 
There are now four types of optima to be calculated under the 
CES production function specification: lump-sum taxation with. errors, 
non-linear income taxation, linear income taxation and first-best 
maximin. The lump-sum solution can be evaluated (given a set of 
parameter values) by searching over (t, 'GN) with bounds on t from zero 
to 90% (0.9), and GN, zero to 0.6. Equations (3.2) - (3.11) could only 
be reduced to two simultaneous non-linear equations in two unknowns, 
LS, L. A Newton-Raphson procedure was used to provide a solution. It 
was this routine which displayed an element of instability from time 
to time; however it is well known that the basic Newton method either 
works very quickly, or, not at all. With this approach the unconstrained 
optimisation5 NAG routine E04JBF could be used to maximise social 
welfare, equation (3.12). 
Another method of obtaining lump-sum solutions was to maximise 
social welfare subject to the four labour supply first-order conditions, 
(3.5) - (3.8), but with six unknowns LS, LS, LN, 
; N_, 
t, GN. Using a 
more sophisticated constrained optimisation routine, NAG-EO AF, it is 
also possible to place bounds on the values of the unknowns. This is 
useful in keeping labour supply within the (0,1) range. This procedure 
was adopted for the greater complexities introduced by Allen's theorems. 
It is certainly very useful for economic problems which place bounds on 
the values of key variables. 
The linear tax solution was evaluated over t running from 0 to 
90%, using the NAG routine E04ABF. When the search was widened to 
5. The E04- NAG routines are set up for minimisation, but for 
maximisation all that is required is a minus sign in front of the 
function value. There are many different routines from which to choose, 
see Chapter 1, Table 1.2. 
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negative tax rates to examine Allen's production effect, we switched 
to the E04UAF method above; but, notice we only have five unknowns 
when GS = GN -G. The nonlinear income tax problem was solved by 
E04UAF throughout. The two constraints are equations (3.14a) and 
(3.15) and the two unknowns are CS and CN. In section 3.4 the 
difficulty with WN > WS means that constraint (3.14a) has sometimes 
to be replaced with (3.14b). Finally with maximin the marginal tax 
rate equals zero and so we have a one dimensional problem in GN 
which can also be solved by E04ABF. Accuracy was to four decimal 
places except for computations using E04ABF, which had lk decimal 
places accuracy. 
Following Stern (1982) social welfare was calibrated using the 
notion of the equally distributed leisurely-equivalent consumption, 
0 C, defined as 
2UV (°C, 0) = vWv 
that is, "that consumption which if equally distributed and when hours 
of work were zero for everyone would give social welfare level V. r' 
U is the CES utility as before. Similarly we label d, the value of 
d which gives equal welfare in both lump-sum and non-linear income 
tax schemes. Moreover 6<d favours the lump-sum regime, and 6>6, 
non-linear income tax. 
We define a base run parameter set as v= -1, R=0, e=0.5, 
a=0.5, y=1,0 = 0.67, ß=1 and a=k. To reduce a vast amount 
of tabulation, only results from varying the elasticity of substitution 
in production, a, and the measure of attitudes to inequality, v, will 
be presented in the text. It is essentially the role of a which 
distinguishes this work from Stern's. Undoubtedly the use of the CES 
production function raises the question of appropriate values for a. 
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Empirical investigation by Layard et al (1971) on the economic 
implications of qualified manpower indicates from their production 
analysis that any confidence interval for a may be extremely large. 
As such we propose to work with two values of a; one is the base run, 
o=4 above, and the other a=. The base run also has 
ds = dN = d, and 0F6<0.5. 
The computations for the base run are presented in Table 3.1(a) 
and for v=0.97 in Table "3.1(b). 
6 
Tables 3.2(a) and 3.2(b) present 
the case a=. The effect of allowing ds - 8N = 0.1 for the base 
run plus a= is illustrated in Table 3.4; and, similarly for 
6N=0 in Table 3.3. The value of 6 is given at the foot of each 
table except for Table 3.4 where it is necessary to distinguish values 
of both 6s and SN. Also listed is the no tax system welfare level. 
An overall statement must reflect that the influence of a does 
not lead to substantial qualitative differences from the results brought 
out by Stern's Cobb-Douglas treatment. Society's attitude towards 
inequality can generate significant differences in welfare levels, 
amply illustrated by comparing Tables 3.1(a) and 3.1(b), and - 
3.2(a) and 3.2(b). For Table 3.1(b), the maximand with 
v=0.97, the lump-sum case with d=0.1,0.2 has the unskilled, 
incorrectly classified individual working his full one unit of time 
for zero consumption. In effect this is a corner solution, for it is 
never optimal in this framework to have individuals idle, unlike the 
Mirrlees formulation. However it does point to the unsatisfactory 
nature of the utilitarian maximand, in a world where governments can 
make mistakes in classification, and the degree of substitution 
6. V=0.97 is our approximation for the utilitarian maximand, 
v=1. Convergence problems with the NAG routines pre-empted 
this approximation. 
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between labour types is greater than unity. 
The values of"d in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 tell a similar story.. 
When v=0.97 considerable misclassification is required before income 
taxation will be preferred: more precisely for Table 3.1(b), 
d=0.379 means that if more than 62% of individuals are correctly 
classified then lump-sum taxation prevails over income taxation. 
For Table 3.1(a) 92% of individuals need to be correctly classified 
to favour lump-sum taxation. Clearly when v= -1 it matters a great 
deal that the unskilled may face a lump-sum tax, 0 S. Further evidence 
can be adduced from the relation between the marginal tax rate and 
6 under the different degrees of aversion to inequality. An equality 
conscious society will have tax rates rising more quickly and to 
higher levels with increasing 6. The influence of a on the marginal 
tax rate in relation to 6 is relatively minor. It appears that as 
a falls the marginal tax rate rises less quickly for d<0.2, but 
ultimately it attains higher levels. 
The calibration of welfare in terms of consumption makes it 
easier to discuss the redistributive gains from taxation. Consider 
Table 3.1(a) (and for comparison in parentheses equivalent values for- 
Table 3.2(a)). This brings out the importance of the elasticity of 
substitution. A move from no taxation to lump-slim provides'a welfare 
gain of 0.02 (0.01+) consumption units or 10.6% (19.2%). A restriction 
to income taxation will yield a gain of 8.1% (17.9%) for non-linear, 
and 3.2% (13.5%) for linear. Finally there is a 5.2% (3.3%) fall in 
welfare from the first best to a position where only 80% of individuals 
are satisfactorily screened (d = 0.2). The welfare gains from having 
a tax system are considerable, particularly when a is less than unity. 
So the greater the extent to which individuals are trapped within 
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their skill category, the greater the benefits to be had from a tax 
system.? Notice also that random classification (d = 0.5) corresponds 
roughly to the linear tax solution, as predicted. Therefore non-linear 
income taxation will always do better in welfare terms for the 
present framework. 
With misclassification (6 - 0.5) gross relative and absolute wage 
rates of the unskilled fall in all cases. The movements are more 
pronounced with a falling elasticity of substitution in production. 
A lower degree of substitutability means that it is less easy to 
counteract the welfare implications of misclassification through 
adjustments in labour input. This point is examined in detail in the 
next section. 
Table 3.3 demonstrates that, where the skilled alone are 
misclas'sified considerable gains in welfare are available of the order 
of 3% in consumption units (c. f. Table 3.3 with Tables 3.1(a) and 
3.2(a) for 0<d40.5). Moreover with less strain on the 
redistributive function of the tax system it is not surprising that 
the optimum marginal tax rates fall. Table 3.4 provides a similar 
picture, but the orders of magnitude are rather smaller. As dN -0 
is the extreme position, this is exactly what we should expect. 
Other sensitivity tests were carried out for different values of 
R, ß, and c, though the tabulations have not been presented in the 
text. Additional needs for government revenue outside the tax system 
(R > 0) pushes marginal tax rates higher and lowers lump-sum grants 
for d>0 under lump-sum tax. Labour supply and output increases 
but welfare declines. Both types of income taxation also require an 
increased output. This result is not of great significance given that 
7. This result would be useful for exponents of dual labour markets. 
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any benefits which might be attributed to government spending of R 
are ignored. An increase in c, the elasticity of substitution between 
consumption and leisure reduces the marginal tax rate for 6>0 
because the deadweight loss from taxation is larger. A reduction in 
the proportion of skilled in the population raises the marginal tax 
rate and lowers output. Clearly falling incomes for the unskilled 
increases the desirability of redistribution. Finally notice that 
Stern's endpoint results for income taxation continue to operate: 
the skilled face a marginal subsidy and the unskilled a positive 
marginal tax rate. 
8 
The final section of the Chapter provides a computational 
assessment of Allen's (1982) two theorems. It turns out that the 
degree of substitutability between labour types along with assumptions 
about individual consumption-leisure choices serve to drastically 
alter the conventional wisdom on the structure of optim 'tax rates. 
8. (1-MTRS) >1 and (1-MT%) < 1, respectively. 
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TABLE 3.1(a)$ 
The Base Run v= -1, a=4 
C- 
Optimum Lump-Sum Taxation with Errors 
t GN GS WN WS Y 0C 
0 0 0.1235 -0.1235 0.34+3 0.6573 0.5896 0.2100 
0.1 0.2291 0.1386 -0.0116 0.3383 0.6623 0.5542 0.2038 
0.2 0.3081 0.1338 0.0321 0.3335 0 . 6666 0.5384 0.2001 
0.3 0.3487 0.124+4 0.0602 0.3302 0.6698 0.5293 0.1977 
0.4 0.3689 0.112k 0.0811 0.3281 0.6719 0.5244 o. 1963 
0.5 0.3970 0.1022 0.1038 0.3279 0.6721 0.5187 0.1959' 
Optimum Non-linear Income Taxation 
(1-14TRN) (1-MTRS) N GS WN WS Y 
0c 
0.7339 1.0146 0.1123 -0.0715 0.3382 0.6623 0.5706 0.2053 
Optimum Linear Income Taxation 
tG WN wS Y 
0.3753 0.0981 0.3275 0.6726 0.5229 
OC 
0.1959 
First-Best Maxi-Min 
GN GS WN WS Y °C 
0.0938 -0.0938 0.3384 0.6622 0.5866 0.2089 
0.076; No tax system welfare level: °C = 0.1899 
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$ 
Notation 
Gi, i=N, S= lump-sum grant intended for individuals type i 
Wi, i=N, S= wage rate for individuals type i 
t= marginal tax rate (MTR) 
proportion incorrectly classified 
Y= output 
0C 
= equally-distributed leisurely-equivalent level of welfare 
v= inequality aversion parameter 
a= elasticity of substitution in production between 
different labour types 
The different optima 
Optimum lump-sum taxation with errors: where ö>0 some individuals 
receive incorrect grants. Optimum non-linear income taxation: every 
individual faces the same income tax schedule although they differ in 
their wage rates; 1-MTR1 is one minus the marginal tax rate and GI is 
the lump-sum grant as given by the tangent to the indifference curve 
for individuals type i. 
Optimum linear income taxation: G= GS - GN is the common grant, so 
there is a one dimension optimisation with respect to t. 
First best maximin: point on the first best frontier where VS= VN- 
The no tax system welfare level means that both t and Gi are equal 
to zero. 
Other parameters 
R, c, ko, a and ß are the government revenue requirement, the elasticity 
of substitution between consumption and leisure, the efficiency 
parameter in the CES production function, the distribution parameter 
in the CES utility function and the proportion of individuals of each 
type, respectively. Excluding the final section of this chapter the 
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Tables present results where R=0, c=0.5, y=1, a=0.5, 
0=1. Section 3.4 distinguishes eS 0 CN. 
f 
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TABLE 3.1(b) 
v=0.97, Q=4 
C. 
Optimum Lump-Sum Taxation with Errors* 
6" t" GN GS WN WS Y oc 
000.5474 -0.5+71 o. 4930 0.6070 0.6447 0.2287 
0.1 0.2183 0.1+608 -0.3321 0.1+24+9 0.6200 0.5894 0.2227 
0.2 0.2025 0.4213 -0.3045 0.3818 0.6350 0.5770 0.2i68 
0.3 0.1906 0.3964 -0.2880 0.3561 0.6489 0.5684 0.2109 
0.4 0.1819 0.3507 -0.2487 0.3368 0.6636 0.5609 0.2051 
0.5 0.1860 0.0519 0.0511 0.3242 0.6761 0.5539 0.2018 
Optimum Non-Linear Income Taxation ti 
(1-MTRN) (1-MTRS) GN GS WN WS T 
oc 
0.7713 1.0012 0.1052 -0.0617 0.3369 0.6635 0.5712 0.2063 
Optimum Linear Income Taxation 
tG 
o. 18146 0.0511 
First-Best Maxi-Min 
GN GS 
0.0938 -0.0938 
wN W5 yC 
0.3242 0.6761 0.5541 0.2018 
WN WS Y 
°C 
0.3384 0.6622 0.5866 0.2039 
6=0.379; No tax system welfare level: 
°C = 0.2011 
Results for 6=0.1' and 0.2 have'CN 0, LN=1, and for 6=0.3 and d=0.4, 
equilibrium has the unskilled, misclassified individual working very hard 
for little return. 
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TABLE 3.2(a) 
V= -1, a=i 
Optimum Lump-Sum Taxation with Errors 
dt GN GS WN WS Y °c 
000.0803 -0.0803 0.4011 0.6041 0.5895 0.2089 
0.1 0.1642 0.1196 -0.0266 0.3927 " 0.6114 0.5664 0.2057 
0.2 0.2998 0.1417 0.0210 0.3741 0.6280 0.5425 0.2020 
0.3 0.4003 0.1461 0.0625 0.3516 0.6489 0.5210 0.1985 
0.4 0.4480 0.1353 0.0926 0.3326 0.6671 0.5088 0.1960 
0.5 0.4596 0.1167 0.1156 0.3250 0.6751 0.5055 0.1951 
Optimum Non-Linear Income Taxation 
(1-PR'i'RN) 
. 
(1-MTTRS) Gv GS WN WS Y 0c 
0.6567 1.0771 0.1103 -o. o674 0.3983 0.6065 0.5700 0.2057 
Optimum Linear Income Taxation 
t G, WN ws y 0c_ 
o. 1658 0.1174 0.3262 0.6738 0.5041 0.1951 
First-Best Maxi-Min 
GN GS WN WS 
0.0709 -0.0709 0.3796 0.6230 
Y0C 
0.5873 0.2084 
0.1; No tax system welfare level: 
0C 
= 0.1688 
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TABLE 3.2(b) 
v=0.97, a= I 
Optimum Lump-Sum Taxation with Errors 
6 t GN Gs WN WS Y °C 
0 0 0.1221 -0.1221 0.5053 0.5224 0.5991 0.2114 
0.1 0.0027 0.1520 -0.1501 0.5032 0.5239 0.5986 0.2112 
0.2 0.0088 0.2001 -0.1948 0.4985 0.5273 0.5974 0.2110 
0.3 0.0279 0.2862 -0.2697 0.4851 0.5371 0.5938 0.2102 
o. 4 0.1397 0.4085 -0.3285 0.4226 0.5859 0.5728 0.2070 
0.5 0.3262 0.0853 0.0877 0.2989 0.7023 0.5303 0.2001 
Optimum Non-Linear Income Taxation 
(1-MTRN) (1 MTRS GN GS WN WS Y 0C 
0.7679 1.0010 0.0929 -0.0467 0.3727 0.6292 0.5721 0.2064 
optimum Linear Income Taxation 
tG WN WS Y oc 
0.3250 0.0862 0.2987 0.7025 0.5305 0.2001 
First-Best Maxi-Min 
GN GS WN WS Y °C 
0.0709 -0.0709 0.3796 0.6230 0.5873 0.2084 
6 -, 0.409; No tax system welfare level: °C = 0.1947 
- 66 - 
TABLE 3.3 
Optimum Lump-Sum Taxation with Errors 
The Base Run v=-1 Q. =4. 
aN =o 
6S t GN GS WN WS Y 0C 
0 0 0.1235 -0.1235 0.3443 0.6573 0.5896 0.2100 
01.1 0.0603 0.1195 -0.1072 0.3420 0.6592 0.5807 0.2081 
0.2 0.1137 o. u61 -0.0928 0.3398 0.6610 0.5724 0.2063 
0.3 0.1611 0.1131 -0.0801 0.3378 0.6627 0.5645 0.20117 
0.11 0.1977 0.1097 -0.0703 0.3360 0.6644 0.5578 0.2032 
0.5 0.2395 0.1076 -0.0592 0.3343 0.6659 0.5506 0.2017 
6S= 0.262 
V=1 CP = 
all =0 
c's t GN GS WN WS Y 
°C 
0 0 0.0803 -0.0803 o. 4oll 0.6041 * 0.5895 0.2089 
0.1 0.0439 0.0858 -0.0764 0.3957 0.6088 0.5834 0.2080 
0.2 0.0992 0.0927 -0.0678 0.3894 0.6143 0.5754 0.2069 
0.3 0.1341 0.0958 -0.0689 0.3831 0.6199 0.5699 0.2057 
0.4 0.1988 0.1035 -0.0560 0.3765 0.6258 0.5596 0.2044 
0.5 0.2374 0.1057 " -0.0548 0.3681 0.6334 
0.5526 0.2030 
ds 0.300 
-67 
TABLE 3.4 
Optimum Lump-Sum Taxation with Errors 
The Base Run SS -SN = 0.1, v -l, Q=4 
I 
as dN t GN G 
S 
WN w y °C 
0.1 0 0.0603 0.1195 -0.1072 0.3420 0.6592 0.5807 0.2081 
0.2 0.1 0.2616 0.1317 -0.0018 0.3361 0.6642 0.5178 0.2022 
0.3 0.2 0.3290 0.1263 o. o4o8 0.3318 0.6682 0.5338 0.1989 
0.1 0.3 0.3632 0.1173 0.0689 0.3291 0.6709 0.5260 0.1969 
0.5 0.14 0.37+4 0.1048 0.0895 0.3277. 0.67214 0.5231 0.1960 
SS-SN= 0.1, v= -l, cr 
SS SN GN GS WN WS y °C 
0.1 0 0.0439 0.0858 -0.0764 0.3957 0.6088 0.583+ 0.2080 
0.2 0.1 0.2206 0.1210 -0.0150 0.3838 0.6193 0.5568. 0.2042 
0.3 0.2 0.3488 0.11405 0.0347 0.3628 0.6384 0.5324 0.2003 
0.4 0.3 0.4235 0.1383 0.0734 0.3403 0.6599 0.5150 0.1971 
0.5 0.4 o. 46o1 0.1255 0.1051 0.3275 0.6725 0.5056 0.1953 
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3.4 The Redistributive Impact of Relative Wages 
It has already been stated that the Mirrlees (1971) incentive 
model has the capacity to redistribute income through the Exchequer, 
the fiscal effect in Allen's (1982) terminology, which essentially 
involves a redistribution of purchasing power based solely on the shape 
of the optimum tax schedule. Within this same framework Sheshinski. 
(1972) proved that with positive labour supply elasticities 
redistribution should, take place from rich to poor and yield lump-sum 
grants coupled with positive marginal tax rates. 
Allen (1982) has, demonstrated that for the present Feldstein 
type framework redistribution can also take place through the 
production function. Here the interdependence of labour supplies will 
involve general equilibrium effects on wage rates. Such an adjustment 
process he labels the production effect. An analytical appraisal 
of a linear tax model enables him to show that, for the Feldstein 
computations with a Cobb-Douglas production function, both the fiscal 
and production effects work together to redistribute from rich to poor, 
which effectively maintains the conventional linear tax schedule with 
positive intercept and positive slope. All previous computational 
work would appear to have reached similar conclusions. 
Nevertheless Allen's (1982) two linear tax theorems indicate 
that where the production effect works in the opposite direction to 
the fiscal effect and dominates, we should expect a negative optimum 
marginal tax rate in conjunction with a lump-sum tax. The Exchequer 
may be redistributing from poor to rich but the attendant labour 
supply adjustment leads to a relative improvement in unskilled wages 
which overall makes them better off. His elasticity analysis posits 
that a likely candidate for this outcome arises when skilled 
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individuals have negative, and unskilled positive, labour supply 
elasticities along with a low degree of substitution between labour 
types (low a). To try and imitate such conditions it is necessary to 
work with non-identical utility functions, given that labour supply 
elasticities are endogenous. Essentially we allow individuals to 
have different consumption-leisure substitution elasticities so 
c (= es = CN) no longer holds. 
This requires a redefinition of the calibration of social 
welfare in consumption units. We propose to use the relationship 
sUS"(°c, 0) + (2-ß)uN"(°c, o) = Wý 
which we again wish to solve for °C. An explicit formula is not 
readily generated, so it vas easier to let the computer find a 
numerical solution. The NAG routine C05AZF was convenient for this 
purpose. °C has of course a similar interpretation to before. 
It is also of interest to examine the Allen arguments in terms 
of the optimum tax with errors framework above, rather than simply 
linear income taxation. This will provide a further test of the 
robustness of Stern's results. However the number of tabulations will 
be kept to a minimum. 
Again it is helpful to define a base run set of parameter values 
which will be fixed throughout: 
v= -l, es = 0.5, a=0.5, R=0, y=1,8 =0 . 
67, ß=1. 
We are only concerned with the influence of v and c., which can allow 
us to generate the case where production substitutability is low, 
the skilled have a negative, and the unskilled a positive, labour supply 
elasticity. Empirical evidence on the non-monotonicity of labour 
supply schedules is by no means clear cut. The closest distinction is 
that between low and high pay (rather than skill). Hall (1973) and 
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Metcalf, Nickell and Richardson (1976) find some support fora 
supply schedule shaped as a right hand side parenthesis - the Allen 
case above. However Atkinson, Stern and Gomulka (1980) support a 
left hand side parenthesis shape. It will become apparent that this 
is an important consideration for the shape of optimum-tax schedules 
derived from variable wage models. 
Tables 3.5(a) and 3.6(a) have the same format as earlier except 
that the maximin outcome is no longer evaluated. Tables 3.5(b) and 
3.6(b) provide the values of the labour supply elasticities for the 
solutions of Tables 3.5(a) and 3.6(a). With a= 
1/2 
and 
1/5 
and, 
EN = 1.6 in both, Tables 3.5(b) and 3.6(b) show that we are able to 
simulate the circumstances where Allen suggests the production effect 
will dominate. 
Table 3.5(a) indicates that the welfare levels are almost 
invariant with respect to 6 for the lump-sum case. Moreover since 
the no tax system welfare level is 
0C = 16900, then the welfare gains 
from any form of taxation are negligible. The production effect has 
brought WN/WS close to unity, and while the marginal tax rates are 
negative they are rather small. This is hardly surprising given the 
welfare invariance to taxation. Similarly for linear and non-linear 
income taxation the marginal tax rates are close to zero. d=0.1 
is in line with earlier results. 
Table 3.6(a) is even more interesting. With a= 
1/5 
the optimum 
marginal tax rates for lump-sum are substantially negative. 
Discrimination is required to be fairly accurate, approximately 96% 
(S = 0.037) of individuals require correct classification before 
lump-sum is superior to income taxation. However societies distributional 
values do not have such a strong 
influence: 
with v'= 0.97 d=0.1 
(d = 0.2 for Table 3.5(a))'.. Nevertheless the movement is in the 
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expected direction. Utilitarianism requires less accuracy in 
classification to favour a personalised tax regime (lump-sum). The 
production effect has WN/WS >1 for d .<0.3 and fairly close to unity 
otherwise. The optimum non-linear income tax now has a marginal 
wage subsidy for the unskilled and a positive marginal tax rate for 
the skilled. Here, of course, the 'Unskilled face a lump-sum tax with 
GN < 0. Remember also that there is- no scope for unemployment- in the 
present framework. This possibility stands in stark contrast to the 
actual tax and welfare system, which is often criticised for having 
effectively 100% marginal tax rates for individuals at the bottom of 
the income distribution, who have to rely on welfare payments. With 
the reduction in o to 
1/5 
the welfare gains from redistributive 
taxation are not inconsequential, like Table 3.5(a). The first-best 
outcome yields a gain of 19.4% in consumption units, non-linear income 
tax 19.1% and linear income tax 17.1%. The gain in going from income 
tax to first-best is rather small. 
Table 3.7(a) explores the influence of the production effect in 
greater detail, but only with respect to income taxation. Table 3.7(b) 
provides the respective labour supply elasticities. The influence of 
e, consumption-leisure substitution possibilities, is particularly 
1 
striking. With a linear income tax system, when . a. _. J5.,. a'move. from 
CS = eN = 0.5 to es =. 0.5, eN = 1.2 changes the optimum marginal tax 
rate by 70% from 51% to -19%. The labour supply elasticity switch is 
also clear from Table 3.7(b). Not surprisingly we witness a very 
large relative wage effect with WN rising 47% and WW falling 23%. The 
same parameter changes give a considerable jolt to the optimum 
non-linear tax solutions. The endpoint conditions switch round because 
the unskilled now appear to have a higher social marginal utility of 
consumption. Hence constraint (3.14b) was appropriate to evaluate 
- 72 - 
this outcome. Finally notice that we found an optimum linear 
marginal tax rate as low as -51%. It serves to underline the rather 
important interactions between Allen's fiscal and production effects, 
and casts doubt on Feldstein's claim that variable wage tax models 
have little effect on the structure of optimum taxation. 
TABLE 3.5(a) 
Base run with a= and eN = 1.6 
Optimum Lumt5-St1m'Taxation 'viith 'Errers 
ö t GN GS iN ws Y °C 
0.0 0 -0.0054 0.0058 
0.5120 0.5177 0.5072 0.16916 
0.1 -0.0003 -o. oo64 0.0062 0.5127 0.5172 0.5075 0.16915 
0.2 -0.0190 -0.0086 -0.0011 0.5102 0.5190 0.5114 0.16914 
0.3 -0.0266 -0.0094 -0.0043 0.5094 0.5196 0.5130 0.16913 
0.4 -0.0304 -0.009.2 -0.0064 0.5092 0.5197 0.5138 0.16913 
0.5 -0.0326 -c. 0084 _o. 0084 0.5088 0.5200 0.5142 O. 16912- 
Optimum Non-Linear Income Taxation* 
(1 MTRN) (1-MTRs) GN GS WN WS Y °c 
0.9666 1.0196 -0.0027 0.0039 0.5208 0.5116 0.5046 0.16915 
* required constraint (3.14b) and likewise for Table 3.6(a). 
Optimum Linear Income Taxation 
tG WN WS Y 0C 
-0.0323 -0.0083 0.5089 0.5199 0.5142 0.16912 
d=0.10 No tax system welfare level: 
°C = 0.16900 
see the notes to Table 3.1(a). All solutions for this section of 
Tables were generated by NAG routine E04UAF 
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TABLE 3.5(b) LABOUR'SUPPLY ELASTICITIES* 
OPTIMUM LUMP SUM TAXATION WITH ERRORS 
d ELS° ELS1 ELN° ELN1 
0.0 -0.21 -0.21 0.33 0.39 
10.1 -0.21 -0.21 0.33 0.37 
0.2 -0.21 -0.22 0.32 0.35 
0.3 -0.21 -0.22 0.32 0.3k 
0.1+ -0.22 -0.22 0.32 0.32 
0.5 -0.22 -0.22 0.32 0.32 
OPTIMUM INCOME TAXATION 
ELS ELN 
-0.21 0.35 
OPTIMUM LINEAR TAXATION 
ELS ELN 
-0.22 0.32 
ELS skilled elasticity of labour supply 
ELN = unskilled elasticity of labour supply superscript o refers to 
individuals correctly classified, 1 to those misclassified. 
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TABLE 3.6(a) 
Base Run with a= 
1/5 
and cN = 1.6 
Optimum Lump Sum Taxation with Errors 
dt GN GS WN WS Y0C 
0.0 0 -o. 0165 0.0465 0.5618 0.1589 0.5147 0.16628 0.1 -0. loo6 -0.0712 0.0173 0.5466 0.4715 0.5354 0.16539 
0.2 -0.2158 -0.0967 -0.0233 0.5289 0.4866 0.5564 0.16457 0.3 -0.3135 -0.1148 -0.0645 0.5130 0.5002 0.5721 0.16396 
0.4 -0.3724 -0.1203 -0.0961 0.502 0.5078 0.5809 0.16361 
0.5 -0.3908 -0.1147 -0.1133 0.5015 0.5102 _ 
0.5836 0.16350 
Optimum Non-Linear Income Taxation 
(1-MTRN) (1-MTRS) GN GS WN WS Y °C 
1.2192 0.8383 -0.0628 0.0576 o. 1870 0.5229 °0.5227 0.16595 
Optimum Linear Income Taxation 
tG WN WS Y °C 
-0.3905 -0.1139 0.5018 0.5099 0.5836 0.16350 
0.037 No tax system welfare level: 
°C = 0.13930 
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TABLE 3.6(b) LABOUR SUPPLY ELASTICITIES 
OPTIMUM LUMP SUM TAXATION WITH ERRORS 
r 
S ELS° ELS1 ELN° ELN1 
0.0 -0.17 -0.23 0.18 0.56 
0.1 -0.20 -0.25 0.12 4 O. J. 
0.2 -0.23 -0.27 0.08 0.27 
0.3 -0.26 -0.29 0.05 o. 16 
0.1 -0.28 -0.29 0.05 0.06 0.5 -0.29 -0.29 0.06 0.06 
OPTIMUM INCOME TAXATION 
ELS ELN 
-0.15 0.14 
OPTIMUM LINEAR TAXATION .. r, 
ELS ELN 
-0.29 o. o6 
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TABLE 3.7(a) 
Optimum Linear Income Taxation 
t GS =G N WN 
WS Y oC e*'* N a 
0.3055 0.0686 0.3709 0.6403 0.4490 0.1715 1.2 4.0 
0.2635 0.0556 0.3994 0.6280 0.4218 0.1718 1.6 4.0 
0.2232 0.0451 0.4257 0.6198 0.4043 0.1738 2.0 4.0 
0.1157 0.0294 0.4825 0.5391 0.5080 0.1734 1.2 0.5 
-0.1439 -0.0373 0.5216 0.5110 0.5191 0.1666 2.0 0.5 
0.5105 0.1262 0.3420 0.6580 0.491+3 0.1952 0.5 0.2 
-0.1976 -0.0563 0.5031 0.5088 0.5699 0.1710 1.2 0.2 
-0.5080 -0.1500 0.5006 0.5110 0.5907 0.1591 2.0 0.2 
Optimum Non-Linear Income Taxation*** 
(1-MTI ) (1-MTRS) GN 
1.0038 1.0000 0.09+2 
1.1734 0.9990 0.0836 
1.3173 0.99861 0.0747 
1.0516 0.9859 0.0159 
1.0867 0.9517 -0.0321 
0.6912 1.3066 0.0888 
1.0866 0.9322 -0.0277 
1.3223 0.7724 -0.0884 
GS 
-0.0947 
-0.1012 
-o. loI8 
-0.0222 
0.0284 
-0.0952 
0.0261 
0.0801 
WN 
0.3735 
0.3855 
0ý. 3930 
0.4730 
0.5156 
0.5277 
0.1988 
0.4775 
ws y 
0.6390 0.514 
0.6331+ 0.5014' 
0.6301+ 0.4946 
0.5461 0.5365 
0.5151 0.4948 
0.4876 0.5841 
0.5126 0.5393 
0.5313 0.5091 
oc 
0.1787 
0.1754 
0.1738 
0.1739 
0.1672 
0.2075 
0.1717 
0.1631 
E ** 
No 
1.2 1+. 0 
1'. 6 4. o 
2.0 4+. 0 
1.2 0.5 
2.0 0.5 
0.5 0.2 
1.2 0.2 
2.0 0.2 
** The other parameters are defined by the base run. 
Non-linear optima for a=0.5 and 0.2 required the use of constraint 
(3.1lb). 
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TABLE 3.7(b) LABOUR SUPPLY ELASTICITIES 
OPTIMUM LINEAR TAXATION 
ELS ELN sN a 
-0.14 0.76 1.2 4. o 
-0.16 1.44+ 1.6 4. o 
-0.17 2.15 2.0 4.0 
-0.18 0.22 1.2 0.5 
-0.24+ o. 1+1+ 2.0 0.5 
-o. ok -0.08 0.5 0.2 
-0.25 0.01 1.2 0.2 
-0.31 0.15 2.0 0.2 
OPTIMUM INCOME TAXATION 
ELS ELN EN ar 
-0.28 o. 64 1.2 1+. o 
-0.28 1.05 1.6 4.0 
-0.28 1.43 2.0 1+. o 
-0.24 0.25 1.2 0.5 
-0.18 o. 146 2.0 0.5 
-0.28 -0.10 0.5 0.2 
-0.18 - 0.01 1.2 0.2 
-0.12 0.25 2.0 0.2 
C 
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3.5 Conclusion 
The incorporation of a CES production function into the optimum 
variable wage tax model has provided some interesting results. First 
is the increasing welfare gains from having a tax system when the degree 
of substitutability between labour types fell. With a=J (Table 3'. 2) 
first-best lump-sum taxation improved welfare by almost 20% in consumption 
units. Second is the important role for society's views on inequality. 
Under utilitarianism (v = 0.97) the government classification scheme 
could be highly inaccurate but still be Ireferable to income taxation. 
Moreover when o=4, a situation with the unskilled incorrectly 
classified working full time for zero consumption was still preferable 
to income taxation, (Table 3.2(b)). This reflects a weakness in the 
approach where it is impossible for any workers to remain idle. One 
might also criticise the fact that governments make mistakes, yet firms 
have no problem in classifying the workers. 
Under the Allen hypotheses Table 3.5 raised the possibility that 
the welfare gains from having a tax system may be small. This and the 
above remarks indicate an extension of the range of outcomes found by 
Stern (1982), rather than any contradiction. It is also apparent that 
the neglect of Allen's production effect has been of significance. In 
particular the shape of potential optimum-tax schedules has been given 
much wider license than previously thought from the Mirrlees and Seade 
theorems. The key features are the relationships between labour supply 
elasticities and the degree of substitution in production between labour 
types. Tables 3.6 and 3.7 provide optimum tax structures with 
substantial negative marginal tax rates. Intuitively with high eN we 
have large quantity responses in unskilled labour with respect to wage 
rates, and low a gives big wage responses to changes in the quantities 
of labour. Here lies the power of the production effect for variable 
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wage tax models. The Feldstein (1973) claim that endogenous wages have 
little effect on optimum tax rates is no longer tenable. 
The policy implications of wage subsidies provide the reverse 
reaction to the real world system. -There the game is to under-report 
income (if possible! ). Here the incentive would be to inflate declared 
earnings. At least our present system has a lower bound. 
Finally the NAG library has been put to extensive use in this 
chapter; in particular the routine E04UAF was very effective for this 
type of optimum-tax problem. I should recommend it to anyone working 
with the Feldstein framework. 
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Chapter 4: A Two Sector General Equilibrium Model of the Determination 
of Union and Non-Union Wage Rates'in a'Closed Economy 
4.1 Introduction 
The concept of equilibrium can be 
thandled relatively easily for 
a two sector model using computational techniques. When the work was 
carried out the equations were solved by an algorithm due to Powell 
(1970), which was available through the NAG C05NAF. 
It would seem that much of the union/non-union literature, for 
example, Johnson and Meiszkowski (1970), Jones (1971) and Magee (1971), 
(1973) have used the conventional two sector model of general equilibrium 
analysis to examine the effects on factor prices of a rise in the 
wage differential earned by unionised workers. Another interesting 
question for a partially unionised economy, where union workers force up 
their absolute wage rate, is how this will affect the wage paid in the 
non-union sector. It turns out that for a closed economy unambiguous 
theoretical answers are impossible to obtain, so numerical techniques 
are employed to try and isolate different possibilities. 
Carruth and Oswald (1981) also examine an open economy framework 
which yields clear results, essentially that in a small open economy, 
a rise in the union wage rate will always increase the non-union wage 
rate and decrease the rental rate on capital. It can also be shown 
that we require the unionised sector to be capital intensive. 
An examination of the determination of input prices can be 
simplified by an appeal to the minimum cost functions of duality theory. 
It is implicitly assumed that the trade union is a rational agent and 
acts as if maximising a utility function subject to constraints. 
Imagine an economy producing two types of output, using two factors of 
production, capital and labour. Assume that labour in one sector is 
unionised and that labour in the other sector has its wage determined 
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on a competitive market. Let w be the union wage and n be the 
non-union wage. Assume that both factors are in fixed supply in the 
economy as a whole and denote the capital and labour endowments by K 
and L respectively. Let both unionised output, x, and non-unionised 
output, y, be produced under conditions of constant returns to scale; and 
assume, taking the price of x as the nuiueraire, that p is the relative 
price of output from the non-unionised sector. 
1 
With constant returns to scale the unit minimum cost of 
production in the union sector is c(w, r), where r is the rental on 
capital, and the unit minimum cost of production in the non-union 
sector is ý(n, r). By standard theorems we know that 
(i) c(. . 
), "(. .) are 
increasing, concave and homogeneous 
of degree 1 
(ii) unit input demands are given by appropriate partial derivatives 
of c(. . 
)' $(. . 
). 
It is also assumed that both minimum cost functions are twice 
differentiable. 
1. In an open economy framework p would be determined on world markets, 
and so would be exogenous. Note also that wage in terms of own 
production is being treated as numeraire. 
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4.2 Wages in a Closed Economy with Endogenous Prices 
We follow convention - see Jones (1971), for example - and 
assume that all consumers have identical, homothetic preferences. 
r_ 
Thus, in equilibrium we may write2 
y x. f(P) f'(p) <0 (4.1) 
where y is output from the non-union sector, x is output from the 
union sector, and f(p) is a negatively sloped (relative) demand curve. 
The full model is given by the following equations 
P= 1(n, r) (1.2) 
1= c(w, r) (4.3) 
L= xcw + yqn (4.4) 
K= xcr + y¢r (4.5) 
i". 6)w y=x f(p) 
where L and K are constants, and w is treated as a parameter set by 
the union, the details of the process being unimportant for the 
analysis to come. Equations (4.4) and (l. 5), the input demands, are 
kept relatively simple through the power of the cost function approach. 
It is helpful to eliminate some equations. Using (4.4) and 
(4.5) it is easy to show that 
Y/x = 
Lcr - Kcv (4.7) 
Kin - Lýr 
Thus equation (L. 6) becomes 
Lcr - Kcv = -{L4r - Kin}f(P) 
(4.8) 
2. A prime denotes a derivative and a subscript a partial derivative. 
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We now have a3 equation system - equations (4.2) and 
(4.3), and , 
equation (4.8) above. Totally differentiating, we may write down. the 
following matrix system: 
-l do/dw 0 On 
p or 0 dr/dw = -Cw 
(4.9) 
ABC dp/dw D 
where 
A= {L4 - Kinn} f(P) >0 
(4.10) 
B= Lcrr - Ke + {L¢rr - K+nr} f(p) <0 
(1+. 11) 
C= ft(p) {L4r - Kon} 
<0 (1.12) 
D= -{Lcw, - Kcvw }<0 
(4.13) 
It is now easy to show how a rise in the union wage affects the 
non-union wage, the rental rate and the relative commodity price. By 
standard methods we find 
do/dw =-Jl-{ ¢rcwC + cw + crD} 
(4.14) 
dr/dw = oncwC + cwA} 
(4.15) 
dp/dw =J ¢n(crD + Bcw) - "rAcw} 
(4.16) 
where the determinant of the matrix in equation 
(4.9) is 
J= cr(A + Ca) 
(I. 1T) 
Now J >< 0 as A+ Can 
< 0. But as A>0, a sufficient condition for 
J>0 is C>0, whilst a necessary condition for J<0 
is C<0. 
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t 
Moreover, as 
C= V(p) {L$r - Kin}l (ß. i8) 
C takes the opposite sign of the term irr curly brackets, which itself 
is obviously positive (negative) when the union (non-union) sector is 
labour-intensive. Put differently, C is greater than or less than 
zero as the union sector's degree of capital-intensitivity is 
greater than or less than the non-union sector's degree of capital- 
intensivitity. 
Equations (4.14) - (4.16) cannot be signed unambiguously, and 
this should not surprise us. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to 
expect that a little progress can be made by contrasting the case in 
which the union sector is capital-intensive with that in which it is 
labour-intensive. Now if the unionised sector is capital intensive, 
C>0 and J>0, so by equation (4.14) - (4.16) w9 have -" 
sign (dn/dw) = sign (ýrcwC + cw + crD) 
sign (dr/dw) = sign - (oncwC + wA) <0 
sign (dp/dw) = sign ($n+ Bcwýn - rAcw) 
<0 
If the unionised sector is labour-intensive, C<0 and J<0. 
Hence we find that 
sign (dn/dw) = sign (-J) 
<0 
sign (dr/dw) = sign (-1/J) {+ncwC + cW }) 0 
sign (dp/dw) = sign (-J) 
<0 
(4.19) 
(4.20) 
(4.21) 
(1.22) 
(4.23) 
(4.2u) 
Although most of the ambiguity still remains, two definite results have 
emerged: when the union sector is capital-intensive a rise in the union 
wage rate lowers both (i) the rental rate on capital and 
(ii) the 
relative price of non-union output. But the relationship between the 
wage rates, the principal concern of this chapter, is still not clear. 
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Carruth and Oswald (1981) also examine some special cases, and 
how the sign of dn/dw is affected by varying some key elasticities. 
Here we want to confront the ambiguity directly by numerical methods, 
and study how the results are influenced by particular functional 
forms and parameter values. 
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4.3 A Numerical Evaluation of the Union-Non-Union Wage Partial 
flat.; era+; t. e 
In a closed two-sector economy a rise in the union wage rate may 
raise or reduce the non-union wage rate. The results of the previous 
section do not allow us to be more specific, so we cannot say anything 
about which is most likely in the real world. To try and overcome such 
a problem the numerical approach may be of service. 
We experimented with Cobb-Douglas and Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution (C. E. S. ) production functions, and with constant elasticity 
and linear demand schedules. Taking the non-union sector as an 
example, the unit cost functions for the above two production functions 
are respectively 
O(n, r) =Ä (r/al)al (n/a2)a2 (1.25) 
"ýn, r) =Ä {(a3r. P)lI(l+p) + (a4np)1/(l+? 
)}1/(l+P) (4.26) 
The usual interpretation attaches to the different parameters of the 
Cobb-Douglas and C. E. S. functions. Equivalent functions were adopted 
for the union sector but with parameters labelled B, bl, b2, b3, b1. 
We also used linear and iso-elastic demand functions, defined 
respectively as- 
f(p) =g- hp (4.27) 
f(p) = gP -e 
where e is-the elasticity of demand and g and h are constants. 
A base run parameter set was defined as follows 
(where K and L 
are capital and labour supplies) 
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AB a1,3 a294 b1,3 b2,1 
11 . 25 . 75 . 25 . 75 
KLge 
10 10 1 .5 
For the C. E. S. case values of'p =1 or -0.753 were adopted, except for 
the mixed model where p was systematically varied in the C. E. S. sector. 
The returns to scale parameters were set roughly in line with empirical 
estimates, see Nerlove (1967), among others. There is also a certain 
amount of information on likely values of the demand elasticity, and 
sensitivity tests were conducted for e in the range 0.25 to 1.5. 
Given a parameter set it is desirable to search over a range of 
values for w to'determine how the equilibrium configuration, particularly 
the derivative Ln, adjusts. Empirical evidence suggests a range'of 
values for w 'between 0 per cent and 30 per cent above n. We shall use 
the 0 per cent as a lower bound but set an upper bound a good deal higher 
than the 30 per cent mark-up. One intermediate solution will also 
be provided in each case. As a matter of course we solved each 
problem over a larger range and finer grid, including a wide variety 
of sensitivity tests. To present all this in the main body of the 
text would be burdensome, particularly when a very small subset of 
results illustrates the main points. 
4 
Furthermore, the Cobb-Douglas 
results can be approximately obtained from the C. E. S. programme through 
the adoption of a small p value (equal to 0.0001). This provides a good 
check on the consistency of the computer programmes, which were written 
independently. As such the Cobb-Douglas function is restricted to the 
mixed model of Table 4.2 where the union sector is Cobb-Douglas and 
the non-union sector C. E. S. Table 4.1 presents solutions with both 
sectors adopting the C. E. S. form. 
3. In other words a, = I or 4+, as in the previous chapter on optimum 
taxation. 
k. Additional Tables of sensitivity tests are given in an appendix to 
the chapter. 
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Table 4.1 illustrates two cases with p= -0.75 and p=1.00. 
Demand is iso-elastic. -Table 4.2 has p changing systematically for 
the mixed model plus a linear relative commodity demand schedule. The 
algorithm usually converged fairly rapidly- much of course depending 
on the starting values. It is also worth remembering that the 
numerical routines can only evaluate local solutions. 
The striking thing about the results is their simplicity and 
similarity: in all cases the derivative do/dw was negative and declined 
in absolute value under, an increasing mark-up of union over non-union 
wages. It is obvious that we cannot lay too heavy an emphasis upon 
this sort of test. However, the parameters chosen were within the 
bounds indicated by empirical estimates, and the computations were 
remarkably consistent, 
5 
so that in practice a rise in the union wage 
is likely to depress the non-union wage rate of a closed economy. 
Additional Tables of results are confined to an appendix. . 
Their 
inclusion is solely to back up the consistent appearance of this inverse 
relationship between union and non-union wage rates. 
5. The Tables in the appendix provide additional support for this view. 
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TABLE 4. la 
C. E. S. Results 
do 
w p x y n r p clw 
0.750 1.00 5.00 5.00 0.75 0.25 -0.75 . -7.00 
0.825 0.57 4.16 5.48 0.40 0.21 -0.75 -3.28 
0.900 0.32 3.30 5.87 0.22 0.19 -0.75 -1.69 
0.750 1.00 5.00 5.00 0.75 0.25 1.00 -7.00 
0.825 0.57 4.27 5.67 0.39 0.18 1.00 -3.25 
01900 0.33 3.56 6.20 0.21 0.13 1.00 -1.71 
a "base-run" parameter set as specified in the text. 
w= union wage; p= relative price of non-union output; x= union output; 
y= non-union output; n= non-union wage; r= rental rate. 
The algorithm used was that specified by NAG routine C05NAF which finds 
a solution to N nonlinear equations in N variables, and was suggested 
by Powell (1970). 
TABLE 4.2b 
Mixed Model Results 
do 
w p xyn r p dw 
0.750 1.00 3.33 6.67 0.75 0.25 -0.65 -3.70 
0.825 0.70 3.01 6.93 0.51 0.19 -0.50 -2.52 
0.900 o. 48 2.78 7.01 0.311 0.14 -0.35 -1.74 
b Union Sector: Cobb Douglas; Non-Union Sector: C. E. S.; Linear 
demand Schedule; Variable p; Parameter Values: "base-run" 
except for linear demand where g=3 and h=1. C05NAF was also 
used to solve for this model. 
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4.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has tried to explore the way in which wages are 
determined in a partially unionised, closed economy. We have been 
concerned, in particular, with the mechanisms by which the wage paid to 
non-unionised workers is affected by a rise in the wage received by 
union men. The ambiguity which arose in this relationship for the 
closed economy made us fall back on computational procedures. Therefore 
a tentative conclusion would be that in a closed economy (or one with 
some monopoly power in world trade) a rise in the union wage rate 
is likely to depress the non-union wage rate. 
Finally it seems sensible to think of this result as 
complementing, rather than competing with the Johnson and Meiskowski 
(1970), Jones (1971) and others, literature. Carruth and Oswald (1981) 
essentially show that the key empirical question for the absolute 
wage approach is whether the economy approximates well or badly to 
the 'small open country' assumption of economic theory. 
!. 
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Appendix to Chapter 4 
The following set of tabulations provides sensitivity tests for 
the CES cost function model (in both sectors). The value of p= -0.75 
implies a=k. The case a= with identical tests yields exactly 
the same sign for do/dw in all computations. It is helpful to list 
the base run parameter set and then only note the value of the 
parameter which has changed for each sensitivity test. It should also 
be stated that similar results were found for the mixed model. In 
fact over a considerable number of computations dn/dw was never 
positive. 
Clearly the number of parameter permutations are vast especially 
if more than one parameter is varied at once. Often there is an 
element of offset, so only single changes are presented, except 
for the values of the factor share parameters (al, a2, bl, b2). 
N 
_9g_ 
Sensitivity Tests 
CES Cost function in both sectors and iso-elastic demand operate 
in all the results to follow. Similarly, p= -0.75 
(ý a= 4) holds 
in all cases. Remember W is the exogenous variable. 
Base run: A B Al A2 B1 B2 KL GH 
1 1 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.75 10 10 1 0.5 
W P X Y N R do/dir 
0.700 1.79 5.50 4.11 1.48 0.37 -36.34 
0.725 1.25 5.24 4.68 0.98 0.28 -12.07 
0.750 1.00 5.00 5.00 0.75 0.25 -7.00 
0.775 0.83 4.74 5.20 o. 6o 0.23 -4.98 
0.800 0.69 4.45 5.35 0.49 0.22 -3.93 
0.825 0.57 4.16 5.48 0.40 0.21 -3.28 
0.850 0.47 3.85 5.60 0.33 0.20 -2.75 
0.875 0.39 3.56 5.73 0.27 0.19 -2.21 
0.900 0.32 3.30 5.87 0.22 0.19 -1.69 
0.925 0.26 3.08 5.99 0.18 0.19 -1.26 
0.950 0.22 2.89 6.11 0.15 0.18 -0.93 
0.975 0.19 2.74 6.20 0.13 0.18 '--0.70 
1.000 0.17 2.61 6.28 0.12 0.18 -0.54 
W= UNION WAGE 
P NON-UNION RELATIVE PRICE OF OUTPUT 
X UNION OUTPUT 
Y NON-UNION OUTPUT 
N NON-UNION WAGE 
R RENTAL RATE 
-94+- 
H/W p X Y N R do/dw 
0.25 0.700 1.75 5.16 x+. 49 1. x+3 0.37 -32.10 
0.725 1.25 5.10 x+. 82 0.97 0.28 -11.43 
0.750 1.00 5.00 5.00 0.75 0.25 -7.00 
0.775 0.82 4.85 5.09 0.60 0.23 -5.32 
0.800 0.67 4.65 5.14+ 0. x+8 0.22 -4.70 
0.825 0.52 x+. 39 5.18 0.36 0.21 -4.71 
0.850 0.35 1+. 06 5.28 0.21+ 0.20 -4.72 
0.875 0.20 3.68 5. x+9 0.14 - 0.19 -3.11 
0.900 " 0.12 3.36 5.72 
0.08 0.19 -1.58 
0.925 0.08 3.11 5.90 0.05' 0.19 -0.814 
0.950 0.05 2.91 6. o4 0.04 0.18 -0. x+8 
0.975 0.01+ 2.75 6.16 0.03 0.18 -0.30 
1.000 0.03 2.62 6.25 0.02 0. L8 -0.20 
H/W p x y N R do/dw 
0.75 0.700 1.83 5.84 3.71 1.55 0.37 -42.40 
0.725 1.26 5.39 4.53 0.98 0.28 -12.80 
0.750 1.00 5.00 5.00 0.75 0.25 -7.00 
0.775 0.83 4.63 5.31 0.61 0.23 -4.68 
0.800 0.71 4.28 5.54 0.51 0.22 -3.44 
0.825 o. 61 3.96 5.72 0.43 0.21 -2.65 
0.850 0.53 3.66 5.87 0.37 0.20 -2.09 
0.875 0.47 3.40 6.00 0.33 0.19 -1.65 
0.900 0.42 3.18 6.10 0.29 0.19 -1.31 
0.925 0.38 2.98 6.20 0.26 -0.19 -1.04 
0.950 0.34 2.82 6.28 0.24 0.19 -0.84 
0.975 0.32 2.68 6.35 0.22 0.18 -o. 68 
1.000 " 0.29 - 2.57 6.41 0.20 0.18 -0.55 
I 
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H/W P X Y N R dn/dw 
1.0 0.700 1.88 6.20 3.29 1.64 0.37 -51.71 
0.725 1.26 5.54 14.37 0.99 0.28 -13.66 
0.750 1.00 5.00 5.00 0.75 0.25 -7.00 
0.775 0.811 4.53 5.42 o. 61 0.23 -4.43 
0.8oo 0.72 4.13 5.71 0.52 0.22 -3.10 
0.825 0.611 3.78 5.93 0.145 0.21 -2.29 
0.850 0.57 3.48 6.10 0.140 0.20 -1.74 
0.875 0.52 3.24 6.23 0.36 0.19 -1.36 
0.900 o. 48 3.03 6.34 0.33 0.19 -1.08 
0.925 0.411 2.86 6.42 0.31 0.19 -0.87 
0.950 0.42 2.71 6.49 0.29 0.18 -0.71 
0.975 0.39 2.59 6.55 0.27 0.18 -0.59 
1.000 0.38 2.48 6.6o 0.26 0.18 -0.149 
H/ W- P X Y N R dn/dw 
1.25 0.700 1.95 6.57 2.85 1.76 0.37 -67.62 
0.725 1.27 5.69 4.21 1.00 0.28 -14.68 
0.750 1.00 5.00 5.00 0.75 0.25 -7.00 
0.775 o. 84 4.44 5.51 0.61 0.23 -4.22 
0.800 0.73 3.98 5.87. 0.53" 0.22 -2.84 
0.825 o. 66 3.62 6.12 0.47 0.21 -2.04 
0.850 o. 6o 3.32 6.30 0.42 -0.20 -1.52 
0.875 0.55 3.08 6.44 0.39 0.19 -1.18 
0.900 0.52 2.89 6.55 0.36 0.19 -0.93 
0.925 0.49 2.72 6.63 0.34 0.19 -0.75 
0.950 0.47 2.59 6.70 0.32 0.18 -0.62 
0.975 0.45 2.48 6.75 0.31 0.18 -0.51 
1.000 0.43 2.38 6.79 0.30 0.18 -0.43 
26 
G/W P X Y N R do/dw 
2.0 0.700 1.65 3.82 5.96 1.29 0.37 -27.20 
0.725 1.20 3.52 6.43 0.92 0.28 -8.91 
0.750 1.00 3.33 6.67 0.75 0.25 -5.00 
0.775 0.88 3.18 6.79 0.65 0.23 -3.38 
0.800 0.79 3.04 6.68 0.57 0.22 -2.52 
0.825 0.72 2.92 6.90 0.52 0.21 -1.98 
0.850 o. 66 2.81 6.91 0.47 0.20 -1.62 
0.875 0.62 2.71 6.92 o. 44 0.19 -1.36 
0.900 0.57 2.62 6.92 0.40 0.19 -1.16 
0.925 0.54 2.53 6.91 0.38 0.19 -1.00 
0.950 0.51 2.46 6.91 0.35 0.18 -0.88 
0.975 o. 48 2.39 6.90 0.33 0.18 -0.77 
1.000 o. 45 2.32 6.89 0.32 0.18 -o. 68 
G/W p X Y N R do/dw 
0.5 0.700 2.02 6.90 2.43 1.94 0.37 -64.88 
0.725 1.35 6.89 2.96 1.10 0.28 -18.87 
0.750 1.00 6.67 3.33 0.75 0.25 -11.00 
0.775 0.72 6.21 3.67 0.51 0.23 -8.64 
0.800 0.45 5.52 4.10 0.31 0.22 -7.02 
0.825 0.26 4.74 4.66 0.18 -0.21 -3.74+ 
0.850 0.16 4.13 5.12 0.11 0.20 -1.79 
0.875 0.11 3.69 5.46 0.08 0.19 -0.97 
0.900 0.09 3.36 5.71 o. o6 0.19 -0.58 
0.925 0.07 3.11 5.90 0.05 0.19 -0.38 
0.950 o. o6 2.91 6. o4 0.04 0.18 -0.26 
0.975 0.05 2.75. 6.16 0.03 0.18 -0.19 
1.000 o. 04 2.61 6.25 0.03 o. 18 -o. 14 
., 27 
I 
c 
K/W P X Y N R do/dw 
5.0 0.700 1.49 1+. 70 3.85 1.12 0.37 -27.92 
0.725 0.98 4.32 4.35 0.71 0.28 -10.79 
0.750 0.70 3.90 4.67 0.49 0.25 -7.62 
0.775 o. 46 3.38 5.00 0.31 0.23 -6.30 
0.800 0.27 2.81 5.38 0.18 0.22 -3.82 
0.825 0.17 2.37 -5.73 0.12 
0.21 -1.91 
0.850 0.12 2.07 5.97 0.08 0.20 -1.03 
0.875 0.09 1.85 6-14+ o. o6 0.19 -0.62 
0.900 0.07 1.68 6.26 0.05 0.19 -o. 
4o 
0.925 o. o6 1.55 6.36 0.0k 0.19 -0.28 
0.950 0.05 1.46 6.43 0.03 0.18 -0.20 
0.975 0.04 1.37 6.49 0.03 0.18 -0.15 
1.000 0.04 1.31 6.53 0.03 0.18 -0.11 
L/w p X Y N R do/dw 
5.0 0.700 
0 
2.10 
0 
3.32 
26 3 
2.29 
67 2 
2.17 
1.36 
0.37 
0.28 
-64.51 
-17.48 
. 725 0.750 
1.5 
1.24 . 3.21 
. 2.88 1.05 0.25 -8.95 
0 775 1.08 3.14 3.02 0.87 -0.23 -5.69 . 
0.800 0.96 3.05 3.11 0.75 0.22 -4.04 
0.825 0.87 2.96 3.18 o. 66 0.21 -3.08 
0.850 0.79 2.86 3.22 0.59 0.20 -2.45 
0.875 0.73 2.77 3.24 0.54 0.19 -2.01 
0.900 o. 68 2.68 3.26 0. I9 0.19 -1.69 
0.925 0.63 2.60 3.28 0.45 0.19 --1.44 
0.950 0.59 2.52 3.29 0.42 0.18 -1.24 
0.975 0.55 2.44 3.30 0.39 36 0 
0.18- 
18 0 
-1.08 
-o 94 1.000 0.52 2.38 3.30 . . . 
- 98 - 
A/W P X Y N R do/dw 
2.0 0.700 0.95 6.26 6.43 1.66 0.37 -45.64+ 
0.725 0.65 6.10 7.58 1.03 0.28 -14.77 
0.750 0.50 5.86 8.28 0.75 0.25 -8.66 
0.775 0.39 5.52 8.80 0.56 0.23 -6.1o 
0.800 0.30 5. o8 9.28 0.42 0.22 -5.32 
0.825 0.22 4.58 9.83 0.30 0.21 -4.28 
0.850 0.15 1. o9 10.4+ 0.21 0.20 -2.89 
0.875 0.11 3.68 11.00 0.15 0.19 -1.78 
0.900 0.08 3.36 11.46 0.12 0.19 -1.12 
0.925 0.07 3.11 11.82 0.09 0.19 -0.74 
0.950 0.06 2.91 12.10 0.08 0.18 -0.52 
0.975 0.05 2.75 12.32 0.07 0.18 -0.38 
1.000 0.04 2.61 12.51 o. o6 0.18 -0.28 
B/W P X y N B do/dw 
2.0 1.450 2.44 8. 72 5.58 1.88 0 ., 5.7 21 
1.475 2.19 , 8.19 . 
5.71 1.66 0.53 7.45 
1.500 2.00 8.28 5.46 1.50 0.50 -5.83 
1.525 1.84 8.08 5.95 1.37 0.48 -1+. 77 
1.550 1.71 7.88 6.02 1.26 . 0.46 -4.03 
1.575 1.6o 7.96 6.08 1.16 o. 15 -3.49 
1.6oo 1.50 7.49 6.12 1.08 0.43 -3.07 
1.625 1.41 7.30 6.15 1.01 0.42 -2.75 
1.650 1.33 7.12 6.18 0.94 0. b2 -2.48 
1.675 1.25 - 6.94 6.21 0.89 o. 
41 -2.26 
1.700 1.18 6.76 6.23 0.83 o. 1o -2.08 
1.725 1.11 6.59 6.25 0.78 o. 1o -1.92 
1.750 1.05 6.43 6.26 0.74 0.39 -1.77 
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Al A2 B1 B2 /W P X 'Y N R do/dw 
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.450 1.31 5.16 1+. 50 0.79 0.58 -11.72 
0.475 1.12 5.11 4.82 o. 6o 0.53 -5.17 0.500 1.00 5.00 5.00 0.50 0.50 -3.00 
0.525 0.91 4.87 5.09 0. x+4 0.48 -1.98 
0.550 0.85 4+. 74+ 5.14, - 0.110 0.116 -1.41 
0.575 0.80 4.62 5.15 0.37 o. 45 -1.05 
o. 6oo 0.76 4.51 5.16 0.34 0.44 -0.81 0.625 0.73 4.41 5.15 0.32 0.1+1+ -0.64 
0.650 0.71 4.32 5.11 0.31 0.1+3 -0.52 
0.675 o. 68 4.214 5.13 0.30 0.43 -0.42 
0.700 0.67 4.18 5.12 0.29 0.42 -0.35 
0.725 0.65 x+. 12 5.10 0.28 0.42 -0.30 
0.750 o. 644 x+. 07 5.09 0.28 0.142 -0.25 
Al A2 B1 B2 /W P X Y N R do/dw 
0.75 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.225 1.09 5.05 x+. 83 0.33 0.78 -6.16 
0.250 1.00 5.00 5.00 0.25 0.75 -1.67 
0.275 0.95. x+. 91 5.04 0.22 0.73 -0.79 
0.300 0.92 x+. 83 5.05 0.21 0.72 -0. I5 
0.325 0.90 4.77 5.04 0.20 0.71 -0.28 
0.350 0.88 4.72 5.03 0.19 0.70 -0.19 
0.375 0.87 4.68 5.01 0.19 0.70 -0.13 
0 . 4o0 o. 86 4.64 5.00 0.18 0.69 -0.10 0.425 o. 86 4.62 4.99 0.18 0.69 -0.07 
0.450 0.85 4.6o 4.98 0.18 0.69 -0.06 
0.475 0.85 4.58 4.97 0.18 0.69 -0.04 
0.500 0.84 4.57 4.96 0.18 0.69 -0.03 
0.525 0.84 4.55 x+. 96 0.18 0.69 -0.03 
4 
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Chapter 5 The Reappraisal of Chamberlin's Welfare Ideal: A Trade-Off 
Between Scale Economies and Product Variety 
5.1 Introduction* 
This chapter extends the numerical computations of Spence (1976a) 
on the welfare trade-off between product diversity and scale economies 
to include a second-best solution and U-shaped-cost curves. A trade- 
off between optimum scale and heterogeneous products would appear to 
be submerged in Chamberlin's 'welfare ideal'; however early commentators 
overlooked the significance of this statement. Spence's (1976b) 
recent reappraisal has shown inefficiency to be no longer just a 
matter of non marginal cost pricing, for the actual number of 
commodities and the product mix are important considerations for any 
welfare analysis of product differentiation. 
It is intuitive that a diversity of products is desirable from 
the consumers' point of view, if the products in question are not 
close substitutes for one another; but, variety may be costly if 
production economies are great. This chapter will demonstrate that 
such considerations are crucial in determining the optimal variety of 
products. Work'by Lancaster (1975), Dixit and Stiglitz (19T7) and 
Meade (197+) provide similar theoretical insights but from rather 
different approaches to that of Spence (1976a, 1976b). Ireland (1982) 
has recently introduced uncertainty into a Spence type framework. He 
shows that output per firm falls with the imposition of uncertainty, 
but the number of firms (products) may increase or decrease. 
The analytical framework of Spence's (1976a) paper is a 
monopolistic competition model specified by linear demand and cost 
* This chapter is based on Carruth (1979). 
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functions from which he derives a monopolistic equilibrium and two 
welfare outcomes, the social optimum and a marginal cost pricing 
interpretation of market equilibrium. By using a quadratic cost 
function we can easily approximate linear costs, and still have 
greater freedom to consider Chamberlin's (1951) welfare ideal which 
was a feature of the so-called excess capacity debate. Moreover a 
second-best solution is also a zero profit welfare outcome which is 
an interesting contrast with the zero profit market equilibrium. 
Finally a computer graphic presentation of a few outcomes helps to 
illustrate the numerical results. 
The next section spells out the market implications of product 
selection, and is followed by a presentation of Spence's analytical 
framework through his missing equations, but including our extensions. 
Section 5.4+ provides the numerical results and graphical illustrations. 
A short concluding section ends the chapter. 
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5.2 Product Selection 
It is well. known that an important function of the price 
mechanism is the choice of products to be placed on the market. However 
Spence suggests: 
"The full range of products may be neither 
feasible nor desirable due to the presence of 
increasing returns to scale. " (1976a; pp 407) 
The reason is simply that most production units incur fixed costs which 
by definition are independent of output. It is these fixed costs which 
are instrumental in imperfectly competitive pricing and profitability 
ramifications. 
In a separate theoretical paper Spence (1976b) focusses attention 
on the influence of fixed costs for product selection within a 
Chamberlin group framework. 
I 
Casual observation indicates that products 
which exist must be capable of extracting revenues sufficient to cover 
fixed and variable costs. However revenues do not provide an adequate 
measure of the social benefits derived from products, evidenced by the 
economics of consumer surplus. Only a perfectly price discriminating 
monopolist can extract all consumer surplus. 
2 
In this rather special 
case the welfare aspects of the product choice problem are eliminated 
simply by the rationale of revenues reflecting the true social benefits 
obtained from a product. The inability of firms to extract the true 
social benefits of their products is a market force working against 
product existence. In effect it reflects a tendency to reduce variety, 
and is symptomatic of market failure. 
1. No attempt will be made to question the existence of equilibrium in 
the face of scale economies, except in the sense of the tangency 
solution. 
2. A potential virtue in terms of no efficiency loss. Of course the 
distributive implications would need to be taken into account. 
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The actual degree to which firms can capture consumer surplus depends 
to a certain extent on the properties of individual firm demand functions. 
The following summarises an argument due to Spence (1976a). Suppose 
demand functions exist and have constant elasticities. Let r be the 
ratio of total revenue to gross consumer surplus. Therefore 
r=f MR (x) dx (5.1) 
; 
!p (x) dx 
Where p(x) is the inverse demand function, MR(x) is the marginal revenue 
function and x is output. Equation (5.1) can be manipulated to yield 
r= (1 - 
e) (5.2) 
where e is the constant own price elasticity of demand. 
3 
As e rises the ratio of total revenue to gross surplus, r, rises. 
The implication is a product selection bias whereby it is possible 
for a product with a low price elasticity to have a higher net welfare 
surplus but lower profit than a product with a high own price elasticity. 
Hence there may be a greater tendency to lose low elasticity products, 
particularly in the light of fixed costs. Moreover an implicit 
welfare bias may also be distinguished as low elasticity products are 
often attached greater welfare weights. Subsequently the 
incentive 
for sellers to price discriminate will be greater for low elasticity 
products. It turns out, Spence (1976b), that it 
is not just elasticity 
that matters, but what fraction of net potential surplus for a 
product is capturable by a selling firm. This will 
involve both 
demand and costs. As a market force selection bias will tend to 
eliminate products. 
3. Note that net welfare surplus as a percentage will be equal to 
(1 - r). 100.1 
.ý, 
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Likewise market interdependence may lead to non-optimal, degrees of 
variety. Consider the case where products are imperfect substitutes. 
When a new product is introduced it affects other firms' market 
positions by reducing their demand which leads to a contraction of 
output for the existing set of firms. Gains arise from the profit and 
consumer surplus of the new product but losses are incurred on the 
profit and surplus of the existing set of, products. When products are 
fairly close substitutes losses may outweigh gains. However the 
entering firm does not take account of such interactions: it may enter 
when it is not generating a net social benefit. This is a market force 
tending to generate too many'products. On the other hand if products 
are complements then the monopolistic equilibrium by reducing output 
and raising price above marginal cost lowers the demand for other 
complementary products. This induces further quantity cutbacks and 
possibly the exit of products from the market. The process reinforces 
itself and leads to an equilibrium where all outputs are below the 
optimum and some of the products in the optimal set are nöt produced 
at all. 
Profitability, therefore, is to be considered a fairly weak 
criterion for product selection. However, it is the only benchmark 
available and as Spence (1976a) points out 
"One can reasonably accept profitability as a constraint 
and pose the problem of product selection as that of 
determining the right set of products subject to that- 
constraint. The solution to the problem includes 
specification of not only the products but also the prices. 
The prices will typically be above marginal cost, since that 
may be required to increase the profitability of products 
to permit the entry of products that are not profitable 
under marginal cost pricing. In short the solution to the 
second-best problem will include a trade-off between numbers 
of products on the one hand and the inefficiency due to non- 
marginal cost pricing on the other. " (1976a; pp. 411). 
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Spence goes on to suggest that the monopolistic equilibrium has 
the qualitative features of the constrained optimum as both problems 
involve the trade-off between product variety and inefficiency through 
non-marginal cost pricing. However it'is apparent that both outcomes 
have a different objective function and price-output configuration. 
Extension of Spence's (1976a) paper to include the 'true second-best' 
solution facilitates a comparison of the implications arising from these 
distinctions. The analytical framework employed by Spence (1976a) 
and extended in this chapter is set out in the next section. 
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5.3 A Framework for Welfare Computations 
The essence of the approach is a computational comparison of the 
aforementioned market outcomes and welfare optima. Welfare is measured 
by the multiproduct net surplus which is simply the sum of producer and 
consumer surplus. Income effects are to be ignored. Recent work in this 
area by Dixit and Weller (1977), Seade (1978) and Willig (1976) 
indicates that this type of assumption may'be less restrictive for 
welfare analysis than was once thought. Nevertheless it should be 
borne in mind that it underlies all the subsequent analysis of this 
chapter. A product's marginal contribution to total surplus is 
defined to be the area under the inverse demand function minus the 
costs of production for that particular product. 
4 
The numerical results depend upon the following framework. The 
quantity of the ith product is xi. The inverse demand for the ith 
product is 
pi =a- 2bx. - 2d Ex5 (5.3) 
i0i 
The cost function6 of the ith firm is 
TC =f+ kx. +'gxi (5.4) 
where f is the fixed cost; d is the interaction effect, and a and b 
are the intercept and slope of the inverse demand for each product when 
there are no other products. Equations (5.3) and (5.4) plus the 
final form of the total surplus function are all the information 
provided by Spence (1976a) before he proceeds to his table of numerical 
b. Note that the total net surplus is not exactly equal to the sum of 
these marginal surpluses as account must be taken of entry 
repercussions on existing members of the 'group'. 
5. The analysis is restricted to linear demand functions. 
6. We include the quadratic term at this stage. The Spence "missing" 
equations are easily obtained by setting g=0. 
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results for the different market outcomes and welfare optima. 
(1976a; pp. 412, Table I). However it aids understanding if the 
analytical framework is spelled out in detail. 
From (5.3) we know that the marginal revenue function has twice 
the slope of the inverse demand function, that is 
MR. =a- 4bx. - 2d E x. 
(5.5) 
i1 ioj J /' 
Under the symmetry and uniformity assumptions of the Chamberlin 
'group' the inverse demand function, equation (5.3), can be rewritten 
as 
pi =a- 2bxi - 2d(n - 1)xi (5.6) 
Now gross surplus (G. S. ) is defined to be the area under the inverse 
demand function. Integrating? (5.6) with respect to xi gives 
G. S. =a xi -bx2i- d(n - 1)x21 
(5.7) 
Net surplus is simply G. S. minus production costs. Using equation'(5.1) 
we obtain 
N. S. =a xi -bx21- d(n - 1)x21 -f-k xi -gx2i 
(5.8) 
Total net surplus can then be derived from (5.8) by summing over the 
n firms and dropping labels (subscripts) due again to symmetry and 
uniformity. This gives8 
7. Analytically symmetry means that 1p. dx" is well defined with no 
'path of integration' difficulties. 
1This is an important property 
of compensated demand functions. 
8. Equation (5.9) corresponds to the surplus equation presented by 
Spence (1976a, in a footnote, pp. 412), having set g=0. 
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T(n, x) = n(ax - bx2) - dn(n T 1)x2 - of - nkx - ngx2 (5.9) 
which means that any outcome must be completely described by x, the 
output per firm and n, the number of firms. This is clearly restrictive, 
for in this type of problem we often have product ordering along 
a spectrum and two products closer together on this spectrum will be 
closer substitutes than two products further apart. With asymmetry 
the actual product labels will become important and (5.9) will not be 
valid. To aid tractable results symmetry will remain an integral 
assumption of this chapter. Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) have provided 
some analysis of the asymmetry problem. 
A profit function can also be derived from demand and cost 
conditions in a similar manner to the surplus function. Multiply (5.6) 
through by xi to yield total revenue and then subtract the total cost 
function, equation (5.1+). With the symmetry condition we can drop 
labels and so obtain 
n(n, x) = ax - 2bx2 - 2d(n - 1)x2 -f- kx - gx2 (5.10) 
With entry in monopolistic competition the zero profit condition is 
simply equivalent to average revenue equal to average cost, that is, 
AR = AC. Therefore, ignoring subscripts under symmetry, equation (5.6) 
and equation (5.1) can be used to obtain 
a-2bx-2d(n-1)x=k+X+gx 
(S. U) 
This helps to simplify the derivation of the monopolistic equilibrium. 
Equations (5.3) to (5.11) provide all the necessary information for 
deriving the different outcomes in terms of our control variables 
A and x. 
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The Optimum (0. ) 
In this case we wish to 
Max. T(n, x) = n(ax - bx2) - dn(n - 1)x2 - of - nkx - ngx2 
First order conditions (F. O. C. ) are 
Tn 
.= ax - 
bx2 - (2n - 1)dx2 -f- 
kx 
- 9x2 =0 (5.12) 
Tx = n(a - 2bx) - dn(n - 1)2x - nk - 2ngx 0 
(5.13) 
where subscripts are used to denote partial derivatives. Rearranging 
(5.13) we can derive 
a- k 
X= 2b + 2d n-1+ 2g 
(5.1k) 
and by substitution for x in (5.12) a little manipulation yields 
(b +g d) (a - k)2 b+g 
n=1+- (5.15) 
1+d2 fd 
(5.11+) and (5.15) enable the isolation of x and n for different initial 
values of our parameters which will consistently describe this welfare 
outcome and allow us to calculate total surplus, profit/loss, prices, 
revenues and costs. 
Market Equilibrium (E. ) 
Within the monopolistic competition model this solution is 
described by the conditions that marginal revenue equals marginal cost 
and under free entry average revenue equals average cost. Now from 
(5.6), (5.5) and (5.4) MR = MC gives 
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a- 1+bx - 2d(n - 1)x =k+ 2gx 
(5.16) 
and from (5.11) AR = AC implies 
a- 2bx - 2d(n - 1)x =k+X+ gx 
(5.17) 
(5.16) and (5.17) depict two simultaneous equations in n and x. Now 
by simply subtracting we obtain 
i 
x= (f/(g + 2b))' (5.18) 
Substitution for x yields 
(a - k) 
2(g 
+ 2b) (2b + g) 
n=1+- (5.19) 
4d2 fd 
Hence equations (5.18) and (5.19) capture the monopolistic market 
equilibrium. 
Equilibrium Number of Firms with MC Pricing 
(M. ) 
In this example we know that supply price has to equal marginal, 
cost and that n is constrained to equal (5.19). From equations 
(5.1) 
and (5.6), ignoring subscripts, we have 
a- 2bx - 2d(n - 1)x =k+ 2gx 
and 
a-k 
x= 
(5.20) 
2b + 2d(n - 1) + 2g 
Equations (5.19) and (5.20) model this outcome. Notice that equations 
(5.111) and (5.20) are identical which simply reflects first best 
efficiency with no thought to loss-offset problems. 
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'Second-Best' Solution9 
The analysis of this welfare outcome involves a fairly 
straightforward constrained optimisation problem. It can be expressed as 
Max T(n, x) (5.21) 
s. t. lr(n, x) =0 
In Lagrangean form (5.21) becomes 
L= T(n, x) +1 n(n, x) (5.22) 
F. O. C. 
X=TX+ aiX =0 (5.23) 
Ln = Tn + am =0 (5.24 ) 
LX = n(n, x) =0- (5.25) 
From (5.9) and (5.10) we can substitute for the partials Tx, 7x, 
Tn, irn to obtain a system of three nonlinear simultaneous equations 
in the three unknowns n, x and X, the Lagrange multiplier. This gives 
L= na = 2nbx - 2dn(n-1)x - nk - 2ngx + X(a-4bx-4d(n-1)x-k-2gx) -0 
(5.26) 
Ln = ax - bx2 -(2n-1)dx2 -f- kx - gx2 - 12dx2 =0 
(5.27) 
Lý = ax - 2bx2 - 2d(n-1)x2 -f- kx gx2 =0 
(5.28) 
9. This welfare outcome was not considered by Spence 
(1976a), although 
it was discussed in (1976b). It can therefore be viewed as an 
extension of his (1976a) simulation exercise. 
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This system ((5.26) to (5.28)) did not manipulate into 
manageable formulas in x and n as in the previous solutions; however 
again we can easily appeal to the NAG library and the Powell (19T0) 
routine C05NAF. On the other hand we could just as easily have 
returned to the initial constrained optimisation problem 
TMax T(n, x) s. t. ff(n, x) = 07 and used a routine like E04UAF from 
the optimum tax chapter. It turns out that C05NAF is rather simpler 
to use and involves less computational resources, so we remained with 
the solution to the first-order conditions. Therefore for any given 
set of values placed on a, b, d, f, k, and g, we can solve for 
n, x and X. 
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5.4 Welfare Comparisons 
The first set of numerical results are presented in Table 5.1. 
Some columns are replications of Spence's Table 1 (1976a, pp. 
412) 
given that the chosen parameter sets are identical. 
l° it is pleasing 
that in these cases the results both coincide. 
Table 5.1 is extended compared to Spence's Table 1 to include the 
exact second-best solution, equilibrium and second best prices plus 
the Lagrange multiplier. T stands for total net surplus and 
subscripts 0, E, M, S are the optimum, market equilibrium, marginal 
cost pricing with equilibrium firms and second-best respectively. 
t1Ti represents the difference between the total net surplus and the 
surplus, pertaining to the relevant subscript, i,, that is, welfare losses 
for i=E, M and S. N. and. XJ . are the number of 
firms and output per 
firm respectively for the different outcomes with j 0, 'E, M and S. 
PE is the market equilibrium price and PS is the second-best solution 
price. Finally X is the Lagrange multiplier for the second-best 
outcome. 
Spence discussed columns ATE and ATM of Table 5.1, which 
essentially illustrates that in some cases the welfare loss for 
non-marginal cost pricing is sometimes less than half the total welfare 
loss. In other words a move from market equilibrium to marginal cost 
pricing with the equilibrium number of firms 
is not enough to remove 
the welfare loss: ATM is unlikely to be zero. 
11 
Therefore the optimal 
price-output decision also common to the excess capacity debate 
neglects the optimal number of products (firms). This may be seen as 
10. ie. we set g=0. 
11. It is zero in a single case, row 6 of Table 5.1. 
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the essence of Chamberlin's welfare ideal. 
The actual cases, where the welfare costs from having the wrong 
number of products are significant, vary in respect of elasticities 
and fixed costs. When cross elasticities are high they occur when 
fixed costs are low, for example, column ATM, groups I and II. Here 
the substitution12 effect dominates andresults in a larger number 
of products than is socially desirable. This supports a proposition 
advanced in section 5.2. Too many-products also tend to occur when 
cross elasticities are high relative to own elasticities and fixed 
costs are low: compare columns N0 and NE for groups I, II, IV and V. 
Variety is'costly with low cross elasticities and high fixed costs, 
groups III and VI; and given the earlier arguments on product 
selection it is not surprising that here we find a situation of 
too few products in. equilibrium. This also contrasts markedly with 
the excess capacity debate, where the concentration on scale effects 
alone came down in favour of too many products all the time. 
Spence's-treatment of profitability and product selection used 
a zero profit market equilibrium as the second-best welfare 
approximation. This was not unreasonable as regards the theory of the 
firm; and even though not such a close welfare approximation as Spence 
may have imagined, it in effect gives fairly similar qualitative 
predictions to the true second best solution in terms of the restricted 
role of marginal cost pricing. However the price-output configuration 
is substantially different between the market equilibrium and 
second-best. Second-best has a higher output and lower price (c. f. 
columns XE and XS, PE and PS). Moreover the second-best outcome 
involves too few products in all cases. This reflects an "optimum" 
12. ie. products as substitutes. 
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amount of variety and output being traded to cover the first-best 
loss, rather than firms entering until profits are driven to zero. 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 have taken two cases from Table 5.1, and, 
using computer graphic software, have provided a pictorial 
illustration of two key outcomes. Figure 5.1 corresponds to group I 
with f=6 and presents the case where there are too many products in 
equilibrium. The notation is similar to the text, although the 
marginal cost pricing contour-which passes through the optimum, 0, 
and M, is not annotated. The full contours represent the net surplus 
function, T(n, x). The axis scales are not significant, and simply 
represent the original size of the diagrams which was 20 cm, on 
each axis. Figure 5.2 presents the group III case with f=T. Here 
we have too few products in equilibrium, altiough the welfare level 
in equilibrium is much closer to second-best, S. 
13 
It is also notable that the Lagrange multiplier values, X., are 
l 
constant within groups but vary between groups. It can be shown that 
NS = (b - d)/2d 
(5.29) 
which means that X is only affected by the demand slope and 
interaction 
parameters. Changes in the demand intercept, fixed and variable cost 
will have no effect on the contribution of an additional unit of the 
profit constraint to the net surplus. This concentration on the demand 
side is reflected in the "too few products" result of the second best 
outcome. 
13. The second-best equations (5.23), (5.24) and 
(5.25) can be used to 
generate the equality T /T = 7r /n , which 
just states that the 
slope of the surplus contour must 
Be the same as the slope of the 
profit constraint at an interior optimum: so S depicts this 
tangency position. 
14. see appendix. 
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20 
is 
C1ý 
C 12 
8---6 
LL 
LL 
O 
fY 8 
W 
Cif 
Z 
i 
0 
Pdc Diversity 
018 12 1s 20 
OUTPUT PER FIRM 
Case: Group I of Table 5.1, f=6 
$ Notation: 
0= Social Optimum, so marginal cost pricing passes through 0, 
and M. 
M= Marginal cost pricing with the equilibrium set of firms 
E= Market equilibrium 
S= second-best 
The contours were drawn using GINO-SURF (1980), the rest of the figure 
by GINO-F (1976). 
118 
Figure 5.2 $ 
20 
16 
Co 
12 
Li- 
LL- 
C: ) 
8 
W 
4 
0. 
0 
Notation: 
0= Social Optimum, so marginal cost pricing passes through 0, 
and M. 
M= Marginal cost pricing with the equilibrium set of firms 
E= Market equilibrium 
S= 'second-best 
The contours were drawn using GINO-SURF (1980), the rest of the figure 
by GINO-F (1976). 
g 12 16 20 
, 
OUTPUT PER FIRM 
Case: Group III from Table 5.1, f=7 
- 119 - 
The more general case of a quadratic cost curve returns us to 
the arguments expressed in the appendix to Chapter 2 concerning the 
extent of cost penalties for firms operating at 50% of minimum efficient 
scale (mes)as' ," It 
is worthwhile adopting the demand parameter values 
of Figures 5.1 and 5.2 to examine the influence of the quadratic cost 
function. For the sake of illustration we have taken a unit cost 
penalty of 12% to operate at output rates 50% below mes. This gives 
f=2.0, k=3.0 and g=1.0. Figure 5.3 corresponds closely to 
Figure 5.1 and similarly for Figure 5.4+ with 5.2; however, the movement 
away from the optimum by the other outcomes is less pronounced. Note 
also that the zero profit condition, AR = AC, now cuts the marginal 
cost pricing contour for high output rates and few firms. With 
U-shaped scale curves it is possible for marginal cost pricing to make 
profits. Nevertheless the possibility, and implications for the 
excess capacity debate, of having too few or too many firms still remains. 
Finally with U-shaped scale curves we can consider-to what extent 
the social optimum will. correspond to optimum scale. The excess 
capacity debate often criticised monopolistic equilibrium for this 
failure. Table 5.2 presents results with respect to the parameter 
values of Figures 5.3 and 5.4. 
It is apparent that the social optimum output rate does not 
correspond to optimum scale. Hence the use of X* as a benchmark in 
the excess capacity debate was inappropriate. 
A final empirical comment on the above results would reflect on 
the implications for a regulatory body attempting to bring about a 
certain welfare outcome. For simplicity take the market equilibrium 
as a benchmark where no intervention is apparent, and that regulation can 
lead to welfare improving adjustments. The optimum will require control 
of the number of firms, n, and the output per firm, x; and, losses will 
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have to be covered in some way. The second-best outcome requires the 
manipulation of n and x, but there is no problem of loss offset. 
Imposing marginal cost pricing on the set of monopolistic products in 
existence will also involve the regulatory body in loss offset provision. 
Needless to say it the information problem will be considerable in 
attempting any such welfare improvements, especially as it is no 
longer a foregone conclusion that equilibrium is simply a case of 
having too many products. Moreover any costs of regulation are 
unaccounted for. Therefore monopolistic market behaviour may be less 
of an inefficiency problem than was once feared, especially as it was 
expressed through the excess capacity debate. 
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Table 5.2a 
f 
ab .d f 
k g X* X0 XE 
10 1 0.5 2.0 3.0 1.0 1.41 1.15 0.82 
10 1 0.1 2.0 3.0 1.0 1.41 1.03 0.82 
X* = (f/g)' = optimum scale output rate 
X0 = (a - k)/(2b + 2d(n - 1) + 2g) - social optimum output rate 
XE = (f/(g + 2b)' = market equilibrium output rate 
a. Notice that when perceived demand is horizontal (b = 0) XE and 
X* coincide, but not otherwise. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter can be summarised by the following points. First 
is the important observation that variety is costly if scale economies 
are considerable; yet consumers will prefer variety when products are 
not close substitutes for one another. It is this trade-off which is 
pertinent to a proper analysis of the welfare implications of 
heterogeneous products versus efficiency. 
Second is the implication that inefficiency can arise from an 
undesired product mix, too little or too many products, as well as 
incorrect output rates. The preceding discussion focussed on the 
trade-off between output levels and product numbers under a particular 
set of restrictions. It was evident that the degree of competition and 
the extent of scale economies had important bearings on where welfare 
losses could be attributed - Tables 5.1 and 5.2 and Figures 5.1 to 5.4. 
It was clear that welfare losses were not simply a result of 
non-marginal cost pricing. 
The excess capacity debate must now be seen in a rather different 
perspective. 
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Appendix to Chapter 5 
The second-best solution is 
Max T(n, x) 
s. t. 7r(n, x) =0 
with F. O. C. 
Tn + airn =0 
Tx+Xwx=0 
From (5.9) and (5.10) we have 
T(n, x) = n/ax - bx2 - d(n-1)x2 -f- kx - 6x2-? 
Tr(n, x) = ax - 2bx2 - 2d(n-1)x2 -f- kx - gx2 
Therefore 
I 
(5.30) 
(5.31) 
(5.32) 
(5.33) 
Tn =/ ax - bx2 - d(n-1)x2 -P- kx - gx2 
/- ndx2 
= jbx2 + d(n-1)x2 7- ndx2 when. w 0 (using (5.33)) 
_ (bd)x2 
7rn =- 2dx 
From (5.30) as =- Tn/nn at it =0 
Hence AS = (b - d)/2d 
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Chapter 6A Quantity-Setting Duopoly Analysis of the Structure- 
Conduct-Performance Paradigm 
6.1 Introduction* 
Since the pioneering work of Harberger (1954) welfare losses due 
to monopoly have received much attention in the literature. Recently 
published estimates put these at 7-13 per cent of gross corporate 
product in the U. S. and 3-7 per cent in the U. K. (Cowling and Mueller, 
1978). These are much larger numbers than Harberger's 'less than 
one-tenth of one per cent of GNP', though. the whole issue remains 
controversial,,. for example, see the exchange between Littlechild (1981) 
and Cowling and Mueller (1981). The empirical analyses typically assume 
linear demand and constant costs. On these assumptions it can easily 
be shown that the monopoly loss will be exactly 25 per cent of the 
level of welfare (net surplus) obtaining under a social optimum 
characterised by zero profit and marginal-cost pricing, irrespective 
of demand and cost conditions. 
1 This is a maximum figure in that it 
assumes monopoly pricing behaviour, whereas many previous studies have 
assumed limit pricing. On the other hand it takes no account of the 
costs of securing monopoly positions, analysed by Posner (1975) and 
others, or of the possibility of reduced technical efficiency in markets 
where competitive pressure is lacking; Leibenstein's (1966) 
X-inefficiency. 
* This chapter is based on joint work - see the Preface to the thesis 
for full details of responsibilities. 
1. Whatever the level of costs and slope of the demand curve, monopoly 
output is half the competitive level and the monopoly profit 
rectangle is twice as large as (a) the consumers' surplus under 
monopoly and (b) the monopoly deadweight loss triangle. Under 
competition net surplus is defined to be the sun of these areas. 
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This chapter is concerned with the extent to which welfare 
losses may be attenuated by inter-firm rivalry in oligopolistic 
markets. It would appear that this has not been considered in the 
literature to date, although Cowling (1976) and Cowling and Waterson 
(1976) have derived the relation 
ýP - c)/P = H(l + a)/ep 
where p= price, 'c = marginal and average cost, H is -the Hirschman- 
Herfindahl index of seller concentration, ep = the industry price 
elasticity of demand, and they interpret A= dx/dxi as summarising 
firms expectations concerning the response of rivals to their own 
output decisions. Thus they relate the Lerner index of monopoly power 
(p - c)/p to the degree of oligopolistic interaction X. However 
alternative oligopoly solutions other than Cournot are not considered 
explicitly, and the econometric results suffer from a lack of industry 
elasticity data plus the difficulty of estimating an equilibrium 
condition. 
Another approach is to postulate a specific welfare function and 
solve for the level of welfare (net surplus) under various, combinations 
of conduct and structure. By 'conduct' we mean alternative 
conjectural 
variations determining the way in which the oligopoly game is played. 
'Structure' embraces both the number of firms (which is fixed at two 
throughout the present analysis) and also consumer preferences and 
production technology, as summarised in the parameters of the relevant 
demand and cost functions. Such definitions neglect the question of 
entry. 
The analysis is based on quantity-setting duopoly and employs 
computational techniques plus computer graphical illustrations to examine 
the welfare losses both for given modes of conduct across alternative 
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plausible structures, and given structure, under different patterns of 
conduct, all relative to the social optimum. 
This approach departs from a long standing tradition in industrial 
economics in which performance (profit) is explained in terms of 
structural characteristics, notably the level of seller concentration: 
a good example is Holterman (1973). For, we look directly at welfare 
and, in addition, concentration is found jointly with prices, profits 
and outputs, as part of an equilibrium determined by preferences, 
behaviour and technology. The traditional framework overlooks this 
endogeneity, and so causal relationships are inferred from equilibrium 
conditions, such as the Cowling-Waterson relationship. A systematic 
relationship between concentration and welfare, if it exists, may 
nevertheless be important to know, not least as a practical aid in 
the determination of priorities for antitrust agencies like the 
Monopolies Commission. The present analysis permits the observation 
of such a structure performance mapping, or alternatively will show 
whether a given structure (concentration level) may correspond to 
several states of conduct-performance. 
Section 6.2 draws on recent work by Bramness (1979), Dixit (1979), 
Ulph (1980) and others providing a unifying framework within which 
alternative conjectural-variations equilibria may be compared with 
each other and with the social optimum. It should be mentioned at 
this point that we are not concerned with the relative merits of the 
alternative models as oligopoly solution concepts: the 'arbitrariness' 
or 'correctness' of firms' conjectures and so forth. Rather we focus 
on the social value of the outcomes produced by alternative 
behavioural postulates which exist in the literature. Section-6.3 
reports the results of the numerical computations, showing indices of 
social welfare for different types of oligopolistic interaction under 
variation in the degree of product homogeneity, and cost and demand 
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asymmetries. The implications of the results for antitrust policy 
are spelled out along with the conclusions in section 6.4. 
The computations for this chapter are simple enough not to 
require any appeal to NAG software; however a number of diagrams do 
rely on the graphic software GINO-F and GINO-SURF, discussed in 
Chapter 1. 
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6.2 Alternative Conjectural Variations Equilibria 
Let us consider a quantity-setting duopoly and assume constant 
marginal costs cl, c2. The utility function is assumed quadratic, 
following Dixit (19T9): 
U= x0 + a1x1 + a2x2 - 2(ß lxl'+ 
2yxlx2 ±ß 2x2) 
(6.1) 
with ai, $i, y>0 and ßl. ß2 > y2 " 
x1, x2 are the duopolists' outputs and x0 is the composite output of 
the rest of the economy, assumed competitive. 
First order conditions for consumers' equilibrium yield linear 
inverse demands: 
pl = al -ß lxl - Yx2 
(6.2) 
p2 = a2 -0 2x2 - Yxl 
y captures cross-price effects between the competing firms and may be 
interpreted as a measure of product differentiation. By definition we 
require that xl, x2 are substitutes in an oligopoly, hence y>0. 
The products are perfect substitutes when both al = a2 and ßl =ß2a Y" 
In the numerical computations the homoger=m product case 
is for 
convenience treated as ß1=ß2=Y= 1" Absolute demand advantages for 
either firm may be captured in a higher value of ai. 
Writing 
ai - ci = 8i, the duopolists' profit functions are respectively 
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2- 
ýl = 01x1 -ß lXl YXlX2 
2 
and n2 = 02x2 - 02x2 - yxlx2 
(6.3) 
Equilibrium conditions for the social, optimum, pure monopoly and 
various oligopoly solutions are set out in equations (6.4)-(6.10) in 
Table 6.1. The social optimum maximises net surplus: U- (clxl + c2x2)" 
Equilibrium is characterised by marginal-cost pricing by both firms, 
and is the benchmark for subsequent welfare comparisons. In the absence 
of fixed costs equilibrium will result in zero profits being earned. 
The Cournot, Bertrand, and Stackelberg solutions are familiar and 
require no comment. 
Market share maximisation, or the maintenance of a, given market 
share, has been proposed as the way oligopolists will formulate their 
strategy in practice, and casual empiricism lends this view 
plausibility. A true equilibrium must ensure that compatible market 
shares are chosen; i. e. must simultaneously satisfy both the reaction 
functions (6.7). With symmetric cross-price effects, implicit in our 
specification of the utility function, it turns out that market share 
equilibrium coincides with collusive behaviour leading to joint profit 
maximisation. 
2 
Thus, (6.7) are also first-order conditions for. a 
maximum of industry profits: 
2 
'rl + n2 = elxl + 62x2 -0 lx1 -ß 2x2 - 2yxlx2. 
2. See also Bramness (1979)" 
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With a quadratic welfare function the'market share/collusion 
equilibrium will, like pure monopoly, always generate exactly half 
the output rate and three quarters the net surplus obtaining at 
the social optimum, irrespective of demand and cost parameter values. 
Thus, denoting the social optimum outputs by (xi, x2) and comparing 
(6.4) and (6.7), it is obvious that (xi, jx2) solve (6.7). Now at 
the social optimum 
1 
u° = 91x1 + 02x2 - 2(s 1(x1)2 + 2Yxix2 +ß 2(x2)2)" 
Recognising that ni = n2 =0 in equilibrium and substituting 
Alxi =B1 (x, )2 + Yxlx2,62x2 =g 2(x2)2 + Yxlx2 
from (6.3) yields 
u° = 01x1 + e2x2 - 
2(elxi 
+ 02x2) (6.14) 
Obviously 
u° 1 (elXi + e2X2) 
whereas, substituting for xis , xMS from 
(6.12) and (6.13), 
2 22) 
(6.15) UMS =0 2 22 -2 
del 
Xý21 
+0 
1 21 +0 
_ (i - )Uo 
The concept of rational conjectures equilibria 
(RCE) has 
recently been discussed by Ulph (1980), Perry (1982), Bresnahan 
(1981) 
and others. The essential requirement is that, for a rational 
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conjectural equilibriun, each firm's conjectures concerning the 
rival's reactions are correct. In this framework a local RCE implies 
that each firm has effectively predicted the slope of its rival's 
reaction function in the neighbourhood 
öf equilibrium. 
To capture local RCE completely we first obtain general 
reaction functions by differentiating (6.4) and setting to zero: 
av 1/ u1 =01- 
20 1 X1 - YX2 - '(Xlk]. 22 
0 
(6.16) 
awe/axe = e2 - 202X2 - yx1 - yx2k2 =0 
where ki = dxj/dxi as conjectured by firm i. The equilibrium so 
defined uses the notion of 'correct' conjectures to provide 
uniqueness. Suppose firm 2 changes output from its equilibrium value 
by an infinitesimal amount dx2. Then dxl is found from 
(6.16): 
dxl = -Y/ (l+ Ykl) dx2 
Therefore, if firm 2's conjecture is to be correct, we require 
k2 = -Y/(2g1 + Yk1) 
(6.17) 
Similarly, firm i's conjecture must be 
kl = -Y/(262 + Yk2) 
06.18) 
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Equations (6.16) - (6.18) are four equations in four unknowns, 
(x1, . x2, 
k1, k2), so that it is possible to solve for the equilibrium conjectures 
and output. ' Ulph considers both interior and boundary optima; the 
equilibrium conditions (6.8) in Table 6. r1 are for an interior solution 
3 
with positive profit. 
Our dominant firm solution may bethought of as an extension 
of Stackelberg's follower-leader solution concept. Follower j' is thought 
of as the aggregate of a competitive fringe of sellers. Leader i 
maximises 'r. over residual demand (market demand minus fringe supply) 
and costs. Fringe supply is governed by marginal-cost pricing hence 
Tri is maximised subject to dxj/dxi = -Y/Bj" The dominant firm 
is 
distinguished by a Bertrand reaction function, the fringe by a social 
optimum. The outcome may be regarded as quasi rational conjectural 
equilibrium, in that the dominant firm's conjecture is correct while the 
individual fringe suppliers are price takers. 
4 
Inspection of Table 6.1 shows that the extent of product 
differentiation, captured in the parameter y, bears 
importantly on the 
equilibrium outcomes. Thus with homogerpa m products 
(Y=' ß1=ß2=1 
in our case) the Bertrand, RCE and dominant-firm equilibria all converge 
on the social optimum, since (2 
2 /ßlß2) =1 (Bertrand, dominant-firm), -Y 
and 6=0 (RCE) respectively. Conversely, as Y goes to zero and there 
are no cross-price effects (i. e. complete product differentiation) the 
Cournot, Bertrand, RCE and Stackelberg outcomes converge on the market 
share/collusion position; in all cases the reaction functions reduce 
to 
3. For details see Ulph (1980). 
4. Fringe firms assume dpj/dxi =O with p. = p", whereýj is the 
dominant firm and i=1,2, .... n 
is . member of an n firm fringe. 
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el = lxl 
and 02 = 2ß2x2 
rý 
In effect we are no longer dealing with, a duopoly; interaction vanishes' 
as the firms are now monopolists serving disjoint demands. Notice, 
however, that xl and x2 are both positive and the outcome differs 
from the pure monopoly case in table 6.1. This refers to the homogeneous 
products case where only one firm exists. Hence cri is maximised 
subject to xj = 0. Clearly, constraining xj to zero under complete 
product differentiation would involve more than merely that firm i 
has a monopoly. 
Each of the foregoing equilibria is depicted in Figure 6.1. 
R1M1, R2M2 are the familiar Cournot reaction functions. 'Along each firm's 
equilibrium locus marginal cost equals perceived marginal revenue and 
a stable equilibrium exists at-C. R1N1, R2N2 are the social-optimum 
'reaction functions', where respectively firm l's, 2's marginal cost 
equals price. Market share reaction functions are the loci MQ1, M2Q2" 
The market share equilibrium MS at their intersection necessarily 
belongs to the set of efficient profit points: the curve M1M2, which 
is the locus of points of tangency of the duopolists' iso-profit curves. 
As we have seen, MS is also the joint-profit-maximising equilibrium. 
The Stackelberg outcomes Si, S2 occur at points of tangency between its 
iso-profit curve and j's (Cournot) reaction function. Likewise, the 
dominant-firm equilibria may be found as points of tangency between the 
dominant-firm's iso-profit curve and the fringe's socially-optimal 
e 
reaction-function, Dl (D2). In the homogenous products case we could 
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legitimately identify the end-points Ml, M2 of the Cournot reaction.. 
functions as the pure monopoly outcomes for firms 1 and 2 respectively; 
marginal revenue equals marginal cost with x2, xl respectively equal 
to zero. 
5 c 
Bramness (1979) has delimited the area where kinked-demand-curve 
equilibria can arise within the framework we are using. Firm i believes 
that if xi is increased xj will increase equiproportionately, but that 
if xi is decreased, xj will stay unchanged. Then its 'equilibrium 
locus' is the whole zone between its Cournot and market-share reaction 
functions. The intersection of these zones for firms 1 and 2 
covers the whole area where kinked-demand-curve equilibria can arise. 
and is the shaded area in figure 6.1. 
5. Figure 6.1 is not drawn for this case where, as was seen, 
B, RCE, 
Dl and D2 would converge on SO. 
Table 6.1: Alternative Equilibria 
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Model Maximand/Conjectural Variations 
Equilibrium, Conditions 
("Reaction Functions") 
Social Optimum (SO) Max{U - (c1x1 + c2x2)} 01 - ß1x1 + Yx2 
(6º. 4j 
02 - 02x2 + Yxl 
Cournot (C) dxj/dxi ao 01 W 261x1 + Yx2 
(i ¢ j; i, j-1,2) (6.5) 
02 - 202x2 + YxI 
Bertrand (B) dxj/dxi - -Y/Bj 
2 
01 " (2 -ß )1x1 + Yx2 
2 
(i. e. firm i chooses xi 
1 
2 (6: 6) 
assuming xj changes such 02 - (2 - 
c)ß2x2 + Yxl 
2 
that pj is constant) 
1 
Market Share (MS) dxj/dxi m xj/xi 
(i. e. firm i chooses xi 
- 1' 
201x1 + 2yx2 
assuming xj changes propor ( 6'" Z) tionately) 02 -'202 x2+ 2Yx1 
Collusion Max(II1 + II2} 
Rational Conjectures (RCE) Conjectural derivatives are dx2/dx1 " -ßl(1 - a)/y 
endogenous, 
dxl/dx2 .. _02(1 - a)/Y 
(6: 8) 
el - B1(1 + a)xt+ Yx2 
02 - ß2(1 +ß)x2+ Yxl 
with 6- el_f2 /0102 
Stackelberg(i)(Sl, S2) Max I[i s. t. dxj/dxi : Y/28 01 r (2-12/20162)81x1+Yx2 
(i. e. Cournot reaction) 
1(6.9) 
02 - 282x2 + Yxl 
Dominant Firm 
(i)(D1, 
D2) Max IIi s. t. dxj/dxi - -Y/B1 01 - (2-Y2/B1B2)B1x1+Yx2 
(i. e. 'fringe' supply priced 
(6.10) 
y at marginal cost) 02 ' 62x2 + Yx1 
Monopoly(i)(ii)(Ml, M2) Max "IIi s. t. xj -0 x-aii /26 i 
Notes: (i) Equilibrium condition assumes firm 1 'leads'. Similarly for firm 2. 
(ii) Strictly, applies only where products are homogenQOvs (al - (12 , B1 - 62 - Y) 
v 
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Figure 6.1 
x2 
Key: SO Social Optimum 
B Bertrand 
RCE Rational Conjectures 
N2 Equilibrium 
C Cournot 
MS Market Share (Joint 
Profit Maximisation) 
Sl, S2 Stackelberg 
1 Dl, D2 Dominant Firm 
M1, M2 Monopoly 
So ® Kinked-demand-curve equilibria 
-" =" Locus of efficient profit 
points M2 
SfB l ýRCE 
M3 
ý2 
M2 Q2 N1 R2 x1 
xl = output of firm 1 
x2 = output of firm 2 
The outcomes reflect a mildly asymmetric case: - 
see Figure 6.4. 
_ 
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6.3 Welfare Comparisons 
It is now possible to examine the extent of welfare losses in 
duopolistic markets, and how these vary according to 
c 
(i) alternative modes of interaction (conduct), and 
(ii) alternative competitive states (structure) as 
captured in the underlying cost and demand parameters. 
In respect to (ii), and with ultimate antitrust-policy implications in 
mind, we focus in particular on the way welfare losses behave as the 
degree of product differentiation increases (y falls), and as one firm 
enjoys progressively larger cost- or demand-advantages (e. g. c. /cj 
falls or ai/aj increases). As any of these happen, competition 
is 
reduced in some sense, and we would expect an increase in the shortfall 
in welfare from the socially-optimal level. Our interest is in the 
gradient of the relationship between welfare and competition; in whether 
this relationship dominates or is dwarfed by the impact of alternative 
modes of conduct on welfare, for a given competitive state; and 
in 
whether variations in competitiveness bear on different behaviour 
patterns uniformly or differentially, i. e. whether the welfare ranking 
of alternative behavioural outcomes is preserved as the degree of 
competitiveness varies. 
These questions are tackled with the aid of numerical computations. 
For specified parameter values we solve for equilibrium prices, outputs, 
profit, implied elasticities, net surplus (absolute and relative to the 
social optimum) and level of concentration 
(as measured by the Herfindahl 
index. 
6 
This output is also available in graphic form and figures 
6.2 
6. Since H= 1/n + a2 where n is the number of firms 
in the industry, 
the minimum H value in our case is 0.5 
(except under dominant firm 
equilibrium), obtained whenever xl= x2" 
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to 6.4 are examples. The contours of our social welfare function are 
elipses centred on SO, with zero or infinite slope as they intersect' 
the social-optimum reaction functions. All three diagrams have 
y=0.75. Figure 6.2 is for the symmetric case, and so MS, C, RCE, 
B and SO all lie along a ray through the origin with a similar 
ascending order welfare ranking. Figure 6.3 has firm 2 enjoying a 
50 per cent cost advantage. Figure 6.14 feätures mildly asymmetric 
demand and costs. Since products are not 
'homogeneous Ml, M2 cannot be 
considered pure, monopoly outcomes. 
' Otherwise, as we should expect, 
market share (joint profit maximisation) generates least net surplus. 
Dominant-firm equilibria cause least reduction 
in welfare from the 
social optimum, other outcomes tending to cluster 
in-between. 
7. Parameter values are: 
al a2 ßl ß2 Y cl c2 
Fig. 6.2 20 20 110.75 66 
Fig. 6.3 20 20 110.75 63 
Fig. 6.4 20 22 110.75 6 6.6 
The reaction function intersections are depicted by the label for each 
outcome. The figures become unduly cluttered if the reaction functions 
themselves are drawn. 
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Figure 6.2 
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Contours were again drawn by GINO-SURF (1980), the rest of the 
figure by GINO-F. 
al a2 01 ß2Y c1 °2 
20 20 110.75 66 
i 
Additional details about the computer drawn diagrams are given on 
the next page. 
48 12 is 20 
OUTPUT OF FIRM 1 
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Notes for Figures 6.2 - 6.4 
1. The exact coordinates of the conjectural equilibria are to be 
found at the bottom left hand corner of the first character in the 
label: except for single character labels like B where the reaction 
function intersection is central to the space occupied by the 
character. This is the reason why the SO does not appear central to 
the highest contour. 
2. As in Chapter 5 the axis scales are not important. They simply 
represent roughly the original length of each axis at 20 cm. 
Moreover the heights of the contours do not feature because the 
discussion focusses on welfare losses relative to the social 
optimum. 
3. A listing of the program which drew the figures for this Chapter is 
presented in an appendix. 
The graphics software employed was GINO-F and GINO-SURF. 
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Figure 6.3 
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Figure 6.4 
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With eight solution concepts and seven parameters to consider. 
the number of possible permutations is large. However-, not all make 
economic sense. Thus, product homogeneity is implausible where there are 
cost or demand asymmetries, and vice versa. For this would imply' 
non-optimising behaviour by at least one firm or by consumers; if costs 
are asymmetric one or both firms must be inefficient, and if demands 
differ consumer preferences are irrational. On the other hand, where 
there is product differentiation, costs and demand may be either 
symmetric or asymmetric. For differentiation can arise either from both 
firms incurring extra costs to secure customer allegiance, or from one 
firm, doing so., Finally, it could be argued that leader-follower behaviour, 
as under Stackelberg and dominant-firm equilibrium, is plausible only 
where one firm has a cost or demand advantage. Otherwise the assumption 
of leader-follower roles is arbitrary. In addition, we may discount 
Stackelberg and dominant-firm equilibria under which the'leader is at 
a cost or demand disadvantage on grounds of total implausibility. 
In presenting the results we first consider the special-case of 
homogeneous 
v products. . 
We then examine separately the impact on the 
welfare rankings of variations in the degree of differentiation (y) 
cost asymmetry (cl/c2) and demand asymmetry (ai/a2). Although, as we 
have said, not all, of, the implied combinations make sense, it is helpful 
to get some feel for the "partials" of welfare with respect to the 
parameters in this way. Next we consider joint variations in the 
parameters, focussing our attention on what we consider to be the most 
plausible or interesting combinations. In particular, we consider 
cases of low, medium and high product differentiation in conjunction with 
correspondingly low, medium and high degrees of cost disadvantage for 
one firm (firm 2) accompanied by a concomitant demand advantage. This 
is tantamount to extending our analysis to incorporate product quality 
and selling effort as decision variables to the firm, albeit for the 
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special case where an x% cost differential secures the same percentage 
absolute demand advantage. 
Homogeneom Products 
Table 6.2 confirms the earlier analytical result that with 
homogenwas products socially optimal behaviour results not only from 
explicit marginal-cost pricing, but also under Bertrand interaction 
and RCE. 
8 
At the other extreme market share behaviour coincides with 
pure monopoly, as we expect from the theory, generating only half 
the socially optimal output at more than twice the competitive 
price, and the expected monopoly welfare loss of 25 per cent. Cournot 
interaction cuts the monopoly loss to only 11.1 per cent and 
Stackelberg. behaviour to 6.2 per cent. 
Note the perverse relationship between 'market structure' and 
welfare loss. Thus the Herfindahl index fails to distinguish the 
social optimum, Bertrand and RCE, on the one hand, and the market 
share equilibrium on the other, whereas these lie at extreme ends of 
the range of variation in welfare: Furthermore the intermediate 
Cournot and Stackelberg cases are ranked perversely, the latter 
generating little over half the welfare loss of the former, despite a 
more concentrated market structure. Similarly non-discriminating or 
perverse results occurred throughout our analysis. We conclude that 
evidently, and contrary to a strong tradition in industrial organisation, 
conduct matters. 
8. Dominant-firm equilibrium is not reported in Table 
6.2 for the 
reasons given. 
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Product Differentiation 
Table 6.3 confirms the convergence of the Cournot, Bertrand, RCE 
and Stackelberg equilibria on the market- share/collusion outcome. 
Notice that the convergence proceeds quite rapidly as the degree of 
product differentiation increases and y falls from unity. Thus, 
despite their differing starting levels, the Cournot, Bertrand, RCE 
and Stackelberg welfare losses all lie between 18 and 20 per cent of 
the social optimum when y=0.25. At this point the average increase 
in welfare loss for these solutions compared with the homogeneous 
product case is 15.5 per cent. We conclude that the gradient of the 
competitiveness - welfare relationship in this plane is quite steep. 
However, the welfare ranking of the alternative equilibria is 
preserved. Meanwhile the dominant-firm welfare loss also increases as 
y falls, to 12.5 per cent - one half that of other solutions. This 
"simply registers the fact that half the total output produced is 
subject to pure monopoly pricing and half is priced competitively. 
However this result is little more than a curiosum, in the absence of 
the cost asymmetry needed to render the dominant-firm solution concept 
plausible. 
Cost Asymmet 
As expected, where rivalry is reduced due to one'firm having 
lover costs (firm 2 in our examples), relative welfare losses increase 
with the degree of cost advantage (table 
6.4). At high levels of 
product differentiation (low y) the effect is barely perceptible 
(table 6.4(b)). It remains small even where products are relatively 
homogenebus; where y=0.75 (table 6.4(a)) the average percentage 
welfare loss for five meaningful cases (i. e. omitting the social optimum, 
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Table (_p: Price, Output and Welfare: Homogenous Products 
FT 
Model X1 X2 pl p2 t11 n2 
" Welfare 
Index 
(5100) 
HERF 
Social optim 
`--ter--- 
7.0 
r 
6.0 
--ter' 
i'0.9 100.0 0.50 
Cournot 4.7 10.7 2.3 88.9 0.50 
Bertrand. 7.0 6.0 0.9 100.0. 0.50 
Market Share 3.5 13.0 3.7 75.0 0.50 
RCE 7.0 6.0 0.9 100.0 0.50 
i 
Stackelberg(1) 7.0 3.5 9.5 1.4 2.7 -93.8 0.56 
Stackelberg(2) 3.5 7.0 9.5 2.7 1.4 93.8 0.56 
Monopoly(1) 7.04 - 13.0 - 1.9 - 75.0 1.00 
Monopoly(2) - 7.0 - 13.0 - 1.9 75.0 1.00 
Note (i) Assumes al, a2 = 20.0; ßl, ß2 = 1.0; cl, c2 = 6.0 
Table 6t'i: Welfare Indices and the Degree of Product Differentiation (y) 
Model y-}1 y =0.75 y 0.5 y=0.25 y-)- 0 
SO 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
C 88.9 86.8 `- 84.0 80.2 75.0 
B 100.0 96.0 88.9 81.6 75.0 
M 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 
RCE 100.0,92.5 86.6 81.0 75.0 
S1 
93.8 89.3 85.2 80.6 75.0 
S2 
Dl l f (100.0) 96.9 93.7 90.6 87.5 
D2 
Mll j 75.0 (-) (-) 
M2 
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Table 6; 1: Welfare Indices under Cost Asymmetry 7- 
1 
c =6.0; c2 
Model 
6.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 
(a) y-0.75 
SO 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
C 86.8 86.4 85.2 83.6 
B 96.0 95.7 94.9 93.8 
M 75.0" 75.0 75.0 75.0 
RCE 92.5* 92.1 91.1 89.7 
S2 89.3 89.6 89.1 88.0 
D2 96.9 95.2 93.5 91'. 7 
(b) y=0.25 
SO 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
C 80.2 80.2 80.2 80.0 
B 81.6 81.6 81.5 81.4 
M 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 
RCE 81.0 80.9 80.6 80.8 
S2 80.6 80.6 80.6 80.5 
D2 90.6 89.5 88.5 87.6 
Note: Demand symmetric: al, a2 a 20; 01,02 ii cl 6.0 
:. 
.ý 
1 
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M Sl and Dl) is 10.6 per cent with a 50 per cent cost differential, 
compared with 7.7 per cent where there is none. Over this range the 
welfare ranking is substantially unaffected, only Bertrand and D2 
interchanging places, these being very cAose in the original, symmetric 
cost case. In practice we would expect differential costs and diverse 
products to go together; if both firms have access to the same 
technology and are cost minimisers, inter-firm cost differences are 
most likely to be product-related. Hence, where cost asymmetries are 
most likely to be found, their impact on welfare, though adverse, is 
very slight. 
Demand Asymmetry 
A similar conclusion, applies in the case of demand asymmetry. 
Thus, where products are relatively homogen us there is a sharp 
increase in relative welfare loss in all cases (except, of course, 
market share) as firm 2's demand advantage is increased (table 6.5(a)). 
But this is an unlikely state of affairs. More plausible is that a 
marked demand advantage will be associated with highly differential 
products. In this case the impact of demand asymmetry on the indices 
of welfare loss for different types of equilibrium is, with one 
exception, minimal (table 6.5(b)). The exception is dominant firm 
equilibrium, where relative welfare loss almost doubles from 9.9 per cent 
where there is no asymmetry to 17.1 per cent where the dominant firm 
has a 50 per cent absolute demand advantage. Thus the welfare- 
enhancing effect of a competitive fringe, it appears, is much reduced 
where it supplies an inferior product. 
Joint Variation 
Table 6.6 shows what happens when the degree of product 
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Table 6; 5" Welfare Indices under Demand Asymmetry (al a; 
ß1 ° 0) 2 
a =20; a2= 
Model 20 
22 24 26 28 30 
(a) y=0.75 
So 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
C 86.8 85.3 81.8 77.7 73.7 70.2 
B 96.0 94.9 92.4 89.5 86.6 84.1 
M 75.0 75.0 75.0 
/ 75.0 75.0 75.0 
RCE 92.5 91.1 88.0 84.4 80.9 77.7 
S2 89.4 89.1 86.6 83.3 79.8 76.6 
D2 . 96.9 
93.5 90.1 87.2 84.8 83.0 
(b) y=0.25 
SO 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
C 80.3 80.2 79.9 79.6 79.3 78.9 
B 81.6 81.5 81.3 81.0 80.7 00.3 
M 75.0 . 
75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 
RCE 81.0 80.9 80.6 80.3 80.0 79.6 
S2 80.6 80.6 80.4 80.1 79.8 79.5 
D2 90.6 88.5 86.7 85.1 83.7 82.6 
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differentiation varies in the presence of simultaneous, offsetting 
asymmetries in both cost and demand. We focus only on plausible 
combinations: e. g. 'mild' product heterogeneity accompanied by 'modestt 
additional costs and demand advantage, etc. The results in general 
confirm previous conclusions. Thus, scanning any column, we see that 
the type of interactive behaviour in force makes a substantial 
difference to welfare. Average percentage losses over the nine reported 
cases are Cournot 16.8; Bertrand 11.5; Market Share 25.0; RCE 13.7; 
Stackelberg 15.4; and Dominant-Firm. 6.4. Similarly, welfare losses 
are much affected by the degree of product differentiation. Average 
percentage losses across all types of equilibria in 6(a) 6(b) and 
6(c) are 10.0,15.8, and 17.7 respectively. However cost and demand 
asymmetries, in this case across a range of variation appropriate to 
the degree of product heterogeneity, make very little difference, 
again with the exception of the dominant firm case. 
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6.4 Conclusions 
Four principal conclusions emerge from the analysis, subject of 
course to the assumptions underlying this approach: static duopoly 
equilibria with no entry and a specific utility function which rules 
out income effects. 
Firstly, under duopolistic rivalry the particular form of 
oligopolistic interaction exerts a major influence on the level of 
welfare. Conduct matters! In general Dominant Firm equilibria involve 
least welfare loss, usually around one third of the maximum, Market 
Share -. Collusion loss level. The intermediate cases are consistently 
ranked Bertrand, RCE, Stackelberg and Cournot, in ascending order of 
welfare loss, in the range one half to somewhat over two thirds of the 
maximum. 
9 
As we have seen, kinked demand curve equilibria will lie 
between the Cournot and Market Share values. It follows that the 
design and execution of antitrust policies should not focus wholly or 
primarily on structural conditions. Two cases merit special attention. 
First, we have seen that Market share behaviour coincides with 
joint-profit-maximisation and produces the largest welfare loss: 
25 per cent in the case of linear demand. 
10 Under competition law in 
most countries where such policy exists, overt collusion is proscribed. 
However non-competitive, adaptive behaviour does not infringe the law 
unless an agreement can be inferred. The analysis shows that, where 
non-cooperative interaction takes the form of mutual market share 
maximisation, precisely the same outcome will be reached. It thus 
calls into question the existence of a clear distinction in law between 
9. This ranking is also discernible from the computer drawn diagrams. 
10. This is, of course, dependent upon the symmetry of cross price 
effects. 
_ 155 - 
the two cases. In countries like the U. K. and West Germany, where 
competition policy provides for the application of a test of the 
public interest on a case-by-case basis, the analysis suggests that 
e 
evidence of Market Share. interaction should invariably lead to a 
negative finding whether or not an implicit agreement can be inferred. 
Secondly, the computations draw attention to the welfare 
enhancing effect of competition from a competitive fringe. This almost 
invariably" pröduces' less' welfare lb"s`s' than" any bther form of iriiralry, 
and in many' cases the' losses ambient to ' only' ä few percentage points. 
However, the constraining influence of competition from the fringe is 
much weakened where products are heterogeneous. When evaluating 
dominant-firm cases antitrust agencies should therefore pay close 
attention to the cross elasticities of demand between the fringe and 
dominant firm's products. Needless to say they should also be 
careful to ensure that the fringe prices at marginal cost and earns 
zero profit. 
The second conclusion argues that the power of inter-firm rivalry 
to further social welfare is highly sensitive to the degree of product 
differentiation in the market. Where products are homogeneous three 
types of interactive behaviour generate welfare levels equal to the social 
optimum, whereas all but the dominant firm case lead to maximum, 
market share (collusion) losses if there is complete differentiation 
of products. Furthermore, welfare losses increase rapidly as 
product heterogeneity enters. 
ll Antitrust policy and agencies should 
therefore pay close attention to the cross-elasticities of demand between 
rival's products in all cases. 
11. Focussing on relative welfare losses we ignore improvements in 
welfare at the social optimum through increased product 
differentiation and the resource costs, of securing them. 
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Thirdly, over broad ranges, asymmetric cost and demand conditions 
as between rivals generally have little effect on the size of welfare 
losses. The one (dominant firm) exception has already been discussed.. 
Finally, measures of market structure are an unreliable guide to the 
level of welfare in duopoly markets is essentially a corollary of the 
first conclusion. Because conduct matters it cannot be assumed that 
there is a unique or even close relationship between particular 
structural conditions and performance. In particular, measures of 
seller concentration such as the Herfindahl index may either fail to 
distinguish different social outcomes or even rank them perversely. 
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Appendix to Chapter 6 
The use of computer software often requires the knowledge of a 
high level language. In the case of NAG a working knowledge of Fortran 
or Algol is necessary. In the present case the many programs written 
to evaluate the diversity of problems used Fortran. It would be tedious 
to provide a listing of all the programs; so it was decided to present 
only the program used in Chapter 6. A listing is presented below, 
and is based on ICL Fortran, 1966 standard. 
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PROGRAM DUOPLY 
REAL BETA(11,2), GAMMA(11,2), X(11), Y(11), RFL(4), UHAT(11), UCON(6) 
REAL P2(2), BETA1, BETA2, ALPHAI, ALPHA2, GANM, Cl, C2, DT, THETA1, THETA2 
REAL XMAX, YMAX, YP, XPI, XP2, XT(11), YT(11), P1(2) 
INTEGER I, J, K, L, HEADIN(6) 
LOGICAL JUMP 
COMMON/PARAM/ ALPHA1, ALPHA2, BETA1, BETA2, GAMM, Cl, C2, SCALX, SCALY 
EXTERNAL A, PI1, PI2 
DATA HEADIN(1)/4HD*LU/ 
DATA HEADIN(2)/4HOPOL/ 
DATA HEADIN(3)/4HY */ I' 
DATA HEADIN(4)/4HUG*L/ 
DATA HEADIN(5)/4HRAPH/ 
DATA HEADIN(6)/4HICS / 
JUMP=. -TRUE. 
C 
C THIS PROGRAM EXAMINES THE WELFARE RANKINGS OF DIFFERENT 
C DUOPOLY OUTCOMES. 
C 
CALL CC936N 
CALL UNITS(10.0) 
1 READ(5, *, END=160)ALPHA]., ALPHA2, BETA1, BETA2, GAMM, C1, C2 
WRITE(6,150)ALPHAI, ALPHA2, BETA1, BETA2, GAMM, C1, C2 
150 FORMAT(lHO, 7HALPHA1=, F5.2,7RALPHA2=, F5.2,6HBETAI=, F5.2, 
16BETA2=, F5.2,5HGAMM=, F5.2,3HC1=, F5.2,3HC2=, F5.2, ß/) 
THETA1=ALPHAI-Cl 
THETA2=ALPHA2-C2 
RFL(1)=THETAI/BETAT 
RFL(2)=THETA2/GAMM 
RFL(3)=THETAI/GAI1M 
RFL(1)=THETA2/BETA2 
XMAX=0.0 
YMAX=0.0 
DT=SQRT(1.0-(GAMIN! *GAMM)/(BETA1*BETA2)) 
DO 120 1=1,2 
IF(RFL(I). GT. XMAX)XMAX=RFL(I) 
120 CONTINUE 
DO 140 I=3,4 
IF(RFL(I). GT. YMAX)YMAX=RFL(I) 
14+0 CONTINUE 
WRITE(6,800)XMAX, YMAX 
800 FORMAT(2Fl1.6) 
XPHYS=((XMAX-0.0)/(XMAX-0.0))*14.0 
YPHYS=((YMAX-0.0)/(YMAX-0.0))*14.0 
WRITE(6,825)XPHYS, YPHYs 
825 FORMAT(2F11.6) 
SCALX=14.0/XMAX 
SCALY=11+. 0/yi AX 
C 
C SOCIAL OPTIMUM 
C 
BETA(1,1)=BETA1 
BETA(1,2)=BETA2 
GAMMA(1,1)=GAMM 
GAMMA(1,2)=DAMM 
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C 
C COURNOT 
C 
BETA(2,1)=2.0*BETA1 
BETA(2,2)=2.0*BETA2 
GAMMA(2,1)=GAMM 
GAMMA(2,2)=GAMM 
C 
C BERTRAND 
C 
BETA(3,1)=(2.0-GAMM*GAMM/(BETA1*BETA2))*BETA1 
BETA(3,2)=(2.0-GM M*GAMM/(BETA1*BETA2))*BETA2 
GAMMA(3,1) =GANßv2 
GAMv1A(3,2)=GAMM 
C 
C MARKET SHARE 
C 
BETA(4,1)=BETA(2,1) 
BETA(1+, 2)=BETA(2,2) 
GAMMA(4,1)=2.0*GAMM 
GAMMA(4,2)=2.0*GAMM 
C 
C RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS 
BETA(5,1)=2.0*BETA1-BETA1*(1.0-DT) 
BETA(5,2)=2.0*BETA2-BETA2*(1. O-DT) 
GAMMA(5,1)=GAM1M 
GAMMA(5,2)=GAMM 
C 
C STACKELBERG 
C 
C FIRM 1 LEADER 
C 
BETA(6,1)=(2.0-GAMM*GAMM/(2.0*BETA1*BETA2))*BETA1 
BETA(6,2)=2.0*BETA2 
GAMMA(6,1)=GAMM 
GAMMA(6,2)=GAM 
C 
C FIRM 2 LEADER 
C 
BETA(7,1)=2.0*BETA1 
BETA(7,2)=(2.0-GAlM4*GAMM/(2.0*BETA1*BETA2))*BETA2 
GAMMA(7,1)=GANM 
GAMMA(7,2)=GAMM 
C 
C DOMINANT FIRM/COMPETITIVE FRINGE 
C 
C FIRM 1 LEADER 
C 
BETA(8,1)=(2.0-GAMM*GAMM/(BETA1*BETA2))*BETA1 
BETA(8,2)=BETA2 
GAMMA(8,1)=GAMM 
GAMMA(8,2)=GAMM 
C 
C FIRM 2 LEADER 
C 
L 
BETA(9,1)=BETA]. 
BETA(9,2)=(2.0-GAMM*GAM/(BETA1*BETA2))*BETA2 
GAMMA(9,1)=GAMM 
GAMMA(9,2)=GAMM 
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C 
C SETUP GRAPHICAL SPACE 
C 
CALL PICCLE - 
CALL WIND02(0.0,15.0,0.0,15.0) 
C 
C EVALUATE INTERSECTIONS AND CONTOUR HEIGHTS 
C 
X(10)=THETAI/(2.0*BETA1) 
Y(10)=0.0 
X(11)=0.1 
Y(11)=THETA2/(2.0*BETA2) 
DO 80 I=1,11 
IF(I. EQ. 10.0R. I. EQ. 11) GO TO 17 
Y(I)=(GAMMA(I, 2)*THETAI-BETA(I, 1)*THETA2)/(GAMMA(I, 1)* 
1GAMMA(I, 2)-BETA(I, 1)*BETA(I, 2)) 
X(I)=(THETA1-GAMMA(I, 1)+Y(I))/BETA(I, l) 
17 UHAT(I)=ALPHA1*X(I)+ALPHA2*Y(I)-0.5*(BETA1*X(I)*X(I)+2.0*GAMM* 
1X(I)*Y(I)+BETA2*Y(I)*Y(I))-(Cl*X(I)+C2*Y(I) 
IF(I. EQ. 6)Pl(2)=THETA1*X(I)-BETA1*X(I)*X(I)-GAMM*X(I)*Y(I) 
IF(I. EQ. 7)P2(2)=THETA2*Y(I)-BETA2*Y(I)*Y(I)-GAMM*X(I)*Y(I) 
IF(I. EQ. 8)Pl(l)=THETAI*X(I)-BETA1*X(I)*X(I)-GAMM*X(I)*Y(I) 
IF(I. EQ. 9)P2(1)=THETA2*Y(I)-BETA2*Y('I)*Y(I)-GAMM*X(I)*Y(I) 
Y(I)=Y(I)*SCALY 
X(I)=X(I)*SCALY 
WRITE(6,500)X(I), Y(I), UHAT(I), I 
500 FORMAT(lHO, 4HX1. =, F8.4,3X, 4HX2 =, F8.4,3X, 6HUHAT =, F8.4,4X, 2HI=, 12) 
80 CONTINUE 
WRITE(6,550) (Pl(I), P2(I), I=1,2) 
550 FORMAT(1H0,4HP1 -, F8.4,3X, 4HP2 =, F8.4) 
C 
C EVALUATE CONTOUR HEIGHTS FOR FUNCON 
C 
CONTU=0.993*UHAT(1) 
CONTL=0.75*UHAT(1) 
C 
C PLOT SURPLUS CONTOURS 
C 
CALL SETFRA(1) 
CALL LEVELS(CONTL, CONTU) 
CALL FüNCON(O. O, XPHYS, O. O, YPHYS, A, 5,1) 
C 
C LABEL REACTION FUNCTION INTERSECTIONS 
C 
CALL CHASIZ(0.25,0.25) 
DO 90 1=1,11 
CALL CONSPA(X(I), Y(I), XT(I), YT(I)) 
CALL MOVT02(XT(I), YT(. I)) - 
IF(I. EQ. 1)CALL CHAHOL(4HSO*. )_ 
IF(I. EQ. 2)CALL CHACEN(1HC) 
. IF(I. EQ. 3)CALL CHACEN(1HB) 
IF(I. EQ. 4)CALL CHAHOL(4HMS*. ) 
IF(I. EQ. 5)CALL CHAHOL(5HRCE*. ) 
IF(I. EQ. 6)CALL CHAHOL(4HS1*. ) 
IF(I. EQ. 7)CALL CHAHOL(4HS2*, ) 
IF(I. EQ. B)CALL CHAHOL(4HD1*. ) 
IF(I. EQ. 9)CALL CHAHOL(4HD2*. ) 
IF(I. EQ. 10)CALL CHAHOL(4HM1*. ) 
IF(I. EQ. 11)CALL CHAHOL(4HM2*. ) 
90 CONTINUE 
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C 
C. PLOT REACTION FUNCTIONS IF JUMP IS FALSE 
C 
IF(JUMP) GO TO 75 
J=1 
DO 1+0 I=1,5 
X(1)=0. o 
Y(1)=THETAI/GAMMA(I, J)*SCALY 
X(2)=THETAI/BETA(I, J)*SCALX 
Y(2)=0.0 
CALL CONSPA(X(1), Y(1), XT(1), YT(1)) 
CALL MOVTO2(XT(1), YT(1)) 
CALL CONSPA(X(2), Y(2), XT(2), YT(2)) 
CALL LINT02(XT(2), YT(2)) 
1+0 CONTINUE 
J=2 
. DO 50 I=1,5 
x(1)=o. o 
Y(1)=THETA2/BETA(I, J)*SCALY 
X(2)=THETA2/GAMMA(I, J)*SCALX 
Y(2)=0.0 
CALL CONSPA(X(1), Y(1)-, XT(1), YT(1)) 
CALL MOVT02(XT(1), YT(1)) 
CALL CONSPA(X(2), Y(2), XT(2), YT(2)) 
CALL LINT02(XT(2), YT(2)) 
50 CONTINUE 
75 CONTINUE 
C 
C LABEL AXES AND ADD TITLE 
C 
CALL CHASIZ(0.30,0.30) 
CALL CONSPA(3.5, -1.5, X1, Yl) 
CALL MOVT02(X1, Y1) 
CALL CHAHOL(18HOUTPUT OF FIRM 1*. )' 
CALL CONSPA(1.25,3.5, X2, Y2) 
CALL MOVTO2(X2, Y2) 
CALL CHAANG(90.0) 
CALL CHAHOL(18H0UTPUT OF FIRM 2*. ) 
CALL CHAANG(0.0) 
CALL CHASIZ(0.40,0.40) 
CALL CONSPA(2.5,12.5, X3, Y3) 
CALL MOVTO2(X3, Y3) 
CALL CHAARR(HEADIN, 6,4) 
CALL CHASIZ(0.2,0.2) 
XA=0.0 
YA=0.50 
DO 4+5 I=1,12 
IF(I. LT. 7)CALL CONSPA(XA, YA, A1, B1) 
IF(I. EQ. 7)XA=0.0 
IF(I. EQ. 10)YA=0.75 
IF(I. GE. 7)CALL CONSPA(YA, XA, A1, Bl) 
CALL MOVT02(A1, B1) 
IF(I. EQ. 1. OR. I. EQ. 7)CALL CHAHOL(3H0*. ) 
IF(I. EQ. 2. OR. I. EQ. 8)CALL CHAHOL(3H4*. ) 
IF(I. EQ. 3. OR. I. EQ. 9)CALL CHAHOL(3H8*. ) 
IF(I. EQ. 4. OR. I. EQ. 10)CALL CHAHOL(lH12*. ) 
IF(I. EQ. 5. OR. I. EQ. 11)CALL CHAHOL(1+H16*. ) 
IF(I. EQ. 6. OR. I. EQ. 12)CALL CHAHOL(4H2O*. ) 
XA=XA+2.75 
contd/ 
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contd/ 
4+5 CONTINUE 
GO TO 1 
160 CONTINUE 
CALL DEVEND 
STOP 
END 
REAL FUNCTION A(X, Y) 
COMMON/PARAM/ ALPHAI, ALPHA2, BETA]., BETA2, GAMM, C1, C2, SCALX, SCALY. 
X=X/SCALX 
Y=Y/SCALY , A=ALPHAI*X+ALPHA2*Y-0.5*(BETA1. *X*X+2.0*GAMM*X*Y+BETA2*Y*Y) 
1-(C1*X+C2*Y) 
RETURN 
END 
REAL FUNCTION PI1(X, Y) 
COMMON/PARAM/ ALPHAI, ALPHA2, BETA]., BETA2, GAMM, Cl, C2, SCALX, SCALY 
X=X/SCALX 
Y2--Y/SCALY 
PI1--THETA1*X-BETA1*X*X-GAMM*X*Y 
RETURN 
END 
REAL FUNCTION P12(X, Y) 
COMMON/PARAM/ ALPHAI, ALPHA2, BETA1, BETA2, GAIVIM9Cl9C29SCALX, SCALY 
X=X/SCALX 
Y=Y/SCALY 
PI2=THETA2*Y-BETA2*Y*Y-GAMM*X*Y 
RETURN 
END 
- 163 - 
rnnnl,, ai r* 
I 
The main aim of this thesis has been to demonstrate the scope of 
an alternative method to quantify relevant features of microeconomic 
models, which were not suitable for conventional statistical approaches. 
The methodology reflects numerical analysis procedures, which have been 
given an 'easy to use' status through the growth in computer software, 
in particular, the advance of the Numerical Algorithms Group (NAG, 1981) 
library of programme subroutines. The NAG development was conscious 
of the importance of portability, so the library is'available at most 
university computer sites. 
The demonstration took the form of a number of alternative 
applications across, a wide spectrum of microeconomic models. The lack 
of a statistical basis made the interpretation of the results rather 
more tentative, but in no way invalidated them. A fairly general 
synopsis may help to justify this position. The second chapter explored 
the likelihood of single price equilibria in a world of imperfect 
information. It would appear that the single price outcome is the 
exception rather than the rule. For example, in a framework of 
monopolistic competition where no individuals have zero search costs, 
the proportion of the market induced to search must be substantially 
uninfluenced by considerable price dispersion. The third chapter 
advertised the versatility of the NAG routine E04UAF in solving complex 
optimum tax problems. The shape of optimum tax schedules took on new 
dimensions where optimum negative marginal tax rates were found to be 
no longer a curiosity. Of key significance are the general equilibrium 
* The diversity of economic subject matter warranted a concluding section 
to each chapter. The reader is referred back for specific details 
of the different analyses. 
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interrelationships of labour supplies and wage rates when the latter 
are endogenous. 
The fourth chapter examined a partially unionised labour market 
model of a closed economy which yielded ambiguous theoretical results 
about the link between union and non-union wage rates. Numerical 
computations suggested that an inverse relationship would receive most 
support. The fifth chapter discussed some aspects of the excess 
i 
capacity debate peculiar to the monopolistic competition literature. 
A computational appraisal made it clear that the issue of the optimum 
number of products depended upon the complex interactions of firms, 
demands and costs. There is no longer support for the view that excess 
capacity is simply too many products. Cases with too few products in 
relation to the social optimum were not hard to compute for reasonable 
demand and cost conditions. The final chapter suggested a framework 
for including all manner of duopoly equilibria under a specific social 
welfare function. This enabled the examination of the structure-conduct- 
performance paradigm where structure is endogenous and the relative 
welfare position of each duopoly outcome can be assessed. It was 
apparent that the oft postulated structure-performance relationship was 
tenuous: conduct does matter. Chapters 5 and 6 also illustrated the 
scope for computer graphics in the presentation of results. This may be 
of more pedagogic value. 
Finally, it shotld be stressed that the NAG library circumvents 
any need for a specialism in either numerical analysis or computer 
programming. However any use of NAG in its present form does require 
knowledge of a high-level computer language like Fortran or Algol 60. 
This is not so difficult, as there are many ways to write a programme. 
An experienced programmer would have written a rather different version 
- 165 - 
1 
0 f'the listing presented in the appendix to Chapter 6. This is of' 
little consequence when most of the programme run time is spent within 
the graphics software. 
c 
It may now be appropriate to 'indicate my belief that computational 
methods provide an additional quantitative tool for the microeconomist 
and can offer useful insights into microeconomic problems. 
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